

NORTH-AFRICAN IMMIGRATION TO FRANCE:  
ECONOMIC BOON OR BURDEN?

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ABSTRACT  
NORTH-AFRICAN IMMIGRATION TO FRANCE: Economic Benefit or Burden?

Over the past several years, France has had a steadily increasing immigrant population. Most of these immigrants come from fellow European nations, but North-Africans follow closely behind as the second largest group of French immigrants. The ever-increasing Maghrebian population in urban areas has caused hostility from French natives as social unrest rises in response to the European sovereign debt crisis of 2008. The goal of this thesis is two-fold. First, it aims to show the growing intolerance that North-Africans are experiencing in French society. And second, it will examine the consequences of North-African immigration on the labor market outcomes of the French natives in an attempt to reveal that the present level of intolerance is unwarranted at least under economic premises.

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## **INTRODUCTION:**

Americans have many stereotypes about the French. We tend to conjure an image of someone wearing a black and white striped shirt along with a red beret, holding a cigarette in one hand while three baguettes rest under the arm, standing bored in front of the Eiffel Tower murmuring about the advantages of socialism and liberal thought. In the spring of 2013, I spent a semester abroad from my native United States to study in Angers, France, and I got to learn more about these stereotypes first-hand. The baguettes proved especially true, but the stereotype of leftist idealism pervading the French public opinion was shown to be a grave misconception for me.

The reality of the very divisive French political arena made itself known to me at dinner one evening with my girlfriend, her roommates, and their host mother when our hostess off-handedly asked us our opinions of the Iraq War. I didn't give the question too much thought, but afterward she began to speak very openly about her utter dislike of Arabs. She claimed that Arabs were "un parasite" on the true Frenchmen by stealing their social benefits and that Islam would be the death of their culture. I was stunned that she was willing to so openly berate an entire group of people. But I was appalled when I learned over the course of that semester that many amongst the French share her opinion of Arabs and their culture.

Racism has been a very serious issue culturally for me throughout my life. I was born and raised in the South. It's a subject that's ingrained into the history of the region.

Finding that a rather large group of Frenchmen holds a sentiment that so negatively reflects and stereotypes my own home weighed heavily upon me. Thus, I aim to expose the fruitlessness of this sort of racism by proving that North-Africans are economically beneficial for France and not the burden that anti-immigration French believe. I will focus specifically on North-Africans because they are the group of French Arabs most affected by this intolerance, as will be shown in chapter one.

The history of North-African immigration to France begins at the end of World War II. With a desperate need for a stronger working force to rebuild the economy during the post-war period, France opened its borders and greatly relaxed immigration laws to allow for a larger working force. Many peoples from less developed nations began to take up these opportunities in France. Some of the most important nations of immigrants to France came from North-Africa just before the end of imperialist conquests. From 1945-1974, four out of every five Maghrebian immigrants were granted refugee status because of the on-going conflicts throughout the area, particularly in Algeria. And in the case of Algeria, once the Algerian War of Independence ended, from 1962 to 1975 the number of Algerian immigrants in France increased from 350,000 to 700,000 (Deux Siècles d'histoire). And that number has only continued to grow.

It's not difficult to understand why North-Africans have immigrated over the past half century. Generally speaking, France has more opportunities, better jobs, and some of the best health care in the world, especially in comparison to most of the developing world (World Health Organization 2010). All legal residents are covered under France's nationalized health insurance. Also, health insurance is free until age 20 for students, and education is free until the university level— at which point it is heavily subsidized by the

government anyway. So even if immigrants can't become legalized citizens and must live as sans papiers, there are obvious advantages to moving to France. But, as this thesis will show, the French have become very unwelcoming especially after the global economic crisis. Despite the social burden that immigrants may pose, this thesis will prove that they are actually providing an economic gain for the French labor market.

To accomplish this goal, chapter one reveals the intolerance and prejudice towards Arabs that has begun to become very apparent in French public discourse. The chapter opens by examining current events and recent, political scandals involving immigrants in the French media before moving the discussion to racist remarks from specific public officials. Then the focus narrows onto French racism targeted specifically at the North-African and Muslim populations.

Chapter two examines the history of France's relations with the each of the nations of the Maghreb in order to better explain why these intolerant sentiments have grown over the past several years. By studying the histories of the relationships between France and the three North-African nations that have had the biggest impact on France's immigrant population (Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia respectively), this thesis shows how past historical conflict has continued to manifest in present intolerance.

In chapter three, this thesis will discuss a brief history of the scholarly study of the effects of immigration on the labor market, including the evolution of the particular models for testing these effects. This will provide a foundation to present the model that this study will utilize.

And chapter four will closely follow a model developed by Anthony Edo, who analyzed the effects of the total immigrant population on the French labor market. With



his work, this thesis will be able to adjust his model to analyze the effects of the exclusively Maghrebian population of immigrants on the wages and employment levels of natives over the course of several years across multiple education and skill groups.

The results of these findings will be reported in the final conclusive chapter. Possibilities for improvements on the model will also be given. Lastly, policy recommendations will be given based on the findings of how North-African immigration affects the French economy.

## **CHAPTER I: Contemporary Views of the Maghreb in France**

After the recent scandal concerning the far-right paper *Minute* comparing Guyanese-born Justice Minister Christiane Taubira to a monkey, race has once again become a subject of considerable debate for the French. In October of 2013, Anne-Sophie Leclere, formerly the Front National's mayoral candidate in Rethel, called Taubira a monkey on television and claimed she would prefer to see the Justice Minister "in a tree swinging from the branches rather than in government." Additionally, Leclere posted a picture to her Facebook with "before and after" photos that, once again, likened Taubira to a monkey (Jespersen). Leclere was dropped from the party's nomination, but her actions represent the ever-present racism currently in the rhetoric of the right-wing parties of France.

This surmounting and overt racism is manifesting despite the Front National's leader Marine Le Pen's attempts to separate her party from its historical image of racial intolerance. And other public figures have stepped forward with personal attacks on the Justice Minister, such as Eric Zemmour, a radio commentator who accused Taubira of being prejudiced against white men (*The Telegraph*). Taubira responded to the remarks by saying, "We know what the Front National thinks: the blacks in the branches of trees, Arabs in the sea, homosexuals in the Seine, Jews in the ovens and so on," (Jespersen). Taubira may be South American, but the verbal attacks she has garnered from far-right political groups has revealed a trend towards xenophobia and outright racism amongst the

French people. And, over the past three years, a considerable amount of this anger has been directed at the North-African, Muslim population of France. Through statistical evidence of France's growing dislike of people from different backgrounds and through comments made from political figures, one can easily see a developing trend toward North-African, Islamophobia in France.

First, it is important to note that the French often associate race with immigration. Though, many foreigners have spent their entire lives in France, if a person does not adapt to the French way of life, he or she will continue to be considered a foreigner (un étranger). This is why the media often directs attention of acts of both racism and xenophobia to the same source. But this racism takes on a different form in France as it is often coupled with religious intolerance. North-Africans are not merely an immigrant or racial group; they are a religious group as well. For instance, the three countries examined in this study (Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia) each have over 98 percent of their populations subscribing to Islam (Pew Research Center).

And this also explains why North-Africans are viewed so unfavorably in France—Islam is seen as “un-French.” Joan Wallach Scott in her book *The Politics of the Veil* argues that the French believed someone of any culture could become French, but the inherent logic was that they would abandon their “inferior” culture (Stille). So to adapt, foreigners must be willing to forego their non-Christian religions, which many immigrants are unwilling to do. The Muslim community in particular has thus been seen as outsiders to the native French, who feel that the lack of integration into French society is a sign of isolationist communitarianism, and this has sparked criticism of the North-Africans and Muslims in France (Hamilton).

To be more specific, one can look at the statistics of French people's feeling toward racism. The National Commission for the Rights of Man (C.N.C.D.H.), which has been charged by the French parliament to monitor incidents of racism in France, noted a 23 percent increase in incidents of racism, Islamophobia, and anti-Semitism from 2012 to 2013, and a five-fold increase over the past twenty years. And according to a poll by the C.N.C.D.H., 29 percent of French people consider themselves at least "a little racist," with another seven percent claiming they are "rather racist." Only 44 percent stated they were "not at all racist," (Stille). And of the forty-four who claimed they were not racist, many of them might either be lying to the poll or not realize they have racist tendencies.

Furthermore, to cite feelings of racism that target the French Muslim population, "A poll by the BVA institution for two anti-discrimination groups found... 28 per cent [of Frenchmen] think that Arabs are more likely to commit crimes than members of other ethnic groups, a number that has more than doubled since a similar poll was conducted last year," (*The Telegraph*). Also, the magazine *Valeurs Actuelles* showed that fewer French people believe immigration is a good thing, with the percent in 2013 being only 37 percent compared to 49 percent in 2007 (Bohlen). Overall, the French agree that racism has become more pronounced in France today. According to a survey carried out by polling agency OpinionWay, a French polling and market research company, 59 percent of French people believe that racism has increased in France. And 68 percent believe it is more difficult to be a Muslim in France in 2013, (Jeanbart)

Finally, a survey carried out by the polling institute Ipsos and the Jean-Jaures Foundation, found that 70 percent of the French population "believe there are too many

foreigners living in the country and 74 percent believe Islam is not compatible with French society.” Additionally “46 percent believe unemployment levels can only be cut by reducing immigration,” (McPartland Jan. 2013). So there is very evident proof of growing resentment towards foreigners throughout France. But the statistics are not the only proof of this recent antipathy.

These statistics have started manifesting themselves in the public’s actions towards Muslim immigrants. The Committee against Islamophobia (CCIF) claimed that attacks against Muslims rose to 469 from 298 between 2011 and 2012; the attacks on mosques doubled to 40 in 2012 (*RT News*). One example of these acts occurred in the summer of 2013 when a French soldier was arrested for planning a terrorist attack on a mosque. In response, Kamel Kabtane, a French Muslim leader, spoke out against the “climate of Islamophobia” in France, citing a recent study which revealed that racist attacks had risen 60 percent overall, and according to Kabtane this increase in attacks is due to government inaction (*RT News*).

One of the first significant attacks on Muslims occurred in September of 2012 when a group of about 70 young people calling themselves Generation Identity stormed a newly built mosque in Poitiers, France, to protest the supposed growth of Islam’s influence in their country. The group hung a banner from the top of the mosque saying “732 Generation Identity.” The number 732 is a reference to the year Charles Martel stopped the invading Muslim army in Poitiers. The group’s website states, “We do not want more immigration from outside Europe or new mosque construction on French soil.” The Muslim leader Kabtane stated that the government was inactive in uprooting

the sources of racism in France, and as proof, only four arrests were made from the attack on the Mosque (McPartland Oct 2012).

Not all attacks against Muslims are overt, however. Muslims have become highly discriminated against in the French job-market. A French study by Claire Adida revealed that a fictional job application with a traditionally Christian name was over two-and-a-half times more likely to receive a response from a potential French employer than an equally qualified applicant with a Muslim name (*Engage*).

And more recently, on November 19<sup>th</sup>, 2013, the Grande Mosquée de Paris was spray-painted with anti-Islamic slogans. This follows a similar event earlier in November where two mosques in Besançon were similarly marked (Schmid). And two weeks prior to the spray-painting in Besançon, a mosque in Carpentras had roughly thirty meters of the exterior wall covered in phrases such as, “Arabs Out!” and “France for the French!” And in Lesparre-Médoc during the summer of 2012, two men painted swastikas on the outer walls of the local mosque (AFP).

Attacks on Muslim women have also increased significantly since the start of 2013. There have been a total of 14 acts of physical violence against women who were wearing a head covering in the Parisian suburbs of Argenteuil, Trappes, and Reims. One of these attacks led to a 19-year-old Muslim girl having a miscarriage. No arrests have been made for these attacks (Schmid).

Marwan Muhammad from the Collective against Islamophobia in France summarized the recent assault on Islam in France, stating, “Muslims are being stigmatized and presented as a problem in France... Negative signals are being sent out by politicians, including those on the left and this helps to empower people to take

action,” (McPartland, Feb. 2013). The problem is not solely for Muslims. Politicians have begun to lambast all foreigners.

The Roma, in particular, have been at the center of a very divisive political discussion for the past several months. Nathalie Kosciusko-Morizet, a Paris mayoral candidate of the UMP, claimed that Roma harassed the public and raised the crime rate (*The Telegraph*). Interior Minister Manuel Valls has continued former President Sarkozy’s high controversial policies of closing down illegal Roma encampments and expediting the Roma back to Romania and Bulgaria. He has described the Roma way of life as “extremely different from ours,” and claimed Roma people who could not integrate and that those who were not working should be “delivered back to the borders,” a policy which is in direct conflict with France’s commitment of the free movement of people throughout the European Union, as stated in a conference by the EU Commissioner Viviane Reding (Diffley). Additionally, in late 2013 the group MRAP (Mouvement contre le racisme et pour l’amitié entre les peuples) claimed they will be suing Valls for making the claim that most Roma do not want to be integrated into French society (Cross).

The most shocking aspect of this racism from Interior Minister Valls is that his public approval rating is at a tremendous 70-80 percent, whereas President Hollande is only at 20-25 percent (Diffley). Many journalists have stated that Hollande’s record-low approval has prevented him from taking action against the racism in France.

Abdallah Zekri, the president of the National Observatory of Islamophobia in France believes the proliferation of anti-Muslim sentiment can be attributed to the “resurgence of the far right.” One example of this resurgence is the percentage of the

Presidential vote that Marine Le Pen, leader of the historically xenophobic National Front took in 2012—17.9 percent (*France 24* Nov. 2012). And Le Pen has had quite racist remarks in recent history. For instance, she compared the act of Muslims praying in the streets to the same type of oppression experienced during the Nazi occupation of France (Heneghan). And during the 2012 Presidential election, Marine Le Pen claimed it would soon be “impossible to buy anything other than halal meat in France.” But the National Front is not the only political party that has been very boisterous in its remarks towards Muslims.

Jean-François Copé, a competitor in the race for leadership in Sarkozy’s party, the UMP, has recently adopted the xenophobic platform as well. He “claimed that Muslim children stole chocolate pastries from non-Muslim classmates to keep them from eating at school during Ramadan,” (Heneghan). And recently, he has victimized the white population of France by saying that “anti-white racism” is spreading throughout France, as Muslims begin to change the French way of life. The National Front condemned Copé’s use of the phrase but because he is attempting to steal support from their party and co-opt their political stances, but the party had quarrel with the sentiments of reverse-racism.

Thus, discrimination against North-Africans and Muslims has become an apparent issue, but is the discrimination warranted? From a sociological or humanitarian standpoint, the answer is obviously “no,” but the French are very worried about the cultural impact that this minority group may have on their way of life. On November 6, the newspaper *Le Parisien* featured the headline “La France devient-elle raciste?” The



newspaper went on to cite globalization, a national identity crisis, and the economic crisis as the major factors for this increase in racism (Jespersen).

There are two distinct issues at play here. First, many French believe that immigrants, particularly Arabic immigrants, are ruining the collective French culture and national identity. Second, many French believe that immigrants hurt the French economy because they are taking jobs from the native population. This thesis will focus solely on the latter issue. While there is certainly room in academia for study on the former issue, the difficulty in quantifying cultural shifts due to an increase in the immigrant population implies that any attained results should be viewed skeptically. By examining strictly the economic impacts of immigrants, one may be able to draw more conclusive results and allow for greater policy implications. Thus, by examining strictly the economic impacts of North-African immigration on the French labor market, this thesis aims to show that the immigrants seeking social protections under the French government is a boon for the struggling economy and not the burden that many have claimed it to be. But to understand the current importance of the North-African population, it is important to know the history of North-African immigration to France.

## **CHAPTER II: History of North-African Immigration to France**

As shown in the previous chapter, the French have a growing aversion to North-Africans. But from where does this dislike stem? To understand why French have begun to look unfavorably on immigration from the Maghreb, it is important to understand the history of France's relationships with the region. Furthermore, it is important to break down the sections of the Maghreb on which this study will focus. Generally, the Maghreb is described as consisting of five nations: (from west to east) Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya. According to INED, in 2008 the two countries with the largest percentage of first and second-generation immigrants in France were Algeria and Morocco with 14.3 percent and 11.0 percent respectively. Tunisia is also significant with 4.4 percent of the immigrant population. Libya and Mauritania, however, are both below the top 25 on the list of nations with immigration to France; thus, they are statistically insignificant for this study.

Thus these three nations will be the area of focus for examining immigration rates for the model in chapter four. The histories of France's relations with Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco are generally viewed negatively because of the many years of conflict and the historical connotations of imperialism. But by studying these relationships throughout history one can see a possible explanation as to why there is a growing population of French natives who are opposed to an increase in immigration from the Maghreb.

## **ALGERIA**

The beginnings of relations between France and Algeria were very combative. Throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the French struggled with piracy from the North-African, Ottoman territory. A century of peace developed after a treaty was signed in 1690, but this peace ended with the French conquest of Algeria between 1830 and 1847 (Abun-Nasr 27).

The event that sparked the conquest is referred to as the Fly Whisk Incident (or the Fan Affair) of 1827. France agreed to buy wheat from Algeria through two specific merchants in the late eighteenth century. When Algerian officials pressed the two merchants to pay their debt for the wheat, they claimed that the French government had purchased the wheat on credit; thus, they would be unable to pay the Algerian government until the French officials paid off their debt to the two men. The French Consul, Pierre Deval then told the Algerian government that France had never agreed to any arrangement with the merchants and that the French government had already paid for the wheat. Believing that the Consul was in collusion with the two merchants, one of the leaders of the Algerian government struck Deval with his fly whisk (Abun-Nasr 47). As a response, Charles X began a naval blockade against Algiers. Upon demanding that a meeting be held between the two nations in France, Algerian leaders began firing cannons against the blockade ships.

The blockades proved unsuccessful, as the pirates were able to navigate the shorelines with ease to continue their trade, while the French merchants were unable to continue trade with one of the largest cities in North-Africa. Thus, on June 14<sup>th</sup> of 1830,

King Charles X began the conquest of Algeria by sending over 30,000 naval troops to Sidi Ferruch where there was little opposition to the attack initially. Once French siege weapons arrived on June 28, attacks on Algiers began. The French entered Algiers on July 5<sup>th</sup>. France officially annexed the occupied regions of Algeria in on June 22, 1834, claiming the nation as a colony despite continual resistance and pressure from the native population (Horne 49).

In 1836, Abd al-Qādir and his Algerian tribesmen engaged in military warfare against the French General Thomas Robert Bugeaud in the Battle of Sikkak. The Algerian leader suffered heavy casualties and thereafter used almost exclusively guerilla-warfare to confront the French forces. The Treaty of Tafna in 1837 granted al-Qādir all the inland territories of Algeria, but when the French forces moved on Constantine in 1839, al-Qādir claimed that the treaty had been breached and continued his attacks. In response, Bugeaud implemented a scorched-earth strategy that decimated al-Qādir's forces. Having been defeated, the Algerian leader fled to Morocco. And when the bordering nation refused to surrender al-Qādir to French forces, the First Franco-Moroccan War of 1844 began (Horne 52-54).

By 1848, France had conquered nearly all of northern Algeria. The Constitution of 1848 under the Second Republic changed Algeria's status from a colony to a French department with three civil territories in Alger, Oran, and Constantine. One of the reasons for this change was that the number of European immigrants to Algeria grew significantly throughout the conquest (Grandmaison 207). In 1858, Napoleon III halted the settlement expansion, fearing that the North-African natives would cause an uprising out of fear from the increasing French population. The distinctive separation of the

French immigrants and the natives would become increasingly important in the history of the two nations.

After Napoleon III's defeat to the Prussians, the Second Empire fell including the Emperor's plans for Algeria. The new Algerian immigrants quickly began expanding out into the tribal regions. Many of the Frenchmen from the areas conceded to the Prussians moved to the newly available territories in North-Africa, doubling the total number of settlers. Once again, this expansion was met with hostility. A revolt occurred in 1871 when the French refused to remunerate the Algerians for the grain supply for which the previous military regime had bargained, but the natives were defeated and severely punished with greater land confiscations and military order being issued that removed due process from non-Frenchmen (Horne 57-78).

The status quo of growing French imperialistic power remained in place for several decades until World War II when France allowed French Algerians to join the military on the mainland. After the war, under the Fourth republic, Algerians clamored for equal voting rights between Muslims and non-Muslims. The Sétif Massacre of 1945 also incited Algerian Muslims: French police fired on Muslim protestors, who responded by killing 100 French civilians; the French military then killed thousands of Algerians over the next few days (Aussaresses 113). The event was a precursor to the Algerian War of Independence that would begin one decade later.

Algerian War was a series of conflicts that lasted from 1954 to 1962. The war began when the National Liberation Front (FLN) attacked French civilians and soldiers on November 1. However, the French did not realize the severity of the FLN's pro-independence claims until August of 1955 when the FLN brutally killed French civilians

in the Battle of Philippeville (Galula and Hoffman 62). The French forces retaliated, killing over 1,000 Muslims. On September 30<sup>th</sup> of the following year, after the FLN called for rebels to use terrorist tactics against the French, three bombs were placed in civilian locations in Algiers. These acts of terrorism were met with the implementation of a curfew in Algiers and the torture of Muslim civilians by the military. With political turmoil on the home front under President de Gaulle, France hosted the 1961 referendum, which revealed that the majority of Frenchmen and Algerians supported Algerian self-determination (Branche, Thénault, Albert 94). During this period of cease-fire a vigilante French militia, the Secret Army Organization (OAS), began some of the most atrocious acts of the war-period, with an average of 120 bombings per day in March of 1961 (Windrow 542). The Évian Accords came into effect on March 18<sup>th</sup>, 1962, granting Algerian Independence. The war of independence was a victory for the Algerians but a moral loss for humanity with both sides committing countless atrocities: murdering, kidnapping, raping, mutilating, bombing, and especially the targeting of civilians (including women and children).

The relationship between the French and the Algerians was not always gruesome. The two nations traded throughout these periods and continue to do so in modern times (Ruedy 164), but the history of violence between the two is almost certainly ingrained in the minds of the Frenchmen who oppose the immigration of North-Africans. In 2005, the UMP passed the French Law on Colonialism which dictated that public schools in France must teach the positive effects of colonialism in an attempt to diminish the negative view the nation holds for their struggles as an imperial power. The law was repealed one year

later, but the passing of it at all reveals a disapproving outlook on the history of French colonialism.

## **TUNISIA**

Fifty years after the beginning of the French conquest of Algeria, France began spreading its North-African empire into Tunisia. After the Ottoman's defeat at the hands of Russia, the Congress of Berlin was held in 1878 to determine how the imperial powers would split territory in the Middle East. France was given Tunisia as part of this agreement. When Tunisian natives responded by raiding northern French Algeria in 1881, France rapidly went on the offensive, sending over 30,000 troops to claim the territory. On May 12<sup>th</sup>, 1881, the Treaty of Bardo was signed to formalize the protectorate status of Tunisia under French control. As a protectorate the Tunisian leaders remained in office, but the French Resident-General soon garnered all the authority on political matters (Langer 56-58, 269).

Unlike Algeria, France's relationship with Tunisia was rather peaceful. This can be attributed in part to Tunisia's small stature as a nation. It did not have a vast countryside to hide rebels or a population large enough to form an insurgency. So, generally, the Tunisians complied with French demands. This was especially true during World War II, where even the independence leader Habib Bourguiba compelled Tunisian natives to comply with the French government for fear that Tunisia would be captured by Nazi Germany or Fascist Italy (Cohen 54).

Violence did break out for a short period in 1952, when a group of Tunisian nationalists used guerilla tactics against several French units, such as planting bombs on colonial facilities. These attacks were the product of growing tension as Morocco was

granted independence and the Algerian War of Independence was beginning. The French government attempted to grant a small amount of authority to local, Tunisian officials, but the gesture was seen as too little by the Tunisians and too much by the French Tunisians, creating unrest until the French government eventually relented and granted independence on March 20<sup>th</sup>, 1956 (Andrew and Kanya-Forstner 314).

## **MOROCCO**

Beginning in the early seventeenth century, France and Morocco had generally amicable relations. Pirates were an issue, like in Algeria, but the two regions had Spain as a common enemy, so Louis XIV supported Morocco. But, after having begun to occupy Algeria and Tunisia, France began to look at Morocco as a potential protectorate (Ling 44). The First Franco-Moroccan War took place in 1844, when the North-African nation chose to shelter Abd al-Qādir as mentioned previously instead of relinquishing him to French authorities. France conducted a naval battle, beginning with the Bombardment of Tangiers. Shortly after, France was successful in the land confrontation named the Battle of Isly against an organized Moroccan force. And the war concluded with the Bombardment of Mogador, another French victory won by the naval fleet (Burke 82). The Treaty of Tangiers, in which Morocco formally recognized French Algeria, formally ended the war on September 10<sup>th</sup>, 1844. Additionally, the treaty made Abd al-Qādir an official outlaw in Morocco. Abd al-Qādir surrendered to French forces in December of 1847 (Burke 97).

In 1911, Germany provoked the Moroccan forces, in an attempt to gain allies against France in the approaching war. Moroccan forces attempted to siege the French city of Fez in what became known as the Second Moroccan Crisis. The siege lasted one



month, at which time the French were able to defeat the Moroccans. In the following year, the Sultan Abdelhafid was forced to sign the Treaty of Fez, which declared Morocco a French protectorate. One month later, in opposition to the treaty, Moroccan forces attempted to mutiny the Fez garrison, but they were unsuccessful. In September of 1912, France continued to lay claims to Morocco by winning the Battle of Sidi Bou Othman and gaining Marrakesh as a base in southern Morocco (Porch 156).

In an attempt to instate a more acquiescent Moroccan leadership, France exiled the Sultan Mohammed V to Madagascar in 1954 and replaced him with Mohammed Ben Aarafa. This sparked great controversy and opposition amongst the natives, who reacted by increasing violence towards French colonials. In November of 1955, Mohammed V was returned to power and three months later France negotiated Moroccan independence (Gershovich 27).

Although France has been one of the most important trade partners with these three nations for the past century, France's history in North-Africa is generally depicted as long and bloody. Violence and resistance characterize nearly every period of North-African colonialism. Incorporation of the French identity (a "Frenchness") is important in the French view of immigration, as the issue is seen as paramount to maintaining a collective culture and identity (Kuisel). Throughout history, despite many attempts to force North-Africa to adopt the French way of life, France's efforts have always been resisted, usually with hostility. Perhaps the French feel that this has been true on the home front in the past few decades. In Algeria, natives could adopt French citizenship, but to do so they had to, in a way, denounce Islam (Julien, Andre, and Le Tourneau 38). Algerians were allowed to continue practicing Islam, but subjection to French law which

forbids open practice of religion was seen by the Islamic community as a betrayal and abandonment of their faith; thus, many Muslims once again had opposing views with the French.

During the reconstruction period after the Second World War, France needed labor to help rebuild what the war had destroyed; therefore, the French allowed for a great number of immigrants to enter the country (Priestley 78). The end of the Algerian War of Independence created entire Algerian communities in southern France. But these groups were, once again, met with violent resistance. The Paris Massacre of October 1961 occurred when the Parisian police attacked a group of pro-FLN Algerians who were hosting a demonstration (Wilson 191). Regardless of opposition to these groups, immigrants from North-Africa continued to arrive in France seeking jobs. And this influx of immigrants has continued throughout the post-war decades. Second and third generation immigrants have continued to experience hardships and intolerance from the French, but until the past decade, the French did not consider North-Africans a particularly dire threat to their own national identity. But, as the last chapter showed, modern racism against North-Africans has become a critical issue—one that is particularly important in light of the historical conflicts between the French and the Maghreb.


### **CHAPTER III: Scholarly Research on the Impacts of Immigration**

There are many reasons people choose to emigrate from one country to another: demography, family, society, politics, geopolitics, etc. Regardless of the reasons, immigration has become an increasingly pressing issue since the end of World War II. Scholars have tried for decades to measure the effects of these movements of peoples in terms of their cultural, social, and economic impacts. As shown in the previous chapters, France has a combative history with the nations of the Maghreb, and the consequences of emigration to France from this region have become very visible in the media. Attacks against the Maghrebian French population have steadily grown over the last few years, indicating an opposition to the immigrant population. While this paper will not delve into the cultural opposition that the French seem to have towards North-Africans, it will examine the possible economic reasons behind the growing antagonism. To quote one of the leading researchers in this field of study, George Borjas, “Three central questions have dominated much of the research: What is the contribution of immigration to the skill endowment of the workforce? How do the employment opportunities of native workers respond to immigration? And, who benefits and who loses?” (Borjas 2006, pg. 1).

Before one can understand how modern scholars examine the effects of immigration on a specific geographical location, it is important to have a conception of the basic economics that have greatly influenced the way most studies are conducted. In

the simple model, there is one type of laborer who produces one specific good. According to the basic laws of supply and demand, the laborers wage is dependent upon how many workers are in the market. When the labor market is saturated, employers will pay lower wages for each additional worker; likewise, when there are few workers in the market, employers will pay higher wages for the labor (Zaretsky 5).

**Graph 1: Basic Wage and Supply**



In Table 1 above, the x-axis represents the total number of unskilled workers ( $s$ ) in the labor market. The y-axis represents the wage ( $w$ ) that each of these workers receives. Point A is a hypothetical maximum wage value that can be attained when there are zero unskilled workers at the equilibrium market level. Point D is the hypothetical, maximum number of unskilled workers that could be in the market. Point B is the

equilibrium point in the market; this is the point where the most workers ( $s$ ) are willing to work for the wage level ( $w_1$ ) provided. Thus, when immigration increases, the supply of workers increases (as represented by the arbitrary values  $s \rightarrow s^*$ ) and the wage each worker earn subsequently decreases ( $w_1 \rightarrow w_2$ ). In Graph 1, the equilibrium worker population and wage has shifted from B to C. Obviously this is bad for the native laborers, and this decrease in wages is often cited as the most pressing problem with continued immigration.

But this is an incomplete view of the true effects of immigration on wages. In the above case, laborers are perfect substitutes as there is only one type of laborer and one type of good. But in reality there are multiple groups of workers. Most scholars, for demonstration purposes, divide these groups into skilled and unskilled workers. In the simple scenario, natives and immigrants are perfect substitutes for one another—they have equal worth and application in the workforce. But in reality, this is often not the case. Instead, immigrants are generally viewed as unskilled workers. Of course this is not always the case, but immigrants typically earn less and have lower levels of education in their native countries than the country to which they have migrated. Otherwise, they wouldn't be migrating in the first place. Thus, in basic economic models concerning immigration with two levels of labor, most economists assume that immigrants arrive with a greater proportion of unskilled labor to skilled labor.

So, for another example, assume that all native workers are high-school graduates (skilled workers) while all immigrants have no education (unskilled workers). In this scenario, the natives compliment the immigrants. The natives take the high-skilled jobs while the immigrants take the low-skilled jobs. Therefore, both groups gain from this

increase in the worker population, assuming the immigrants are better off with low-skilled jobs in the new country compared to the country from which they migrated. But how is the betterment generated by complimentary worker classes represented in Graph 1? The wage has decreased overall, but the blue box has now been redistributed to the skilled workers, giving them more opportunities for higher wages, thus making them better off. And the triangle (BEC) shows the total gain of skilled natives.

For another example, assume that an amount of skilled and unskilled immigrants arrive in a country, and assume this amount is proportional to the native distribution of skilled and unskilled workers. In these circumstances, the equilibrium will remain even, as both groups will increase proportionately. And in a situation with two goods in the economy (instead of the previously assumed single good), assume that one good requires considerable unskilled labor and little skilled while the other good requires the converse. This way the new labor generated from immigration will still be split between the two goods, with possibly some high-skilled labor from the first good swapping to the second.

However, the problems with immigrations typically arise because natives and immigrants are not perfect compliments or perfect substitutes. Scholars refer to immigrants as “imperfect substitutes,” because they displace (substitute) the low-skilled native workers. But only some of these native workers are able to move into the skilled labor force. Consequently, some natives are better off while those who remain in unskilled labor suffer lower wages.

And there are many other factors to take into account when attempting to analyze the effects of immigrants on a population. Statistically, immigrants concentrate into urban areas. Does this create problems for specific areas but not the surrounding cities,

or do natives respond by migrating to the surrounding areas to offset the effects of the immigrant-shock in the urban areas? How long does it take for the effects of immigrants on wages to take effect? In economic terms, when do the long-run effects begin and are the short-run damage to wage and employment levels worth the possible long-run rewards? And how substitutable are native workers; do immigrants of equal skill and education replace them outside of theoretical models?

The empirical methods of analyzing the effects of immigration on the native population are still a fairly new science. The first attempts to do so were conducted merely two decades ago (Card 1990 and Hunt 1992). Named the “spatial correlation method,” this approach examines specific geographical areas. The general consensus when using this approach was that immigrants had very little impact on the wages of natives, though the impact was somewhat negative. But the flaw with this methodology is that a bias is formed whereby observations may be finding a correlation between the causes of migration and choice but not the consequences of migration choice (Edo 8). Additionally, the impact is lessened with the special correlation method because it does not account for natives who move away from immigrant-dense areas in order to prevent a decrease in their own wages.

The second notable methodology for examining the impacts of immigration is the “skill-cell approach” created by George Borjas (2003). This system examines the entire nation’s labor market in order to eliminate the undesirable effects of the special correlation method. Earlier, the theoretical model of immigration on the economy was shown to have different effects depending upon the number of skilled and unskilled workers in the labor market. To account for this, the skill-cell approach breaks the

laborers down into groups based on their education levels and their years of experience in the workforce. Thus, the immigrant share of the labor market at each level of the economy is calculated over time to calculate the impact on natives. In doing so, Borjas concludes that a 10 percent increase in number of immigrant workers decreases native weekly earnings by four percent. This negative impact is considerably higher than the levels recorded under the spatial correlation method.

While Borjas's method does account for the skill levels of natives and immigrants, it falls short in that it assumes immigrants and natives are perfect substitutes at each level. But as demonstrated in the theoretical model, this is not necessarily the case. Additionally, the complimentary effects of physical capital are unexamined. In other words, physically capital (technologies such as computers and assembly lines) compliments workers by allowing them to be more productive. And over time physical capital will almost certainly adjust to make better use of an increase in the immigrant population in the labor market, as these technologies will evolve to compliment the levels of education and technical understandings of the migrant workers. Giovanni Peri describes the potential benefits of immigration best, stating:

Immigrations economic benefits mostly result from its effect on immigrant and native workers' occupational choices, accompanied by employers' investments and reorganization of the firm. For instance, immigrants are usually allocated to manual-intensive jobs, promoting competition and pushing natives to perform communication-intensive tasks more efficiently. This process, at the same time, reorganizes firms' structure,



producing efficiency gains and pushing natives towards cognitive and communication-intensive jobs that are better paid. (Peri 2010, pg. 6)

Immigrants and natives, even at the same education and experience levels, are unlikely to be perfect substitutes. The reasoning for this is that there will almost certainly be cultural differences between the two, the most notable being language (Somerville and Sumption 16). Lacking the cultural advantages of natives and likely competing in different job markets (communication vs. labor) thus makes immigrants imperfect substitutes to the native workers. To account for this, the “nested constant elasticity of substitution” (CES), which observes the effects of capital and different types of labor, must be calculated and included, thereby forming the “structural skill-cell approach.”

Surprisingly, most studies that use this method find that immigration, in fact, has a positive impact on the wages of natives. Part of the reason for this is that immigrants are shown to be substitutes not for natives, but for other immigrants. Thus, they replace recent immigrants in the labor force, hurting their wages while natives remain mostly unaffected as low-skilled jobs while skilled workers continue to gain economic benefits from the reduced cost of labor.

Scholars have noted several other flaws with this model, but the most important of these is that this model makes the assumption that wages are perfectly flexible. However, wages have shown to be downwardly sticky in France (workers are slow to accept cuts in the equilibrium wage) (Edo 10). Even with these adjustments over time to the models for testing the effects of immigration, France remains an outlier. Scholars have struggled to understand why results remain inconclusive as to how France’s immigrant population affects the native workforce. Edo (2011) claims that scholars inability to calculate these

effects stems from their assumption that France has a perfectly competitive market when, in fact, wages are not as flexible in France as they are in many other developed nations. In other words, the price of labor cannot freely adjust to a supply shock. For example, in 1994, 92 percent of workers were covered by collective bargaining union contracts. France's institutionalized wage rigidity must be taken into account if results of the economic effects of immigration are to be accurate. And a secondary problem in determining wages in France stems from the country's social programs. Generous unemployment benefits and income support programs for non-workers may encourage some workers to accept unemployment over a decrease in their wages due to an immigration shock on the market (Edo 7). Thus, with the many problems underlying the structural skill-cell model, this study will use the basic skill-cell model to examine the effects of immigrants on natives' labor market outcomes.

## **CHAPTER IV: Model to Determine the Impacts of Immigration in France**

This study will use the skill-cell model, as mentioned in the previous chapter. The specific model is heavily based on one proposed by Anthony Edo in his 2011 work concerning the effects of total immigration on the French labor market. The measured years are 1990-2002. This model will remove any bias that may occur by simply assuming only two levels of labor (skilled and unskilled). Additionally, by examining the labor market outcomes for natives in the entirety of France, regional difference will be removed; this is particularly important as urban areas such as Paris and southern areas such as Marseille and Nice experience much greater immigrant supply shocks than urban areas experience.

As previous scholars have done, exclusively employed working men from the ages of 15-64 will be examined, as women often have periods of inactivity and unemployment which makes calculating the years of experience for a given cohort difficult.

As shown in the previous chapter, to determine the effects of immigrants on the labor market outcomes of natives, it is important to note the skill and education levels of both the immigrants and the natives. This is because immigrants in different levels of education and skill are likely to replace natives at their respective levels. So, to account for education and experience, the model will have three levels of education (graduates of

one to two years of education, three to four years, or five or more years) and eight levels of years of experience (1-40 years in five year increments). Years of experience is determined by subtracting the number of years of schooling an individual has from the age that same individual has; the assumption is that individuals immediately enter the workforce after completing a given level of education.

Note that all data concerning the population has been pulled from the French National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE – Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques). Also, note that “Maghrebians” will be defined as persons who were born in Algeria, Morocco, or Tunisia and moved to France. Even if these individuals acquire French citizenship, they will still be calculated as foreign labor. This is similar to the French view of immigrants (*étrangers*) as outsiders, as shown in chapter two. The children of these immigrants will be considered natives, so they will not be included in the calculations. But it is worth noting that the native French will likely view these children as immigrants despite their citizenship.

Once again, Edo’s model (which in itself is based after Borjas’s methodology) will be the defining one used for this study. His approach examines immigrants and natives according to their levels of education (*j*) and labor market experience (*k*) during each year (*t*) from 1990-2002 to account for the substitutability between the immigrants and natives. Previous scholars have used many different numbers of skill-cells, ranging from two (educated and non-educated in Card and Shleifer 2009) to six levels (low, medium, and high education along with drop-outs of all three categories in Edo 2011). For simplicity, and with the limited amount of data from the French census, this study will use three education groups, as described previously.

But two people with the same level of education can still differ greatly in their value in the market. If one graduate is a 22 year-old just entering the market, and the other graduate is a 50 year-old with 28 years of experience, the two will not likely be considered labor-market substitutes. Obviously, most employers would choose to hire the person with market experience. Accordingly, a secondary variable to account for the level of market experience each education group has attained will be used—the level of skill (experience). This study will classify groups of workers into 8 different skill groups based on the number of years of market experience each group has attained. The groups will be divided into five years increments (1-5, 6-10, 11-15, 16-20, 21-25, 26-30, 31-35, and 36-40).

Thus, there will be 24 “skill-cells” per year (3 education groups x 8 skill groups). With three education groups and eight experience groups over twelve years, this study has 288 observations. With such a robust model, this study will be better able to examine the effects of immigration at all levels of the French economy and be more effective at reducing any problems of substitution that may arise. There is no specific data in the French census on how long individuals have been in the market, however. So to calculate a rough estimate of labor market experience for each cohort, this study will use the following equation (Edo 12):

$$\text{Potential Experience}_i = \text{Age}_i - \text{Age of Ending School}_i$$

This equation does create two problems. First, French employers may view native and immigrant labor-market experiences differently, generally favoring the former. And second, this measure does not account for periods of inactivity and unemployment.

Once again, the second issue is particularly important in why this study only examines the impact of male, foreign employed workers from the age of 15-64.

This study will focus on two specific labor markets outcomes: wages and employment levels. Employment levels are the more apparent concern in modern discourse of immigration, as natives are often concerned that they are being replaced by immigrants in their particular fields of work. Immigrants may also have an effect on the wages of natives, as shown in the previous chapter. Wages will be broken down into two dependent variables: monthly and hourly wages, as often-times workers in the low-skilled category may retain the same hourly wage but be offered fewer hours by employers and be faced with lower monthly wages. Thus, both methods of monitoring wage levels will be used.

Employment levels will also be divided into two dependent variables: employment to population ratio of natives and employment to labor force ratio of natives. The employment rate of natives as a ratio of the total population should be sufficient to measure the rate at which immigrants replace natives. However, because this variable can decrease as working conditions improve (due to a faster growth in the age of the working population), the employment rate to labor force ratio will also be included as a variable. If this ratio decreases, it is because the working conditions for natives have decreased as well with an increase in unemployment. By using these four dependent variables, the study will have robust results and account for many of the pitfalls of calculating the effects of immigration in past studies. For estimates on these four variables at separate years, refer to Tables 3-6.

The first of these variables this study will examine is wages. Using the CPI deflator provided by INSEE, this study first calculates the average monthly wage for each native cohort. Then, the monthly wage is broken down to include the hourly wage, as two laborers may have similar monthly wages while one of the two laborers works considerably more hours during the month. However, INSEE does not give statistics on hourly wages, so this study will use an equation to estimate hourly wages. The average hourly wage for each cell (j, k, t) is calculated with the equation (Edo 13):

$$(Hourly\ Wage)_{jkt} = (Monthly\ Wage)_{jkt} / [(Hours\ per\ Week)_{jkt} \times 4]$$

The independent variable, as calculated by Borjas and subsequent scholars, will be the immigrants' share of the labor force ( $p_{jkt}$ ). If there is a decline in native wages or employment levels, this variable will show a correlation with the amount of immigrant labor present in the market. In each skill-cell (j, k, t) this variable is found using the following equation:

$$p_{jkt} = M_{jkt} / (N_{jkt} + M_{jkt})$$

Here,  $N_{jkt}$  represents the number of male natives in the labor force at each skill-cell and  $M_{jkt}$  represents the number of immigrants present. Another way of explaining this figure is that it allows us to examine the immigrant supply shock in each skill-cell during each year (t). But, of course, Borjas and Edo both accounted for the effects of total immigration on labor markets. Thus, for the purpose of this study,  $M_{jkt}$  will refer to the number of Maghrebian immigrants present in the labor market. By using solely the number of Maghrebian, male workers while utilizing the same model, this study will be

able to examine the effects of an immigrant supply shock that is exclusively North-African. Below, Table 1 represents of these figures in balanced years.<sup>1</sup>

**Table 1**

Maghrebien Share of the Labor Force by Skill Cells (in percent)						
Level of Education	Years of Experience	1990	1993	1996	1999	2002
High Level	1 to 5	2	4.1	6.4	3.9	3.7
	6 to 10	0.8	2	2.1	2.4	1.9
	11 to 15	1.3	1.9	1.9	2.2	1.9
	16 to 20	0.4	2.1	1.8	2.3	2.3
	21 to 25	0.8	1.3	2.3	2.4	1.8
	26 to 30	1.9	1.4	2.6	2.3	2.1
	31 to 35	2.4	2.7	3.1	3.1	3.4
	36 to 40	3.6	2.9	4.8	4.5	2.9
	1 to 40	<b>1.7</b>	<b>2.3</b>	<b>3.1</b>	<b>2.9</b>	<b>2.5</b>
Medium Level	1 to 5	6.2	9.6	6.3	10.1	9.1
	6 to 10	2.7	3.5	5.3	4.8	3.3
	11 to 15	2.1	3.1	3.2	3.1	2.8
	16 to 20	1.8	3.1	3.1	2.4	2.1
	21 to 25	2.1	2.2	2.7	2.7	2.3
	26 to 30	1.9	1.9	2.9	2.2	2.3
	31 to 35	2.3	2.4	3.2	3.1	1.9
	36 to 40	3.9	2.3	4.1	4.3	4
	1 to 40	<b>2.9</b>	<b>3.5</b>	<b>3.9</b>	<b>4.1</b>	<b>3.5</b>
Low Level	1 to 5	15.6	18.7	20.2	19.5	16.2
	6 to 10	8.4	10.2	11.2	12.9	10.8
	11 to 15	4.4	6.4	9.3	9.7	6.9
	16 to 20	3.9	8.2	6.1	7.2	5.8
	21 to 25	2.8	7.6	4.9	5.5	4.4
	26 to 30	3.2	4.1	4.8	5.4	4.1
	31 to 35	1.9	3.8	4.4	5.1	4.1
	36 to 40	2.9	4.5	5.1	5.8	4.4
	1 to 40	<b>5.4</b>	<b>7.9</b>	<b>8.3</b>	<b>8.9</b>	<b>7.1</b>

Of particular note in Table 1 is that the Maghrebians hold a considerably larger portion of the labor force in the low-level and low-educated sectors of the market. The gap between their inclusion in the low-levels versus their inclusion in the high-levels of

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<sup>1</sup> Tables ? and ?, following the conclusion, show the figures that yield these results.



the market could indicate a substitutive effect between the natives and immigrants, as opposed to the desired complimentary effect. This is assumed because, without an immigrant labor market distributed similarly to the native French one, there will be a larger supply increase in the category of unskilled laborers than the skilled ones. And assuming immigrants will be willing to work for lower wages, they will then substitute native workers in the unskilled level market but not the skilled sector. But if a proportionate amount of skilled and unskilled labor arrived, the French economy would simply grow.

Borjas (2003) uses the following equation to evaluate the impact of immigration on natives' wages and employment rates:

$$y_{jkt} = \alpha + \beta(p_{jkt}) + \delta I_h + \delta_j + \delta_k + \delta_t + \delta_j \times \delta_t + \delta_k \times \delta_t + \delta_j \times \delta_k + \zeta_{jkt}$$

Here,  $y_{jkt}$  represents the total labor market outcomes for native men with education (j) and experience (k) during year (t).  $I_h$  is a dummy variable to account for the change in the number of workweek hours from 39 to 35 implemented in 2000 (Edo 16). This change affects the hourly wage, as the monthly wage remains constant, but the hours worked decreases, thus causing an increase in the hourly wage that must be accounted for in the model. As Edo explains,

In sum,  $I_h$  is a vector equal to 1 for each cell at time  $t \geq 2000$  and 0 otherwise. In addition to including vector of fixed effects for schooling  $\delta_j$ , experience  $\delta_k$  and time  $\delta_t$ , this model also contains a full set of second order interactions for schooling by time, experience by time and schooling by experience. The linear fixed effects in equation (1) control for differences in labour market outcomes across schooling groups,

experience groups, and over time. Interactions  $\delta_j \times \delta_t$  and  $\delta_k \times \delta_t$  control for the possibility that the impact of education and experience changed over time, whereas  $\delta_j \times \delta_k$  control for differences in the experience profile by schooling group. (Edo 2011, pg. 17)

It is important to find the ease with which immigrants can replace natives in the labor market. So, to find the elasticity of native workers, this study will start with the ratio of immigrants to natives in a cell during a given year at each level of education. To accomplish this, Edo uses the equation  $m_{jkt} = M_{jkt} / N_{jkt}$ . Then the elasticity, represented by  $\partial y_{jkt} / \partial m_{jkt}$ , gives the change in natives' wage and employment levels as a percentage that relates to the supply of immigrant labor. This study, in keeping with Edo's work, will use the following equation to calculate elasticity (17):

$$\partial y_{jkt} / \partial m_{jkt} = \beta / (1 + m_{jkt})^2$$

The beta coefficient [ $\beta(p_{jkt})$ ] will be converted to an elasticity for the purposes of providing real-world numbers to the regressions. To change  $\beta$  to an elasticity, it will be multiplied by the mean value of the number of Maghrebian immigrants ( $m$ ) or  $[1 / (1 + m)^2]$ . The mean value ( $m$ ) is .043 percent over the period in this study, 1990-2002. Thus, the beta coefficient will be multiplied by .92.

In his own work, after calculating the logs of the average monthly wage, average hourly wage, average employment to population rate, and employment to labor force rate, Edo finds that "immigrant flows deteriorate the labour market opportunities of natives in France, leaving their wages unchanged." This indicates that natives and the total immigrant population are substitutes in production. Specifically, using his 3x8x13 model, he finds that a "10% increase in immigrant labour supply decreases native's

employment to labour force rate by 2.7%,” (18-19). This study’s results in finding the effects of solely the North-African immigrant population on the labor market outcomes of natives can be seen in Table 2 below.

**Table 2**

Specification:	Dependent Variable			
	Monthly Wage	Hourly Wage	Employment to Population	Employment to Labor Force
Basic Regression	-0.49 (0.56)	-0.5 (0.54)	-0.21 (0.18)	-0.19 (0.15)
Including Natives as a Regressor	-0.57 (0.56)	-0.62 (0.59)	-0.28 (0.21)	-0.22 (0.17)
Years of Experience between 5-35	-0.11 (0.61)	-0.22 (0.62)	-0.17 (0.24)	-0.19 (0.23)
Years of Experience over 10	-0.19 (0.58)	-0.25 (0.56)	-0.09 (0.19)	-0.16 (0.17)

As expected, the findings of this study are very much in keeping with those found by Edo. First, the top row of each regression shows the beta coefficient for each dependent variable, and the row underneath shows the statistical significant of each corresponding beta coefficient. According to these findings, wages both hourly and monthly are not statistically significant, and thus, are not strongly affected by the immigrant population. However, North-Africans do have an adverse effect on the employment opportunities of native workers, in both their relationship to the population and the labor force. Thus, it is likely that immigrants and natives are labor market substitutes, as predicted. According to the basic regression, a 10 percent increase in the supply of North-African labor decreases the employment opportunities of natives by 1.7

percent. This figure is found by multiplying the beta coefficient to the elasticity (.91) shown earlier.

Three additional tests are done to determine to accuracy of the basic regression. First, another regression is run, using the log of the number of natives as an additional regressor.

Second, because the lowest and highest groups of experience levels amongst workers are volatile with laborers in these groups often entering and leaving the market, a third regression is run which excludes these two groups to account for possible variance that they may cause.

And third, similarly to the second additional test, a final regression is run which excludes workers with less than ten years of experience, as these groups are most affected by the minimum wage, which may reduce the effects of a change in wages after an increase in immigration.

All three of the additional tests show conclusive results similar to the baseline regression. In all four examples this study shows that wages in France are unaffected by an increase in the supply of the immigrant labor force. However, these immigrants are likely to substitute these workers and decrease their employment opportunities.

Conclusions will be derived from these results in the next chapter.

While this study's own statistical analysis is concluded, it is worthy of note that Edo derives an additional model that may be valuable for future scholars. He offers another instrument to use in finding the effects of immigration on the labor market, "an instrument which incorporates the idea of social reproduction since parents' educational attainment is strongly associated with their children's educational attainment." One of

the problems with the skill-cell approach to calculating the effects of immigration is that it assumes each individual in the labor market acts independently of the labor market outcomes; immigrants often go to certain areas because they believe they can attain better wages there, and natives often respond to this movement. The response from natives then diminishes the effects caused by immigrants. However, by limiting the market to specific occupations, independent of geographic location, the effects may still be taken into account. Thus, the measurement chosen to reflect the educational attainment of each individual's parents is a division of the groups by occupational category (22).

Edo uses 29 occupational categories and divides them into the three previously established educational levels (low, medium, high). Using this new model to calculate regressions in the same fashion as done previously, Edo finds that "a 10% increase in immigrant labour supply decreases native's employment to labour force rate by 3.7%," (24).

In conclusion, in both models, Edo finds that an increase in the number of immigrants has a negative impact on the French labor market by displacing native workers at the lower skill level. These results reflect the substitutive nature of foreign and native immigrants in France. In short, immigrants have lower reservation wages as a result of lower bargaining power, so employers are willing to hire immigrants at equal education and skill to natives for lower wages, thereby replacing natives in the market.

## **CONCLUSION**

There is not a perfect model to find the effects of immigration. The effects of immigration on the labor market vary drastically according to which study is examined and which model it utilized. For example, in the case of France, Ortega and Verdugo found that a 10 percent increase in the immigrant population lead to a three percent increase in the wage of natives. Whereas, Edo, as shown previously, found that a 10 percent increase in the native population led to a three percent decrease in the employment level of natives. And across the globe, different geographic areas have found different effects when using different models.

This thesis found that North-African immigrants do have a negative effect on the labor market outcomes of natives. As previously stated, a 10 percent increase in the number of North-African laborers in the market yields a 1.7 decrease in native's employment to labor force rate. However, it is important to note that this is substantially lower than impact of the total immigrant population. In studying the effects of all immigrants on wages and employment levels, Edo found a 2.7 percent decrease in the dependent variable. Thus, while North-Africans do have a negative effect on natives, they are not the immigrant group causing the most harm. North-Africans have constituted slightly more than 30 percent of the immigrant population for the past two or three decades. Europeans account for roughly 40 percent, and all other immigrants (mostly from other parts of Africa and Asia) account for the remaining 30 percent.

Perhaps these groups or the collections of fringe populations have had particularly adverse effects on natives. Thus, although North-Africans do have a negative effects on the market, they are not the primary problem and thus unworthy of the political ire they have received.

The model used in this thesis does have several issues to note. First, even if the results conclude that France has gained from the increased immigration, this might only be true on a national level. As shown in the theoretical model, workers who compliment the unskilled labor of immigration benefit, but native unskilled workers may be forced out of the market by immigrants who are willing to accept lower wages. Thus, an income disparity is created as unskilled workers receive lower wages and the skilled workers reap the benefits of the transfer. The immigration surplus is the difference between what society gains from immigration and what those harmed by immigration lose; ultimately, not all natives will benefit from immigration because the two groups are not perfect compliments.

Immigration, therefore, has two distinct consequences and these are precisely the consequences that drive the immigration debate. The nation, as a whole, gains from immigration. In other words, immigration increases the size of the economic pie available to natives. Immigration also redistributes income—from native workers who compete with immigrants to those who hire and use immigrant services. Immigration changes how the economic pie is split between workers and firms. (Borjas 2006, pg. 12)

In a counter argument, however, Somerville and Sumption, in their examination of immigration's effects on the UK claims, "There are almost certainly distributional effects... however, other factors such as education, trade, outsourcing, demographic change and technological change affect wages and employment much more than immigration [does]," (Somerville and Sumption 3). Perhaps, the reason immigration is still one of the most debated factors when discussing changes on natives' labor market outcomes is that immigration provides a physical face to the changes. There is a visibly different "enemy" of sorts for people to rally against. It is also one of the easiest factors to change. Legislation that limits or expands the number of immigrants allowed to migrate to the host nation is much more easily levied than trying to monitor and set limits upon outsourcing and demographic change.

Next, it should be noted that the experience years given are possibly flawed in that natives and immigrants likely have very different experiences in their respective workforces. Measuring these experiences is incredibly difficult though, so time spent in the workforce is the best representation of this variable for the time being.

Also, because this study uses census data, it does not attempt to calculate the effect of illegal immigration on the labor market. This is probably for the best, as statistics on illegal immigration are often very biased and difficult to accurately estimate. But it must be noted that the effects of immigration on especially the lower education and skill groups will be more heavily effected than studies examining exclusively legal immigration will find.

Legislation can have a drastic impact on not only the amount of immigrants allowed into France, but also the skill and education levels of the immigrants. This



legislation can't be well represented in the statistics used, however, so the effects of immigration may be altered according to those restrictions. Luckily, France rarely passes restrictions on immigration, but the recent law instituted in 2011 decreasing the amount of legal immigration by roughly 10 percent does reduce the effective number of years which the study and possibly future studies can use in formulating the regression.

This paper also does not account for social benefits used by immigrants. This is especially important in the context of the immigrants' families. Only the effects of men on the labor force are measured in this study. But how much of this additional output is used to support the women and children who are not contributing to the economy (assuming the women are not working as well) is not represented here. In the same vein, women may also substitute native workers, but they are not taken into account in this study for reasons previously explained. Though, if North-African women have levels of education and experience similar to those the men, they will likely have a substitutive effect in the labor and service markets like the men do. These additional figures will likely lessen any positive effects of immigration or worsen any negative findings.

So, what are the implications that these mixed results have for public policy? First, policy should be very hesitant to make sweeping changes to the way in which immigrants are or are not allowed into a nation. Because the effects of immigration are difficult to accurately estimate, it is best not to trust any single scholarly work when questioning whether or not immigration is positive or negative for an economy. In the future, governments should keep the following points in mind when considering immigration policy:

- Immigration generally has minor effects for an economy. These effects can be positive or negative, but note that other factors have greater effects on the labor market outcomes of natives.
- The low-skill native groups who will be most affected by the substitutive effect of immigration should be prioritized and considered first before passing immigration. This has typically been done in the past by allowing high-educated laborers to enter the market under work visas.
- Employment standards such as minimum wages and weekly hours must be enforced. Do not allow immigrants to be exploited, as employers will allow this cheaper source of labor to undercut native workers.
- Allow immigrants access to adult training or child education to generate social mobility and allow integration into communities to create a more complimentary native and immigrant labor force.

Because the study of immigration is still very new, and the results are very mixed and debated based on different models and different information used, the political implications concerning immigration on a national level should generally err on the side of caution. Ultimately the most important conclusions to derive are that immigration is worthy of further study.

So how should issues of immigration be resolved and monitored in the future? First, polling systems such as Opinion Way are very useful in discovering the native population's sentiments on immigrant groups. And knowing these sentiments can be worthwhile in determining whether or not immigration should be limited or expanded to allow for better societal cohesion and reduce any sentiments of social unrest. Work visas

have also been an invaluable tool in assessing the labor status of immigrants; programs such as these that promote diversity amongst the labor classes of immigrants are essentially to insuring a broad working class and in preventing unrest due to an over-populated, under-educated level of the group.

In conclusion, this study examines the racism that North-Africans are experiencing today and the history that these nations have had with France. But, as the results in this thesis show, perhaps not all of the xenophobia is unwarranted. By a sociological and moralistic point of view, the French attitudes towards the Maghrebians are unjustifiable. But on an economic level, this group of immigrants does appear to harm the employment levels of natives. However, North-Africans harm natives substantially less than other immigrant groups, so they should not be the primary target of political discussion when aiming to quell the effects of immigration on the native labor market. And lastly, further study is needed in examining the economic effects of immigrants on the native population, as different studies using different models have shown drastically different results.

**Table 3**

<b>Total Number of Native Men in the Labor Force by Skill-Cells</b>						
Level of Education	Years of Experience	1990	1993	1996	1999	2002
High Level	1 to 5	369017	346488	222767	314299	389349
	6 to 10	459531	360631	477358	450951	522949
	11 to 15	438643	445485	523326	457784	526767
	16 to 20	539601	403058	491502	495363	477144
	21 to 25	497824	473770	565758	468033	549669
	26 to 30	445606	456092	466750	485114	542035
	31 to 35	379461	427807	459678	433870	404618
	36 to 40	351611	424271	328847	317716	393166
	1 to 40	<b>3481294.3</b>	<b>3337601.2</b>	<b>3535987.1</b>	<b>3423129.9</b>	<b>3805697.1</b>
Medium Level	1 to 5	375854	252226	237155	374101	471697
	6 to 10	519272	380718	428897	665068	605702
	11 to 15	588508	423549	595410	717027	664664
	16 to 20	766544	528247	686235	748202	777228
	21 to 25	751707	818544	787152	711831	723626
	26 to 30	771489	880411	837610	784573	766507
	31 to 35	257163	728124	701372	680656	836190
	36 to 40	509381	747160	772014	524781	514578
	1 to 40	<b>4539916.7</b>	<b>4758979</b>	<b>5045844.7</b>	<b>5206238.5</b>	<b>5360191.8</b>
Low Level	1 to 5	479476	327645	437031	475698	422950
	6 to 10	577999	588547	584599	627810	616802
	11 to 15	715930	685627	703789	644404	728414
	16 to 20	761907	794842	749195	669296	740163
	21 to 25	972089	904057	817304	757797	834152
	26 to 30	952384	964732	868385	785454	887020
	31 to 35	1142861	928327	828655	840768	863523
	36 to 40	965521	873720	686762	730141	781283
	1 to 40	<b>6568166.8</b>	<b>6067497.4</b>	<b>5675720.4</b>	<b>5531367.6</b>	<b>5874307.1</b>
<b>Total Native Workforce</b>		<b>14589378</b>	<b>14164078</b>	<b>14257552</b>	<b>14160736</b>	<b>15040196</b>

**Table 4**

**Total Number of Maghrebian Men in the Labor Force by Skill Cells**

Level of Education	Years of Experience	1990	1993	1996	1999	2002
High Level	1 to 5	7380	14206	14257	12258	14406
	6 to 10	3676	7213	10025	10823	9936
	11 to 15	5702	8464	9943	10071	10008
	16 to 20	2158	8459	8847	11393	10974
	21 to 25	3983	6159	13035	11240	9894
	26 to 30	8467	6385	12136	11158	11383
	31 to 35	9107	11551	14250	13449	13757
	36 to 40	12658	12304	15785	14297	11402
	1 to 40	<b>53131</b>	<b>74741</b>	<b>98278</b>	<b>94689</b>	<b>91760</b>
Medium Level	1 to 5	23303	24214	14941	37784	42925
	6 to 10	14020	13325	22732	31949	19987
	11 to 15	12359	13130	19053	22228	18610
	16 to 20	13797	16376	21273	17957	16322
	21 to 25	15786	18007	21232	19219	16643
	26 to 30	14658	16728	24291	17261	17630
	31 to 35	5915	17475	22443	21100	15888
	36 to 40	19866	17185	31652	22565	20583
	1 to 40	<b>119704</b>	<b>136440</b>	<b>177617</b>	<b>190063</b>	<b>168588</b>
Low Level	1 to 5	74798	61270	88280	92761	65818
	6 to 10	48552	60032	65475	80987	66615
	11 to 15	31501	43880	65452	62507	50251
	16 to 20	29714	65148	45701	48189	42929
	21 to 25	27218	68708	40048	41679	36703
	26 to 30	30476	39554	41682	42415	36368
	31 to 35	21714	35276	36461	42879	35404
	36 to 40	28001	39317	35024	42348	34376
	1 to 40	<b>291974</b>	<b>413185</b>	<b>418123</b>	<b>453765</b>	<b>368464</b>
<b>Total Maghrebian Workforce</b>		<b>464809</b>	<b>624366</b>	<b>694018</b>	<b>738517</b>	<b>628812</b>

**Table 5**

		Average Monthly Wage of Natives by Skill Cells				
Level of Education	Years of Experience	1990	1993	1996	1999	2002
High Level	1 to 5	1511.9	1580.6	1951	1529.3	1659.9
	6 to 10	1702.5	2220	2189.7	1948.8	2035
	11 to 15	1989.8	2452.1	2820.6	2453.6	2440.7
	16 to 20	2142.1	2489	2530.2	2714.1	2880.9
	21 to 25	2492.1	2630.3	3102.1	2684.5	3000.2
	26 to 30	2584.6	2761.6	2916	2988.5	3137.1
	31 to 35	2565.7	3075.4	2980.1	3037.5	3407.8
	36 to 40	2661.7	3034.2	4516.5	3426.6	3373.9
	1 to 40	<b>2206.3</b>	<b>2530.4</b>	<b>2875.8</b>	<b>2597.9</b>	<b>2741.9</b>
Medium Level	1 to 5	849.5	1196.4	1127.3	1006.6	1110.7
	6 to 10	974.8	1133.6	1220	1164.6	1279.6
	11 to 15	1151.8	1330.2	1578.7	1296.4	1405.9
	16 to 20	1301.1	1467.3	1367.1	1440	1508.2
	21 to 25	1426.4	1532.4	1543.9	1565.1	1651.7
	26 to 30	1550.4	1588.7	1963	1643.9	1739
	31 to 35	1496.9	1683	1952.2	1776.6	1797.3
	36 to 40	1480.9	1887.4	2056.5	1775.1	1869.6
	1 to 40	<b>1279</b>	<b>1477.4</b>	<b>1601.1</b>	<b>1458.5</b>	<b>1545.3</b>
Low Level	1 to 5	714.2	826.8	808.8	858.3	963.5
	6 to 10	844.9	983.1	1017.2	1053.6	1115.6
	11 to 15	982.9	1101.9	1282.7	1140.2	1214.5
	16 to 20	1100.9	1202.8	1238.3	1246.3	1327.7
	21 to 25	1156.9	1299.5	1434.1	1319.8	1407.4
	26 to 30	1204.9	1364.6	1374.6	1423.6	1521.4
	31 to 35	1252.8	1665.8	1429.9	1517.8	1541.7
	36 to 40	1213.3	1408.7	1492.4	1523.4	1608.5
	1 to 40	<b>1058.9</b>	<b>1231.6</b>	<b>1259.7</b>	<b>1260.4</b>	<b>1337.5</b>

**Table 6**

		Average Hourly Wage of Natives by Skill Cells				
Level of Education	Years of Experience	1990	1993	1996	1999	2002
High Level	1 to 5	9.2	9.5	11.6	9.4	10.6
	6 to 10	10.3	13.1	12.9	11.7	12.9
	11 to 15	12.1	14.4	16.1	14.2	15
	16 to 20	13.4	14.5	14.6	15.8	17.2
	21 to 25	14.8	16	18	15.8	17.5
	26 to 30	15.9	16.7	17.5	17.8	18.6
	31 to 35	15.3	17.8	17.6	18.9	20.7
	36 to 40	15.4	17.8	26.8	20.5	20.2
	1 to 40	<b>13.3</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>16.9</b>	<b>15.5</b>	<b>16.6</b>
Medium Level	1 to 5	5.2	7.3	6.9	6.3	7.4
	6 to 10	6	6.9	7.4	7.2	8.5
	11 to 15	7.1	8.1	9.7	8	9.2
	16 to 20	8	9	8.4	8.9	9.9
	21 to 25	8.8	9.4	9.5	9.6	10.8
	26 to 30	9.6	10.2	12.1	10.2	11.4
	31 to 35	9.3	10.3	11.9	11	11.7
	36 to 40	9.2	11.8	12.7	11	12.3
	1 to 40	<b>7.9</b>	<b>9.1</b>	<b>9.8</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>10.1</b>
Low Level	1 to 5	4.3	5.1	5.1	5.4	6.5
	6 to 10	5.2	6.1	6.3	6.6	7.4
	11 to 15	6	6.8	7.8	7.1	8
	16 to 20	6.8	7.4	7.6	7.8	8.8
	21 to 25	7.1	8	8.8	8.2	9.3
	26 to 30	7.4	8.4	8.5	8.8	10
	31 to 35	7.8	10.2	8.8	9.4	10.2
	36 to 40	7.6	8.6	9.2	9.4	10.5
	1 to 40	<b>6.5</b>	<b>7.6</b>	<b>7.8</b>	<b>7.8</b>	<b>8.8</b>

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