

TERRORISM IN THE TIME OF SCHENGEN

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Abstract

This paper investigates the relationship between the Schengen area in Europe and terrorism. The Schengen agreement was implemented in 1995; since then, internal borders between the contracting parties have been abolished. This paper emphasizes the rationale that Schengen made member-states more vulnerable to terrorist attacks because the agreement inherently involved less regulation. In order to test this rationale, this study uses James Q. Wilson's choice theory. This theory refers to the school of thought which maintains that rational wrongdoers act as if they weigh the possible benefits of criminal or delinquent activity against the expected costs of being apprehended. Specifically, I posit that Schengen has lowered the costs that terrorists, who want to commit attacks within the area, associate with being apprehended. This study involves a mixed large-N quantitative analysis and a small-N case study. My sample for the large-N analysis includes the original contracting parties of Schengen: France, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. The particular case examined in the small-N analysis is France. Overall, this research shows that while terrorist attacks have decreased since Schengen was implemented, the perpetration of said terrorism has experienced shifts.

Keywords: Terrorism, Schengen, France

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“It is all too easy to assume that Europe simply exists and thus stop thinking about the conditions under which this assumption comes to be taken for granted or how this assumption is put into practice” (Sidaway, 2002).

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Borders and terrorism are linked because of their opposite and reciprocal functionality. One reason that countries protect their borders is to keep invaders out. Terrorists inherently attempt to break that protection by creating revolutionary sentiments, changing the existing order, and/or engendering psychological or social disruption. Borders create definable lines that mark national power, sovereignty. They dictate the extent of national force; where the government can enforce policy and where it cannot. Therefore, borders act as a defensive mechanism against offensive actions including terrorism. The defensive nature of borders can present itself as border control checkpoints, surveillance, passport checks, border patrol units, visa processes etc. Terrorism can be domestic or international in this context. Before a terrorist can perpetrate an attack in a foreign country, they must enter the country and travel to their target. A terrorist can also perpetrate an attack in their home country and exit across a border to another country. Borders, therefore, act as a barrier that terrorists have to cross before gaining access to a target or cross after an attack to escape apprehension.

Borders have historically played a key role in the organization of space. Throughout the course of human history, borders have marked the separation of peoples, cultures, traditions, and nations. They are as relevant today as they were to Hammurabi in 1762 B.C.E., who conquered his neighboring empires to form the Old Babylonian Empire (Coffin, Stacey, Cole, & Symes, 2011). The introduction of the Schengen area indicates

an important advancement in the history of borders. Named after the Swiss town where the idea was conceived, the Schengen area now encompasses twenty-six countries. Instead of the nationalistic approach to borders, the Schengen agreement adjusted its concentration to a more pluralistic and supranational model. As a result, contracting parties had to relinquish some sovereignty to a supranational organization. This shift has caused Schengen to become the subject of much criticism over the past decade. Slogans like “beginning of the end for Schengen” plague the media as Schengen is faced with challenges (Zaiotti, 2011b). This paper seeks to investigate some of the assumptions about the Schengen area in Europe, specifically the security of European borders under Schengen since 1995.

The Schengen area in Europe is one where internal borders between contracting parties are abolished and only external borders are regulated. Reasons for its emergence has been debated by scholars. Yet, the logical response hypothesis has been argued as the “mainstream way to think about the emergence of Schengen,” (Zaiotti, 2011b). It suggests that the advent of Schengen can be attributed to key European governments trying to solve common problems concerning border control in the 1980s and 1990s (Zaiotti, 2011b). These problems included international crime and terrorism and transnational economic activities (Zaiotti, 2011b).

In order for Schengen to exist, member countries had to give up a portion of their national sovereignty. At the root of my argument is this premise. Because Schengen member-states have surrendered some of their sovereignty to open their borders, they have left themselves vulnerable to attack. Instead of each country being responsible for their own borders, Schengen member-states are now entangled with each other. They are

only as strong as their weakest link. They have to depend on each other for their collective safety.

I suggest that there are three key challenges that have catapulted the Schengen area to the forefront of European debate recently. One, immigration has generated doubts about Schengen, since Europeans fear the radicalization and diffusion of terrorism by foreigners (Bove & Böhmelt, 2016). This potential link between immigrants and terrorism brings about the discussion of border security. With open internal borders under Schengen, Europeans are concerned with immigration patterns across any exterior border of the area. For example, the Arab Spring, in particular, was followed by worry about the influx of migrants coming from the Middle East (Pascouau, 2011). Following this influx, French President Nicolas Sarkozy and Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi wrote a joint letter asking for modifications to Schengen rules (Pascouau, 2011). They argued that “broadening and softening” of Schengen rules threaten public order (Pascouau, 2011). More recently, Europe has experienced another influx of refugees from Syria, which has led to several contracting parties of Schengen to reintroduce internal border controls and reevaluate the validity of Schengen itself (Traynor, 2017).

A compounding reason for scrutiny of Schengen concerns itself with recent trends in transnational organized crime, specifically, the European drug market and human trafficking. According to a report by the European Union (EU) Center of Excellence, “in 1998 the cocaine market in the U.S. was estimated to be four times the size of the European market,” but “now, they are almost equal in size” (Center, 2013). Similarly, in 2017, Europol stated that “the Schengen area is a comfortable ‘operation area’ for human traffickers” (Laan, 2017). In Europe from 2006 to 2015 the number of assumed human

trafficking victims have increased (Laan, 2017). Given the statistics, it is clear that some parties believe Schengen is ineffective at preventing transnational crime.

The third key issue that instigated debates about Schengen is terrorism. In this paper, terrorism is given the most weight as it is at the forefront of my argument. While transnational terrorism inherently involves two countries and thus requires the discussion of borders, I would also argue that domestic terrorism is relevant here. After committing an attack in one country, domestic terrorists may flee their home country easier post-Schengen. The abolishment of internal borders not only allow terrorists to enter but also exit with less regulation. Albeit, I think domestic and transnational terrorism can both be connected to borders. However, I will concede that transnational terrorism is the more obvious association.

The connection between terrorism and borders is not unfounded. The most common tactic used to counteract transnational terrorism has generally been blocking entry to non-citizens that wish to enter a country (Tanguay & Therrien, 2010). Historically, Europe has not strayed from this pattern. Since its enactment in 1995, Schengen's internal borders have been temporarily closed by some contracting parties. One of the most well-known displays of this action was after September 11th. 9/11 triggered a response in Europe in which the EU embraced four measures: "judicial cooperation, cooperation between police and intelligence services, cooperation with the USA, and measure at the borders," in order to further safeguard their borders (Guild, 2003). This is to not to say that counterterrorism efforts were not established before 9/11 only that counterterrorism efforts gained more attention post 9/11. Yet, despite these increased counterterrorist tactics, Europe has been subject to many deadly attacks over


the past few years. The apparent inability of the EU to counteract terrorist efforts has left many to question the cogency of Schengen.

Given the increased immigration influx, concern about the rise in transnational organized crime activity, and the recent terrorist incidents throughout the region, European officials have reexamined the Schengen area, giving rise to two broad positions (Alkopher & Blanc, 2017). While some claim that Schengen needs to be dismantled, others argue that Schengen has become too ingrained in European economy and culture and thus, dismantlement would only serve to cause unwanted consequences. In an effort to mitigate doubts about Schengen, the EU has implemented agencies, policies, and procedures that have all contributed to better border cooperation and integration between participating countries; however, despite these efforts, Europeans are becoming ever more doubtful about the validity of Schengen and especially its ability to prevent terrorism (Bertoncini, 2015). This paper will focus on the relationship between terrorism and the Schengen Area.

Previous research has largely concentrated on either Schengen or terrorism, not on the relationship between terrorism and Schengen. Further, few attempts have been made to correlate them. If they have tried, I contend that they have done so only provincially. This paper takes the preliminary research surrounding this relationship further, discussing not only the number of terrorist incidents in Europe since the advent of Schengen, but also discerning whether Schengen has changed the ways terrorism is perpetrated. For instance, has the opening of internal borders produced any change in the types of weapons, targets, or attacks used by terrorists. Additionally, I will be looking for difference in the number of fatalities since the implementation of Schengen.

My research question stems from the contradiction between Schengen's efforts to increase integration and cooperation between contracting parties and the recent increases in terrorist incidents in Europe. In other words, if Schengen has made advancements in its goal of uniting the European community, particularly, in its efforts to counteract terrorism, then what can explain the surges of terrorist incidents since 1995? Figure 1.1 shows evidence of these surges in five Schengen countries: France, Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.

Figure 1.1 Number of Attacks per Year, 1970 - 2016



Instead of being limited to each country's individual efforts, Schengen has allowed a new forum in which contracting parties are able to merge resources in order to better protect their borders and citizens. It stands to reason then that if countries contributed their own resources to the collective pool terrorist incidents would decrease. In spite of advances made to create Schengen-inspired agencies and programs, terrorism has persisted. I argue that an increase in terrorism could be the result of changing variables. In this paper, I will attempt to discern whether Schengen has added to or

detract from the costs associated with committing a terrorist act. Moreover, is terrorism on the rise because the Schengen Area changed the way that terrorism is perpetrated in Europe? Additionally, have individual policy changes or specific Schengen programs affected the growth of terrorist incidents within member-states?

To investigate these questions, I will employ a mixed methods research design that incorporated both a large-N quantitative analysis as well as a qualitative case study. The large-N analysis is a quantitative study of the original Schengen-area countries before and after the implementation of Schengen. The small-N analysis consists of a case study of France. In the case study, I will review the history of terrorism in France. Then, I will analyze differences in terrorist perpetration and the French government's response to such events. Overall, I believe that France is a good case because it has the largest number of attacks since 1970 in my sample. France is also a symbol of Western influence to some terrorist groups which makes the study of terrorism there that much more interesting. This mixed design supplies more reliable results for the whole of Schengen and also provides a deeper look into a single country as an example.

The purpose of this research is to gain knowledge about the evolution of the perpetration of terrorism using border policy, specifically the Schengen area, as its foundation. This research will provide a greater understanding of the current tactics used by terrorists, thus allowing officials to be better equipped to prevent incidents from occurring. Additionally, this research will give scholars a starting point for future studies on the connection between border policies and terrorism. Ultimately, the importance of this project is to test the validity of Schengen and the effectiveness of border integration and cooperation in Europe, as outlined by the Schengen agreement.

The plan of this paper is as follows: chapter one has provided an introduction to Schengen, terrorism, and the research questions posed by this project. Chapter two outlines the theoretical background of Schengen and of terrorism. The first section of this chapter provides a brief history of Schengen and places it in the context of border theories. The second section addresses the concept of terrorism, terrorist motivations, and differences in new and old terrorism. The section also attempts to apply relevant theories from the scholarship on terrorism to Schengen. Lastly in chapter two, I describe my hypothesis, detailing how Schengen and terrorism are connected. In conjunction with the theoretical approaches, the focus of chapter three is the methods for my large-N analysis. This chapter will include sections on research methods, case selection, variables, and procedure, which will also include data analysis. Chapter four follows a similar structure for my small-N analysis. The closing chapter is devoted to conclusions, limitations, and suggestions for future studies.

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

The goal of this chapter is to place my research within the context of previous work. I do so by drawing current theories and applying them to the topics explored in this paper. This chapter is composed of two subsections: Schengen and terrorism. The Schengen section contains a brief history of the Schengen area and an analysis of Schengen using border theories. It is important to note that in this paper Schengen will be viewed as both a theory of border policy and a concept of European integration and cooperation. Terrorism is the subject of the next section. Here, I explore and establish the definition of terrorism for the purposes of this paper, discuss terrorist motivations, differentiate traditional and new forms of terrorism, and survey theories that are applicable to the Schengen border case. The concluding section of this chapter introduces my hypotheses.

2.1 SCHENGEN

Borders are important because they organize space. They are multifaceted; they play a role in the economy, politics, and culture. They are at the root of modern states. Without them, no one would know where one government's authority started and ended. Citizens would not know what laws governed them and government would not know what citizens they governed. States insist on defending their borders because without boundaries their power would become obsolete. Schengen ushered in a new culture of border control. Contracting parties of the agreement exchanged security for freedom of movement. The logical response hypothesis attributes the emergence of Schengen to solve common problems including international crime and terrorism and transnational economic activities (Zaiotti, 2011b). Countries agreed to risk opening their borders

because Schengen would make transnational market flows easier, thus stimulate economies, and hopefully mitigate issues concerning immigration, terrorism, and organized crime. If borders have a wide range of functions (economic, security, and cultural), then Schengen exhibits a trade-off of these functions. While taking internal borders down opens market flows, it also creates weaknesses in state's defenses. Thus, a tension exists between the economic gains of Schengen and the security challenges it presents.

Borders are a significant component of a state's defensive strategy; therefore, borders are an integral topic when discussing terrorism both transnational and domestic. A state's borders are used to assert power and sovereignty over land. They are marked with tangible (border control points, signs, flags, etc.) and intangible (treaties, laws, constitutions, etc.) aspects that allow them to function. States value them because they mark territory that belongs to them; and states need territory to govern. They distinguish the extent of national power to enforce policy. The consideration of border theory is important to fully grasp Schengen's complexity. I will place Schengen within the history of borders and analyze it in regard to different border theories.

I start with Michael Biggs' theory about the origins of borders and how they were used to define the first modern states. According to his theory, borders began as a mechanism for "fighting and taxing" (Biggs, 1999). When spaces started to grow quantitatively by getting more officials, greater revenues, and larger armies, borders formed states (Biggs, 1999). The progression continued with the development of modern states from disorganized entities to centralized and unified bodies (Biggs, 1999). Biggs continues his narrative by tracing the evolution of cartography as an indicator of

modernity. The functionality of borders as sources of power and money expanded by the early nineteenth century, when they transformed the world into a jigsaw puzzle of modern states (Biggs, 1999). Biggs advances the history of borders to the point of modernity.

Kolossov then carries the history from modernity into postmodernity. He describes the history of border theories to show this advancement. Through this process, he makes distinctions between modern and postmodern borders (Kolossov, 2005). He classifies modern borders as rational, uniform entities that serve limited purposes (Kolossov, 2005). On the other hand, he classifies postmodern borders as fluid, interconnected, and complicated systems (Kolossov, 2005). Kolossov argues that modern border theories failed to answer rising concerns about borders, thus a shift to postmodernity emerged (Kolossov, 2005). This change can be seen when looking at the shift in Europe from the Westphalian system of border control to the Schengen system of border control. This shift signifies a crucial change in European border policy, one that I believe needs to be explored further.

From the 1940's through the 1980's, the Westphalian border culture was predominant in Europe. It focused on national control over borders with a heavy importance placed on security and military functionality (Zaiotti, 2011b). The shift from the Westphalian system ensued as a result of several challenges: immigration, "euro-sclerosis" (a term coined by Zaiotti used to refer to borders as obstacles to transnational economic trade in Europe), and security matters in the 1970's and 1980's (Zaiotti, 2011b). These factors provoke change and opened the door for new approaches, specifically, Schengen. Dissimilar to Westphalian border control, the Schengen era

brought about the postmodernity of borders. This focuses on international control over borders and involves a more complex, pluralistic approach. Although the opportunity for a borderless Europe existed, the process did not happen quickly; it took eleven years to formalize this change. I will briefly outline the process.

The idea for a borderless Europe was developed in tandem between the Schengen agreement and the European Community. The first official step to post-Westphalian border policy was marked by the Saarbrücken accord in 1984 (Zaiotti, 2011b). This agreement was between French foreign minister Roland Dumas and German undersecretary Waldemar Schreckenberger in which they “formalized their commitment to gradually abolish controls at their common frontiers” (Zaiotti, 2011b). Shortly after the signing of the Saarbrücken accord, the Benelux countries (the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg) expressed interest in joining (Zaiotti, 2011b). Together in 1985, France, Germany, and the Benelux countries signed the first edition of the Schengen agreement, the ultimate goal of which was to abolish border controls in Europe. As stated more specifically in the agreement, the aim was to “abolish checks at internal borders,” where internal borders are defined as, “the common land borders of the contracting parties, their airports for internal flights and their sea ports for regular ferry connections exclusively from or to other ports within the territories of the contracting parties and not calling at any ports outside those territories” (European Union 31-33). Contracting parties began negotiations at the Schengen Implementation Convention (SIC) in 1990 (Zaiotti, 2011b). Common definitions, rules, regulations, and procedures were established in the years that followed. In 1995, Schengen gained entry into force starting with the abolition of internal borders in France, Belgium, and the Benelux countries (Zaiotti, 2011b).

As the Schengen agreement was being formed, the European Community took interest in the project because it was compatible with the European integration project. They framed Schengen initiative as the “laboratory of the EC” (Zaiotti, 2011b). By framing it in this way, the EC was able to test the potential of a post-national border approach (Zaiotti, 2011b). Realizing the potential of Schengen, the EC strove to adopt the project into EU law. Additionally, treaties and legislation were also important because they set up more homogenous rules and regulations that prompted a space in which Schengen could flourish. Although the European Parliament had some concerns about the undemocratic nature of Schengen as it involved migrants and asylum seekers, the Schengen project was officially absorbed into EU law with the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997 (Zaiotti, 2011b). Schengen gained a level of legitimacy from official acceptance by the EU (Zaiotti, 2011b). By 1997, the Schengen project had already begun in the five original countries and scheduled to be carried out in many others.

Even though the process took eleven years, the shift in border control throughout much of Europe from the Westphalian approach to the Schengen approach resonates with Kolossov’s theory. While the Westphalian approach fits firmly in the modern category to border theories, Schengen exemplifies the features of postmodernity. Principally, the change from national governments controlling the borders to the supranational government controlling much of border policy highlights the shift from modernity. Such a shift entails changes in the way contracting parties of Schengen counteract terrorism. The power over borders being relegated to the supranational government, the European Union in the case of Schengen, could also change the methods that terrorists use to

execute attacks. Now that it has been established that Schengen is a postmodern approach to borders, I will continue to explore other border theories starting with James Sidaway.

Sidaway supplies border scholars with a new way to interpret borders. In his paper, *Signifying Boundaries: Detours around the Portuguese-Spanish (Algarve/Alentejo) Borderlands*, Sidaway unpacks the relationship between symbolic and tangible aspects of borders. Using Anssi Paasi's idea that "boundaries are institutions and symbols that are produced and reproduced in social practices and discourses" as a foundation, Sidaway argues that borders can be seen as semiotic systems (Sidaway, 2002). In this context, semiotic systems are the study of signs and symbols as elements of communicative behavior. These systems, as Sidaway suggests, consist of tangible and intangible objects that frame our understanding of borders. For example, fences, markers, and maps converge with treaties, language, and national symbols to create our concept of borders (Sidaway, 2002). As seen with adoption of Schengen, border policies can change. And because borders change so do the semiotic systems of borders. With the implementation of Schengen came the implementation of new tangible and intangible objects that framed our conception of European borders. For example, where national symbols decorating border control points used to stand, EU symbols now stand. Most border points in Schengen have the EU flag displayed rather than the national flag. Thus, Schengen changed the semiotic system of borders in Europe.

Since there are many tangible and intangible symbols that define borders, there must be a way to study them all. Brunet-Jailly provides this valuable contribution to border scholarship with his proposal for a more inclusive border theory. Brunet-Jailly created a framework composed of four lenses that could be used to study the different

aspects of borders at the same time. The four lenses model recognizes the connectedness between the many aspects of borders. The lenses include: market forces and trade flows, local cross-border culture, local cross-border political clout, and the policy activities of multiple levels of government (Brunet-Jailly, 2005). He argued that the four lenses model allowed scholars to study borders across time and space (Brunet-Jailly, 2005). Using Brunet-Jailly's theory, scholars are able to investigate the relationship between multiple facets - economic, political, and cultural - that characterize borders. As Brunet-Jailly theorized, this model allows us to examine the interdisciplinary nature of Schengen. I will analyze Schengen in reference to this model next.

According to the economic lens, the advent of the Schengen area has brought increased cooperation and integration of market forces and trade flows throughout Europe. The lack of internal borders allows the freedom of movement for people and goods, which in turn created a viable space for increased trade and investment. Borders in the economic sense denote market boundaries. The elimination of borders creates a space in which market forces can be circulated freely, beyond the scope of one country. Since its advent, European markets have become so integrated that the dismantlement of Schengen would cause an estimated loss of 1.4 trillion euros over ten years (Lehmacher, 2017). By removing borders, states, on one hand, see greater economic benefits but, on the other, they give up increased safety and expose themselves to greater security risks.

Brunet-Jailly defines local cross border culture as, "sense of belonging, common language, or ethnic, religious, socio- economic background, [that] spans the border, and borderland," (Brunet-Jailly, 2005). An example of this can be seen in Schengen on the border between France and Spain. Here lies a cross border culture of the Basque country

(Keating, 2013). The Basque community on either side of the border share commonalities that link them: language, history, ethnicity, etc. Many examples of cross-border culture can be drawn from this borderland. For instance, “growth in numbers of people residing on one side of the Franco-Spanish frontier and working or studying on the other, and local media too have become increasingly cross-frontier in nature,” (Keating, 2013).

Cross-border political clout is defined by Brunet-Jailly as, “active local civic and political organizations and individuals initiate and expand: local level relations, local policy network, local policy communities, symbolic regime, local cross border institutions,” (Brunet-Jailly, 2005). The INTERREG cross-border program established by the European Commission in Basque country is an example of this lens. (Keating, 2013). The intent of these programs is “to help local governments across Europe to develop and deliver better policy, by creating an environment and opportunities for sharing solutions,” (European Union, 2018).

I would argue that within the structure of Schengen policy activities of multiple levels of government is inherent in the project. Because contracting countries have agreed to open internal borders they must collaborate, thus opening channels of communication between foreign officials. In addition, many of Schengen initiatives can also be seen as examples of policy activities of multiple levels of government; specifically, agencies like FRONTEX, Europol, and Schengen Information Systems. Brunet-Jailly’s model accounts for the multiplicity of borders and allows scholars to interpret several factors at one time.

Like Brunet-Jailly, Bauder follows a similar rhetoric. He argues that borders cannot be incorporated into one concept (Bauder, 2011). Instead, Bauder states that borders are based on aspect-seeing, a term coined Ludwig Wittenstein (Bauder, 2011).

He explains that aspect-seeing highlights the plural nature of borders, in which the concept of them changes depending on which aspect is seen by the viewer. Hence, borders have an unlimited number of meanings depending on who is looking at them and why. Employing Bauder's theory, Schengen is seen differently by border patrol officers and terrorists. For example, a patrol officer most likely sees the border as something they have to protect, but a terrorist most likely sees the border as a potential obstacle.

Based on previous literature described in this chapter, many details about Schengen can be extrapolated. First, it can be deduced that Schengen is a postmodern border. Its meaning is composed of tangible and intangible objects that form our understanding. It is not static, as borders are fluid and susceptible to change. It has multiple facets that include economic, political, and cultural elements. It can be seen many different ways, depending on who is looking at it and why. The significance of Schengen is the change in border culture that it symbolizes. With Schengen, states exchanged security for freedom of movement for goods and people. This change from security is why I suggest terrorism has increased since Schengen. Given all these characteristics, Schengen becomes something that can be studied. These characterizations help us to understand the function of borders and how they are managed; thus, it provides a foundation from which terrorism can be applied.

2.2 TERRORISM

Terrorism is a phenomenon that has been practiced for centuries and relatively recently come to the forefront of much research. Terrorism is used by a wide variety of extremist organizations; all with their own objectives, tactics, and ideologies. For this

reason, I believe that it is necessary to establish a few common aspects of terrorism before assessing theories. I will start with the definition of the term.

The first organized terrorist incidents can be traced back to the Zealots in 70 C.E. (Chaliand & Blin, 2016). Since then, the world has fallen victim to countless terrorist acts. In conjunction with the plethora of terrorist activity over the course of history, there have been numerous attempts to define it. The French are recognized as recording the first definition of the terms “terrorism” and “terrorist” in the Dictionnaire of the Académie Française (Laqueur, 1987). Here they defined terrorism as a “système, régime de la terreur,” (Laqueur, 1987). This definition, however, has not held up over time. Alex Schmid and Albert Jongman developed a questionnaire that asked one-hundred scholars to define terrorism (Chowanietz, 2016). Leonard Wienberg, Ami Pedhazur, and Sivan Hirsh-Hoefler established another definition of terrorism by studying seventy-three definitions of terrorism found in fifty-five articles from three academic journals (Chowanietz, 2016). Yet, because of the wide variety of types of terrorism forming a modern definition is difficult to accomplish. Although pundits have not assembled a common definition of terrorism, there has been consensus on common features of terrorism: the use of illegal force, subnational actors, unconventional methods, political motives, attacks against soft civilian and passive military targets, and acts aimed at purposefully affecting an audience (Martin, 2016).

For the purposes of this paper, I have elected to use the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) definition and criteria for terrorism: “the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation,” (National Consortium, 2017). The

GTD supplements this definition with three separate criteria; “one the incident must be intentional, two the incident must entail some level of violence or immediate threat of violence, and three the perpetrators of the incidents must be sub-national actors” (National Consortium, 2017). I chose the GTD definition for two reasons. First, it makes the concepts used in this study and my data fluid. Two, it includes the necessary information while also being brief. The next part of this section will focus on terrorist motivations.

Although they are not comprehensive, there are four typical objectives of terrorist groups: changing the existing order, psychological disruption, social disruption, and creating a revolutionary environment (Martin, 2016). Terrorist attacks generally seek to cause of the aforementioned disruption of society. They do this by inflicting maximum fatalities to expose “the weakness of the government and the strength of the movement,” (Martin, 2016). In order for terrorists to expose weaknesses in government, they exercise a practice called “propaganda by deed”. Through this process, they attack symbolic targets and cause the maximum amount of fatalities. Their motivations are best applied in well-known cities because there are usually more people and larger number of targets to choose from. The more attention/distress terrorists cause, the more successful they are.

With this in mind, I argue that terrorists have to travel to major cities, to be able to perpetrate attacks. This travel involves crossing borders; whether it is from an external or internal Schengen country (from Syria to France/from Germany to France) or to an external or internal Schengen country (from France to Syria/from France to Germany). This movement across borders through Schengen can be seen as a weakness of the government; weakness that stems from less national regulation on the borders. Terrorist

motivations impact where terrorists attack which in turn influence border policy. Essentially, if terrorists seek to accomplish any one of the aforementioned objectives, I argue they likely have some interactions with borders. Another important factor of terrorism, that I posit influences border crossings, is the shift scholars refer to as new terrorism.

I will discuss the difference between traditional and new forms of terrorism. Traditional terrorism can be typified by the following elements: clearly identifiable organizations or movements, use of conventional weapons, usually small arms and explosives, explicit grievances championing specific classes or ethno-national groups, and relatively “surgical” selection of targets (Martin, 2016). New terrorism can be classified by the following characteristics: loose, cell-based networks with minimal lines of command and control, desired acquisition of high-intensity weapons and weapons of mass destruction, politically vague, religious, or mystical motivations, asymmetrical methods that maximize fatalities, and skillful use of the Internet and manipulation of the media (Martin, 2016). This distinction is integral in the discussion of terrorism because it effects the way terrorist choose targets, weapons, and attack types. For example, traditional terrorists function differently from new terrorists and therefore tactics of counterterrorism must also change.

With this working understanding, I will begin reviewing specific theories related to terrorism. The literature reviewed draws on scholarship written about both criminology and terrorism. Specifically, I will examine the following theories by James Q. Wilson, Martha Crenshaw, and Marc Sageman: modernization, choice theory, and radicalization. To begin, Crenshaw posits that modernization can be used to explain the increase in

terrorist incidents within Schengen member countries. She categorizes modernization as a permissive cause of terrorism, meaning that it “provides opportunities for terrorism to happen and situations that directly inspire and motivate terrorist campaigns” (Crenshaw, 1981).

Modernization, as Crenshaw theorized, constructs a space of increased “complexity on all levels of society and economy [which in turn creates] opportunities and vulnerabilities.” And with more complexity comes more that offer mobility and means of publicity for terrorists (Crenshaw, 1981). According to Crenshaw, modernization is the sophistication of transportation and communication. She also denotes that urbanization is a facet of modernization. Cities “increase the number and accessibility of targets and methods,” (Crenshaw, 1981). While this theory could be used to explain why terrorism occurs elsewhere, I don’t believe it is entirely prudent for this study. Seeing as how the countries in Europe are already modern, this theory cannot solely be used to explain terrorism within the Schengen area. However, I do argue that European border policy has advanced and consequentially become more modern under Schengen. Since its advent, there have been many programs and initiatives that have been founded that have progressed borders to modernity in Crenshaw sense. The introduction of programs such as the Schengen Information System (SIS) provides an example of modernization in the Schengen context. SIS is a “large-scale information system that supports external border control and law enforcement cooperation in the Schengen States” (Europa.eu., 2018). Along with SIS, Schengen member-states have implemented half a dozen other programs aimed at bettering integration and cooperation between

Schengen states. These programs speak to Crenshaw's theory that with an increase in communication, comes increases in terrorism.

The next theory I will discuss is James Q. Wilson's choice theory. It refers to the school of thought which maintains that rational wrongdoers act as if they weigh the possible benefits of criminal or delinquent activity against the expected costs of being apprehended (Gaines, 2014). Using this theoretical approach, the terrorists would conduct criminal cost-benefit analysis of committing a terrorist act within Schengen. The question involved with this theory is whether or not the Schengen area adds or detracts from the costs associated with committing a terrorist act and whether that outweighs the benefits enough to commit a terrorist act.

For example, if a wrongdoer wanted to steal a car, they would weigh the costs and benefits of executing such a task. The benefits might include money, fame, and/or getting a mode of transportation. The costs might include jail time, fines, and/or adding to or starting a criminal record. If the benefits of stealing the car are greater than the costs, then the wrongdoer would commit the crime. The equation gets more complicated when you get more specific. Let's say that the car is worth \$10,000, easy to steal, and you don't have a record yet. In this equation, the benefits outweigh the costs and the wrongdoer would most likely steal the car. If the car is worth \$10,000, hard to steal, and you are a repeat offender, then the wrongdoer probably wouldn't steal the car because the costs are greater than the benefits. The same logic can be applied to Schengen.

Consider that the wrongdoer is a terrorist and wants to commit an attack in one of the five Schengen countries used in this study. According to the choice theory, a terrorist would weigh the costs and benefits of perpetrating the attack. The benefits include

advancing their cause by changing the existing order or creating a psychological disruption, social disruption, or revolutionary environment. The costs include the likelihood of being caught. I argue that Schengen detracts from the costs of being apprehended of the cost-benefit analysis. The area creates more vulnerabilities which decreases the costs of being arrested because there is less regulation. In other words, I suggest Schengen makes it easier for terrorists to enter and exit the twenty-six Schengen states to commit attacks.

Last of the terrorism theories is Sageman's radicalization model. He defines radicalization as "the process of transformation of ordinary people into extremists using violence for political means," (Sageman, 2008). He argues that there is a four-step process to radicalization: moral outrage, a specific interpretation of the world, resonance with personal experiences, and mobilization through networks. Any strategy to fight terrorism must be based on an understanding of terrorist radicalization. I suggest that the rise in terrorist incident rates in Schengen could be explained by an increase in radicalization around Europe. As Sageman summarizes, weak integration techniques, discrimination, and late detection by police all contribute to higher radicalization and increased incident rates (Sageman, 2008). The question involved with Sageman's theory is whether or not radicalization can be used to explain the rise in terrorist activity. While I do believe that there is an association between Sageman's theory of radicalization and the implementation of Schengen, I do not think that Schengen is the only or even the main explanation for this phenomenon. Therefore, I will not be exploring it in this paper.

Defining and categorizing terrorism was fundamental to this study for two reasons. First, understanding the meaning, motivations, and classification of terrorism is

necessary before testing changes in the perpetration of terrorism can be done. Second, it also gives a foundation of terrorist motivations and general function of new terrorists which effects counter terrorism strategies. Understanding how and why terrorism occurs provides vital insight on how to stop it. Of course, counter terrorism strategies are not fluid across space and time. Just because one strategy works for a certain terrorist group in Germany doesn't mean that it'll work for a different group in France, or even the same group in France. Countries have different factors that impact their counter terrorism strategies such as policy, government, resources, etc.

Each of these theories about terrorism provides a unique perspective on Schengen but for the purposes of this paper I will focus on Wilson's choice theory. My analysis will emphasize the costs-benefits associated with Schengen and whether or not the costs offset terrorists from perpetrating attacks within the five member-states I have chosen.

2.3 HYPOTHESES

My overarching hypothesis is that Schengen has detracted from the costs associated with committing a terrorist attack in Europe. In other words, with fewer regulations and checkpoints, the implementation of the Schengen area in Europe has cultivated a space in which terrorist can enter, move around, and exit the area easier. I expect that border policy under the Schengen agreement has given rise to terrorist activity. Although I presented four well known theories on terrorism, I lean on one in order to explain my hypothesis. I predict that choice theory will help to explain the increase in terrorist incidents in Europe. Moreover, I hypothesize that there will be an increase in international attacks because the costs associated with crossing borders is much lower post-Schengen.

Since Schengen has changed the way borders are managed, it should hold that it has changed the way terrorists carry out attacks across borders. In so doing, I hypothesize that Schengen has created shifts in weapon types, target types, attack types, and fatality rate. In reference to the above factors of perpetration, I posit that the Schengen area detracts from the costs of committing a terrorist attack classified by new terrorism elements but adds to the costs of committing a terrorist attack classified by traditional terrorism elements. By categorizing each group between traditional terrorism tactics and new terrorism tactics, I suggest that there will be an increase in new terrorism weapon, target, and attack types. Table 2.3 shows my categorization of weapon, attack, and target between traditional and new terrorism. The aforementioned categories are referenced from the GTD. I will use these categories in my data analysis to determine any fluctuations. With this shift, I predict that fatalities will increase as a result of the shift to new terrorism because new terrorists seek to inflict the maximum number of deaths.

Specifically, I think there will be an increase in explosives/bombs because they can be constructed remotely with common materials. This means that terrorists would not have to transport weaponry across external borders to Schengen and therefore decrease risk/cost. In reference to target type, I consider there would be an increase in the new terrorism targets because they pose a lesser threat of detection. Insofar as, a terrorist is less likely to be caught if they commit an attack on private property, transportation, tourism, or airports because they can blend better into the crowd and there is typically less security than at government, police, military, or regional institutions. They are less likely to be noticed attacking new terrorism targets.

It is important to note that my analysis does not consider differences in individual incidents. For example, if one incident involves both new and old weapon, attack, or target types, I don't distinguish that one incident as old or new terrorism. Instead, I isolated each incident by these three categories and then look for fluctuations. So, each incident is broken down by weapon type, attack type, and target type and then analyzed. I do not take the incident as the whole of each of these categories.

Table 2.1 Old and New Terrorism Weapon, Target, and Attack Type Categories

	Traditional Terrorism	New Terrorism
Weapon Type	Firearms, melee, vehicle, incendiary	Biological, chemical, nuclear, radiological, and explosive/bombs
Attack Type	Armed assault, assassination, hostage (barricade), hostage (kidnap), unarmed attack	Facility, infrastructure attack, hijacking, and explosive/bombs
Target Type	Government (diplomatic), government (general), police, military, regional figures/institutional	Private citizens and property, education, tourism, transportation, airport

To counteract security worries, the EU has implemented various programs and initiatives. These include but are not limited to the Schengen Information System (SIS), Radical Awareness Network (RAN), Europol, CEPOL, eu-LISA, SIS II, and Frontex. I predict that these programs have had some effect on terrorist agendas. I have separated these agencies into two groups: border control and information sharing. In parenthesis are the years that each program was founded and put into force, seen in Table 2.2.

Table 2.2 Schengen Agencies: Border Control and Information Sharing

Border Control	Information Sharing	
Europol (1999)	SIS I (2001)	eu-LISA (2012)
CEPOL (2014)	Frontex (2004)	SIS II (2013)
	RAN (2011)	

CHAPTER 3: LARGE-N METHODOLOGY

3.1 RESEARCH QUESTION

The research question will be answered using a mixed design that incorporates a large-N and a small-N analysis. The former will survey the five original Schengen area members: France, Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. Terrorist incident data for each of the five countries will be pulled from 1970 to the most current year available, which is 2016. Although, it should be noted that for unknown reasons the Global Terrorism Database does not have data recorded for the year 1993. This data will include factors such as: incident, attack, target, weapon, perpetrator, and fatality rates for each country by year. The next chapter will include a case study on France.

The strengths of this design are in its initial comprehensive analysis of multiple European countries' terrorist incident rates. The simplified panel exercise allows for a variety of independent variables to be tested on many countries in an attempt to determine the effect of the Schengen area on terrorism. Furthermore, the mixed research design also permits for a case study of one of the countries, which will give insight into a particular case. This will be beneficial for testing the effects of other factors' responsibility for the changes in terrorist tactics, motives, or targets. Some weaknesses include selection errors in the simple panel design and sampling bias.

3.2 CASE SELECTION

The five countries that I have chosen for the large-N analysis were picked for several reasons. Each of the five countries has been a part of the Schengen area for the longest amount of time. France, Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg were the original Schengen member-states. As such, I argue that they are the most

developed under the Schengen program and the most reliable to study because they have had more time to adapt and develop under Schengen. In addition, the countries that I have chosen are all in Europe, which is my undergraduate focus area and regional site. Finally, these countries were chosen based on available data before and after the introduction of Schengen.

France was chosen for the case-study portion of this thesis for three reasons. One, it has recently been the target of much international terrorism. Two, it is an outlier when grouped with the original Schengen area member countries from 1992-1995 in regards to terrorist incidents. And three it will be used based on my study-abroad experience and language proficiencies.

3.3 VARIABLES

The unit of analysis is country-year. The units of observation in the large-N comparison will be France, Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. The dependent variables are terrorist incident rates, weapon type, attack type, target type, and fatality rates. Other dependent variables that I will use include distance from capital of attacks and perpetration of attacks either by international or domestic terrorist groups. I have chosen these categories in an attempt to assess changes in the number of incidents and the perpetration of terrorism over time.

I will briefly give the GTD definition for each of these terms. Target type consists of twenty-two different categories and “captures the general type of target/victim” (National Consortium, 2017). Attack type consists of nine different categories and “captures the general method of attack and often reflects the broad class of tactics used” (National Consortium, 2017). Weapon type consists of thirteen different categories and

“records the general type of weapon used in the incident” (National Consortium, 2017). Fatality rate is “the number of total confirmed fatalities for the incident; the number includes all victims *and* attackers who died as a direct result of the incident” (National Consortium, 2017).

The independent variables include the Schengen Area, SIS I, Frontex, Europol, CEPOL, RAN, eu-LISA, and SIS II. These have been codified according to whether their purpose is border control or information sharing referenced in the appendix. For the purposes of this paper, border control and information sharing will be considered separate variables. The codification of these programs helps to track the implementation of Schengen initiatives within the area.

I will briefly state the purpose of each of these programs. As mentioned earlier, SIS is a “large-scale information system that supports external border control and law enforcement cooperation in the Schengen States” (Europa.eu., 2018). “RAN is a network of frontline or grassroots practitioners from around Europe who work daily with people who have already been radicalized, or who are vulnerable to radicalization,” (Europa.eu., 2018). RAN is also used in research and policy making efforts (Europa.eu., 2018). Europol “assists EU States’ police forces in improving their cooperation on the prevention and fight against the most serious forms of international crime, such as terrorism, drug trafficking, and people smuggling, focusing on the targeting of criminal organizations,” (Europa.eu., 2018). “CEPOL is an agency of the European Union dedicated to develop, implement, and coordinate training for law enforcement officials” (Europa.eu., 2018). Eu-LISA is “the EU Agency for the operational management of large-scale IT systems,” (Europa.eu., 2018). Frontex’s mission is to “facilitate and render

more effective the application of existing and future Union measures relating to the management of the external borders, in particular the Schengen Border Code established by Regulation (EU) 2016/399 in line with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the concept of the European integrated border management,” (Europa.eu., 2018). I coded border control and information sharing agencies that I will utilize for my analysis. Their specific coding can be found in the appendix. I have included Schengen itself as a factor of each category because it is inherently intertwined in each because it represents the shift that took place in border culture that led to the founding of the aforementioned programs.

Other independent variables include population, fractionalization data, number of external borders and time in years. I have chosen these variables because I believe that they have an impact on the perpetration of terrorism in Europe. The more people you have in a country, the more divided the population is, and the number of external borders you have increase the likelihood that attacks will occur. Fractionalization is based on the percentage of the total population that is categorized as foreign. This data was drawn from an article entitled, *Fractionalization*, in the Journal of Economic Growth (Alesina, 2003). Population data was drawn from the World Bank database and expresses total population in each of the five countries. Year includes 1970-2016. The number of borders variable accounts for each of the five countries external borders with countries that were not included in this study (France 3, Germany 5, Benelux 0). The reasoning for this is because my sample includes only five Schengen member-states and I am only analyzing the area in which they cover. Therefore, the number of borders is counted by any

neighboring countries of France, Germany, or Benelux that are external to the group of five. I seek to utilize these variables to detect the significance of the choice theory.

3.4 PROCEDURE


I will begin my research by comparing terrorist incident rates before and after the implementation of the Schengen area among the five original contracting parties: France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, and Luxembourg. This analysis will apply my independent variables to Schengen, IS, and BC in a SPSS regression which will account for population, fractionalization, number of borders, and time in years. Next, I will investigate the perpetration of international and domestic terrorism from 1970 to 2016. Then, I will conduct a survey of target type, attack type, weapon type, and fatality rates of the original five countries before and after the debut of Schengen. I also will incorporate a SPSS regression table for each type of weapon, target, and attack that focuses on new terrorism methods. These tables will analyze the relationship between Schengen, information sharing, and border control and the new terrorism types of weapons, targets, and attacks referenced in Table 2.1. Next, I will evaluate the number of fatalities due to terrorist attacks before and after Schengen. Finally, I will explore changes before and after Schengen in reference to distance from country capitals attacks occurred. Through this process, I seek to measure if any significant changes occur in my dependent variables when tested against my independent variables.

Moreover, I will conduct a case study on France in order to more closely examine the effects of Schengen and terrorism in Europe. This study will include focusing on specific French counter-terrorism and political policies that may have affected terrorism incident rates from 1970 to the most current year of available data.

3.5 DATA ANALYSIS

Figure 3.1 below shows overall the number of attacks from 1970 to 2016 for the five original Schengen member-states. As you can see, France have the greatest number of attacks followed by Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg respectively. The graph serves as the foundation for my analysis. From this graph I will attempt to extrapolate changes in the perpetration of terrorism over this time frame.

Figure 3.1 Number of Attacks by Country 1970-2016



In the twenty-four years of available data before the application of Schengen, there were 2,242 attacks. After Schengen, over the course of twenty-two years, the five countries were victim to 1,394. From 1970 to 1994, the average attacks per year was 93. From 1995 to 2016, the average attacks per year was 63. Table 3.1 attempts to control for the differences between all five countries when testing for a relationship between independent variables (Schengen, information sharing, and border control) and the number of attacks. The table can be used to explain approximately 22% of the total

incidents. I have accounted for four factors fractionalization, population, number of borders, and time in years that might influence the variation of attacks in each country.

Table 3.1 Schengen and the Number of Attacks

Model		Coefficients ^a		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		Unstandardized Coefficients	Std. Error			
		B		Beta		
1	(Constant)	-1957.458	783.890		-2.497	.013
	Population	1.763E-6	.000	1.503	4.110	.000
	Fractionalization	.295	.257	.108	1.146	.253
	Year	.985	.396	.370	2.490	.014
	Number_Borders	-19.884	6.245	-1.122	-3.184	.002
	BC	-16.164	6.159	-.465	-2.624	.009
	IS	-2.790	2.719	-.148	-1.026	.306

a. Dependent Variable: Total Number of Incidents

Table 3.1 proves that population makes a difference in the likelihood of terrorist attacks occurring. It also proves that border control (BC) is statistically significant as it decreases terrorist attacks. Additionally, Table 3.1 confirms that the number of borders decrease terrorism. The last significant finding from Table 3.1 that can be extrapolated is as time progresses terrorist attacks increase.

From inferences made from the number of borders and BC above, some connections can be made in reference to the choice theory. Overall, since the implementation of Schengen terrorist incidents have been dropping. This finding negates my hypothesis that Schengen made member-states more vulnerable and instead suggests that Schengen has made member-states more secure. In this context, this assumption means that Schengen does not add to the costs that wrongdoers factor into being apprehended.

Contrary to the number of borders and BC result, time presents the opposite conclusion. From Table 3.1, it can be surmised that as time progresses, terrorist activity increases. I consider this could be the result of the emergence of new terrorism. The onset of terrorist organizations built as loose cell-based structures with minimum command or control makes it more difficult for counter terrorism agencies to track and, thus prevent attacks from occurring.

Figure 3.2 depicts the number of attacks each year committed by international, domestic, or unknown terrorist groups. I codified each terrorist organization from the GTD data over my time period in the five countries as either international or domestic groups. To do this, I searched each terrorist group by name in GTD and reviewed their attack history. If their history included attacks in two different countries then I coded it as an international group. If not, I coded it as a domestic group. From Figure 3.2, it can be deduced that 1992 had the most international attacks with 171, 1979 had the most domestic attacks with 156, and 1996 had the most unknown attacks with 199.

Figure 3.3 International, Domestic, Unknown Attacks, 1970-2016




Table 3.2 shows the specific numbers of attacks classified as international, domestic, or unknown from the time period before and after Schengen. The most significant element to note here is the difference in unknown attacks. Before Schengen unknown attacks accounted for 30.2% of the total attacks from 1970-1994. After Schengen unknown attacks accounted for 47.7% of the total attacks from 1995-2016. This increase in the amount of unknown attacks could be the result of Schengen. I would argue that Schengen created a space that created confusion and chaos in its early days of the area, which led to the culpability of attacks being unknown.

Table 3.2 International, Domestic, Unknown Attacks

	International	Domestic	Unknown	Total
1970-1994	623	941	678	2242
1995-2016	264	464	666	1364

Table 3.3 is a regression that shows the relationship between the percentage of international attacks over total attacks compared to the implementation of Schengen led information sharing and border control variables. From the table, it can be inferred that border control, by a factor of $-.156$, is statistically relevant. This implies that Schengen inspired border control programs did have an effect on international terrorist rates declining.

This finding negates my hypothesis. According to the choice theory, I assumed that international attacks would increase after Schengen was put into force because it would make the area more vulnerable and attractive to terrorists. Table 3.3 proves that Schengen has actually decreased international attacks. For the purposes of this paper, Schengen has added to and not detracted from the costs of being apprehended. In other words, the area makes it riskier for terrorists to commit attacks in member-states.

Table 3.3 International Attacks and Information Sharing and Border Control

Model		Coefficients ^a				
		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	.312	.041		7.605	.000
	IS	.058	.037	.517	1.561	.126
	BC	-.156	.068	-.763	-2.305	.026

a. Dependent Variable: PERC_INTL

Figures 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6 seek to show differences before and after Schengen concerning specific elements involved the perpetration of terrorist incidents (weapon, target, and attack). The data is represented in percentages because there is a disproportion of 848 incidents from before to after Schengen. The figures are investigating whether there is a difference in the way terrorists are committing incidents not how many they are committing; therefore, the total number of incidents does not matter. However, it is important that the disparity does not skew the results in perpetration. If I used data as raw numbers the analysis would not be valid because the two periods I am trying to test for change would not be synonymous. In order to account for this variation, I have calculated the data into percentages of the whole number of attacks for each time period. For instance, all the data points from 1970 to 1994 equal 100% of the total attacks during that time frame, as do from 1995-2016. This will give me a clear reading of if changes occurred out of the whole from each time frame, instead of the analysis giving me changes that occurred out of the raw numbers.

Each figure covers all five countries from 1970 to 2016. They are separated into two lines: before and after the implementation of Schengen. In all three figures, the x-axis represents the percentage of each type of the total incidents from before and after Schengen and the y-axis represents what type of weapon, target, or attack was used in the

perpetration of the incidents. Guides for the type codifications for Figures 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5 can be found in the appendix section of this paper. Following each of the figures is a SPSS regression testing the relationship between new terrorism weapon, target, and attack types and Schengen, information sharing, and border control practices.

Figure 3.3 illustrates the different weapons types used by terrorists from 1970 to 2016. For the majority of attacks, weapon type regardless of Schengen has remained consistent. However, there are some subtle differences. For example, from 1995 to 2016 there was an increase in the use of incendiary (coded #6) and from 1970 to 1994 there were many more unknown weapons (coded #12) were recorded.

I posit that the increase in incendiary use after the advent of Schengen is indicative of two factors: the rise of new terrorism and the rising costs of crossing into the area to commit an attack. First, the shift could be explained by the new terrorism shift that focuses on higher intensity weapons that inflict the most fatalities. Also characteristic of new terrorism, tutorials on how to assemble incendiary devices can be found online; and, therefore can be made anywhere using common materials. Second, the increase after Schengen could be explained by the nature of the weapon. For example, because incendiary devices are global, they can be built after a terrorist crosses into the country where they plan to commit an attack. Not having to transport these materials across borders since they can be constructed anywhere because the materials are available everywhere, unlike other types of weapons, detracts from the costs of being apprehended. This finding aligns with my hypothesis in which Schengen made terrorists more likely to cross into its contracting parties because it decreased likelihood of them being detained.

Figure 3.3 Weapon Type, Before and After Schengen




Table 3.4 displays the relationship between new terrorism weapon types and Schengen, information sharing, and border control. These weapons include biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive/bombs. According to the table, there is significant relationship between these categories and Schengen by .033. This means biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive/bombs weapon trends have increased by since the implementation of Schengen. These findings account for 20% of incidents.

I argue that this finding is suggestive of my hypothesis. Most new weapons can be constructed anywhere; therefore, terrorists don't have to cross external borders to Schengen with them. This presents a more favorable situation in which they are less likely to be caught, leaving contracting parties vulnerable to more attacks where new weapons are used.

Table 3.4 New Weapon Types and Schengen, Information Sharing, and Border Control
Coefficients^a

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	.654	.042		15.721	.000
	Schengen	.390	.177	.897	2.200	.033
	IS	-.030	.040	-.263	-.746	.460

BC	-.166	.124	-.805	-1.343	.187
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a. Dependent Variable: PERC_WeaponNew

Figure 3.4 illustrates the different types of targets attacked by terrorists from 1970 to 2016. Similar to Figure 3.3, the types of targets that terrorists attack have not changed much from the advent of Schengen compared to before.

Figure 3.4 Target Type, Before and After Schengen




Table 3.5 reflects the same results found in Figure 3.4. It demonstrates the relationship between new terrorism target types and Schengen, information sharing, and border control. New terrorist target types include private citizens and property, education, tourism, transportation. There is no significant relationship between new target type and Schengen, information sharing, or border control methods. This means private citizens and property, education, tourism, transportation target trends have not changed since the implementation of Schengen. These findings account for 21% of incidents.

Table 3.5 New Target Types and Schengen, Information Sharing, and Border Control


Coefficients ^a					
Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Coefficients Beta	
1	(Constant)	.183	.028		6.589

Schengen	.121	.118	.412	1.019	.314
IS	.046	.026	.605	1.732	.091
BC	-.075	.083	-.540	-.909	.368

a. Dependent Variable: PERC_TargetNew

As seen with target type in Figure 3.4, attack type, as seen in Figure 3.5, does not have much variation. There isn't much change across time between 1970 and 2016. Though, there is a small spike, after Schengen, in the amount of facility/infrastructure attacks (coded #4). Moreover, there is a consistent spike in bombings/explosions (coded #3) across my sample of Schengen states from 1970 to 2016.

Figure 3.5 Attack Type, Before and After Schengen



Examining the spike in bombings/explosions further, Table 3.6 investigates the relationship between bombing attacks and Schengen information sharing programs. There is a significant relationship between these two variables. It shows that bombing attacks decrease by -.037 when information sharing techniques are used and accounts for 12% of all bombings. This means that the more France, Germany, and the Benelux countries cooperate, coordinate, and share information, the more likely it is that bombing attacks will decrease. More information from multiple sources allows Schengen countries the opportunity to piece together intelligence to improve counterterrorism efforts and

interrupt terrorist bombing plans. Sharing information on terrorist cells, members, and/or organizations helps Schengen member-states detract terrorists from committing attacks.

Table 3.6 Bombing Attacks and Information Sharing

		Coefficients ^a				
		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients		
Model		B	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.
1	(Constant)	.696	.037		18.600	.000
	IS	-.037	.016	-.339	-2.387	.021

a. Dependent Variable: PERC_Bombings

Table 3.7 shows the relationship between new terrorism attack types and Schengen, information sharing, and border control. New terrorist attack types facility attack, infrastructure attack, explosive/bombs, and hijacking and Schengen, information sharing, or border control methods. Schengen did affect new terrorism attack type trends. From this analysis, it can be inferred that new attack types are affected by Schengen slightly by .260. These results account for 21% of the incidents. In other words, the advent of the Schengen area increased the probability of terrorists' using the following new methods of attack: facility, infrastructure, explosive/bombs, and hijacking.

Similar to the increases present in weapon types after Schengen, the results from Table 3.7 present increases in new terrorism attack types since Schengen has gone into force. This supports my hypothesis. I argue that using new attacks types give the perpetrator a greater chance of amenity.

Table 3.7 New Attack Types and Schengen, Information Sharing, and Border Control

		Coefficients ^a				
		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients		
Model		B	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.
1	(Constant)	.724	.028		25.568	.000

Schengen	.260	.121	.873	2.161	.036
IS	-.024	.027	-.313	-.897	.375
BC	-.042	.084	-.296	-.498	.621

a. Dependent Variable: PERC_AttackNew

Figure 3.6 displays the number of fatalities before and after Schengen as raw numbers. The x-axis indicates the number of fatalities for each attack. The y-axis indicates the number of fatalities per each incident. For example, from 1970 to 1994, 137 attacks resulted in one death or continuing with this line, 30 attacks resulted in two deaths. Attacks that resulted in one fatality were far more frequent before Schengen, while ten or more fatalities per attack were more frequent after. The total number of fatalities after the advent of Schengen was 716 and before Schengen was 296. It is important to note that even though there were less terrorist incidents after Schengen, there were more fatalities. Specifically, there were 716 fatalities from 1995 to 2016 and 296 fatalities from 1970 to 1994.

One tenant of new terrorism emphasizes the use of asymmetrical attack methods in order to inflict the maximum number of fatalities. Figure 3.6 proves that post Schengen, there have been less attacks but more fatalities. I claim this is telling of new terrorism. Terrorist have indeed accomplished their motivations of creating psychological and social disruption with this tactic. Moreover, from the perspective of a terrorists, this finding adds to the benefits of committing an attack. Accordingly, terrorist are more likely to risk crossing borders if they can cause more fatalities.

Figure 3.6 Fatalities, Before and After Schengen





Figure 3.7 portrays the change in distance from each country's capital that terrorist incidents occurred before and after the start of Schengen. The distance is represented in miles. I calculated the differences using the percentages of the total attacks from the time periods before and after Schengen. Figure 3.7 is akin to Figures 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5 in the sense that there is little to no variation. The biggest difference between time periods occurs in the smallest mile range. Attacks perpetrated between 1 and 50 miles of the capital before Schengen account for 38% of the total attacks in that time period and only 13% of the total attacks from 1995-2016. There have also been slight increases in attacks at 250 to 300 miles and 700 to 750 miles.

Figure 3.7 Attacks by Distance from Capital, Before and After Schengen



The analysis below in Table 3.8 denotes the relationship between distance of attacks and Schengen further. It solidifies Figure 3.7 in that attacks closer to the capital are less likely after Schengen. From the table, it can be inferred that within a radius of 450 mile, attacks are less likely to happen by -.240 when Schengen is applied.

I suggest this finding detracts from the benefits of committing an attack. If terrorists want to create revolutionary environments and/or change the existing order, it would reason that in order to produce the greatest payoff, they would want to attack capitals. Because Schengen makes it harder to attack a country within 450 miles of their capital, for terrorists the benefits of committing an attack decrease.

Table 3.8 Distance Within 450 Miles and Schengen, Information Sharing, and Border Control
Coefficients^a

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	.672	.037		18.197	.000
	Schengen	-.240	.085	-.614	-2.803	.008
	IS	.057	.042	.581	1.341	.187
	BC	-.051	.154	-.161	-.330	.743

a. Dependent Variable: Total Number of Incidents

“Le contrôle aux frontières n’existe pas seulement dans l’intérêt de l’État membre aux frontières extérieures duquel il s’exerce, mais dans l’intérêt de l’ensemble des États membres ayant aboli le contrôle aux frontières es à leur frontières intérieures,”

(MacErid, 2017).

CHAPTER 4: SMALL-N - FRANCE

4.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter focuses on France. I chose France because it has been the target of much international terrorism, it is an outlier when grouped with the original Schengen countries in regards to terrorist incidents, and it is where I completed my study-abroad experience and language proficiencies.


France started discussions about forming the Schengen area in 1985 and was a part of its implementation in 1995. These facts make France one of the five first member-states of the agreement. Although they got off to a rocky start, France did eventually embrace the “spirit of Schengen”. When Schengen was being ratified, the centre-right party was in power in Paris. Known for their nationalistic sentiments towards security, they were “openly critical or the treaty, [but surprisingly] they nonetheless overwhelmingly voted in favour of it,” (Zaiotti, 2011a).

Despite voting in favor of Schengen, France remained apprehensive throughout the implementation process (Zaiotti, 2011a). The French delegation blamed other contracting parties for “laxness at the borders” and lack of progress which led to France’s hesitation about abolishing internal borders (Zaiotti, 2011a). After the Schengen Executive Committee (Comex) finished prepping all necessary foreseeable instruments, the member-states set a date for implementation – March 26, 1995 (Zaiotti, 2011a).

France, still not ready to fully commit to “the spirit of Schengen”, enacted its right under Article 2.2 of the Schengen Implementation Convention and maintained its internal borders (Zaiotti, 2011a). Hervé de Charette, French Foreign Minister at the time, was quoted saying, “[Schengen] might be at the same time the best and worst thing, *excellent if it works, dangerous if it fails*... If it seems, as it is the case, that our citizens’ security depends also on the border controls, it is understood that we have to keep them,” in defense of the French delegation’s actions (Zaiotti, 2011a). After two years of successful operation of Schengen and the subsequent enlargement of the program, France decided to cede its reliance on Article 2.2 and abolished all internal borders.

As you can in Figure 4.1, France endures as the country with the highest number of terrorist attacks when grouped with the other original Schengen members. This raises many questions. Why is France subjected to more terrorism than other European countries? What can explain the spikes in attacks in 1979 and 1996 as seen in Figure 4.1? Has Schengen mitigated France’s vulnerability? What’s the extent of France’s national counter terrorism efforts?

Figure 4.1 Number of Attacks by Country, 1970-2016



This chapter is broken into four sections not including the introduction. Section 4.2 provides a brief history of terrorism in France since 1970. I start with this because it provides context to the progression of terrorist activity in France. I cover two influential pieces of the history, although there are many more that I unfortunately cannot cover due to time restrictions. The next section highlights prominent terrorist organizations. Again, I deem it necessary to give a concise outline of the most active terrorist groups in order to understand more fully the French case-study. Section 4.4 discusses French programs and strategies to counteract terrorism. These are relevant to my data-analysis. The fifth section states my hypotheses. Finally, I will present data and analysis in the last section of this chapter.

4.2 HISTORY

“Few states have the history or breadth of engagement with terrorism that has been experienced by France... For more than one hundred years it has been refining its organization, strategy, and operations, in the fight against an evolving terrorist threat,”

(Gregory, 2003).

I argue that throughout French history there have been two key events that speak to the country’s long history with terrorism: the terror during the French Revolution and the bombing at Café Terminus in 1894. The Reign of Terror carried out by the Committee of Public Safety prompted the definition of the word *terrorism*. And the bombing at Café Terminus, as John Merriman, argues incited the modern age of terrorism. This section will present these two hallmark moments in French history first.

The word *terrorism* was coined by a British statesman named Edmund Burke. He first used the word to describe the events that were happening in France as part of the

Reign of Terror during the French Revolution. Led by the Jacobins, the Reign of Terror sought to thwart counter revolutionary sentiments. They radicalized their approach and punished anyone that threatened their ideology. Using the newest method of killing at the time, the guillotine claimed somewhere between 17,000 and 40,000 lives during the Reign of Terror (Martin, 2016). Another 200,000 political prisoners' lives were lost from disease and starvation (Martin, 2016). The events that occurred during the Terror offered specific examples of what terrorism looked like. I would argue that attempts to define terrorism started with the Reign of Terror in France.

The bombing of Café Terminus offers another moment that provides insight into France's long engagement with terrorism. The bomber, Émile Henry, lived in Paris through the 1890s or more colloquially the Belle Époque. Renowned for its distinct "material progress and exhilarating cultural innovation," the Belle Époque while beneficial to some, wasn't great for everyone (Merriman, 2016). Émile was an educated man that came from a middle-class home but lived among the poor. He saw first-hand their struggles. From this backdrop, Émile, angered by social inequalities, turned to anarchism. He carried out his first bomb attack in November 1892, killing five people (Merriman, 2016). Two years later Émile committed his second attack in 1894 that attracted far more attention.

On February 12, 1894, Émile Henry threw a bomb into Café Terminus killing one and wounded twenty others. Despite other bombings of this period, Émile stands out. Merriman claims that Émile's attack on Café Terminus was the first modern terrorist act (Merriman, 2016). He further explicates his assertion by offering seven reasons. First, Émile attacked "innocent people who just happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong

time,” (Merriman, 2016). Second, this type of terrorism “cut across social lines,” (Merriman, 2016). Émile was a middle-class intellectual that fought for workers’ rights. Before this incident, terrorists were mainly poorly educated (Merriman, 2016). Third, like others that he venerated, Émile hope to gain notoriety and fame for his attack (Merriman, 2016). Fourth, while he bombed a café, his greater target was the French government (Merriman, 2016). Fifth, Émile’s attack suggests that dynamite and bombs became the weapon of choice because of their ability to create damage and breach state defenses (Merriman, 2016). Sixth, the Café Terminus attack highlights the belief held by terrorists that their ideology will eventually prosper (Merriman, 2016). And finally, the anarchist terrorists operated in a small, cell-like structure and were not a central organization with a chain of command arrangement (Merriman, 2016). For all these reasons, the bombing of Café Terminus signifies the beginning of modern terrorism.

Both the Reign of Terror and the attack on Café Terminus provide clear evidence that terrorism is closely intertwined in French history. Each event symbolizes an important advancement in the study of terrorism. The Reign of Terror symbolizes the establishment of the definition of terrorism and the attack on Café Terminus symbolizes the progression of terrorism into the modern age. Next, I will turn my attention to specific terrorist organizations. I will highlight six of the most active organizations from 1970 to 2016 in France.

4.3 FRENCH TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS

There have been five major terrorist groups in France since 1970: Front de Libération National de la Corse (FLNC), Action Directe (AD), Front de Libération de la Bretagne (FLB), Iparretarrak’s (IK), and Resistenza. Together these groups account for

the majority of incidents in France from 1970 to 2016. Therefore, I believe that it is important to provide a brief background on each of them.

FLNC was formed in 1976 with the objective to recover Corsican territory from France. They wanted independence and were willing to die for it; as evident in their slogan: “la valise ou le cercueil” which means “the suitcase or the coffin” (Chowanietz, 2016). Known for their night operations called the *nuit bleu* in which they carried out multiple attacks in the same night, the FLNC executed most of their attacks on the island of Corsica. Notably on 31 May 1979, the FLNC expanded its scope by organizing twenty-two targets in Paris (Chowanietz, 2016). The FLNC has completed “10,000 attacks involving either firearms or explosives and has killed more than 220 security personnel and civilians and injured several thousand more” (Gregory, 2003). The FLNC fits into the ethno-nationalist communal category of dissident terrorism, colloquially known as separatist terrorism (Guy, 2016). Making up 31% of the total terrorist attacks in France, the FLNC was the most active group from 1970 to 2016.

The AD, known for its assassinations of General Rene Audran in 1985 and Renault chairman Georges Besse in 1986, was a Euroterrorism group (Chowanietz, 2016). The AD mostly targeted the French state and corporate businesses. Founded in 1979, the AD “opposed capitalism in general and the link between the French government, international corporate business and the arms industry” (Gregory 126). Revolutionary dissident terrorism is defined as terrorism aimed at destroying the existing order through armed conflict. I argue the AD can be classified in this category.

Created in 1964, the FLB claimed that the people of Bretagne were being oppressed by French colonial power. Their goal was to liberate themselves from France.

Their tactics did not include blood-shed; although, in April 2000 the group did unintentionally kill a McDonald's manager (Chowanietz, 2016). After this event, the public asked the FLB to cease its activities (Chowanietz, 2016). The FLB can be classified as a nationalist dissident terrorist group (Guy, 2016). The goal of nationalist dissidents is to mobilize a certain demographic group against another group or government, (Guy, 2016). In this case, the FLB tried to mobilize the citizens of Brittany against the French government.

Another ethno-nationalist terrorist group, IK fought for the reunification of the French and Spanish Basque regions. Active since 1973, IK most active period was between 1975 and 1988. During those twelve years, the IK committed “more than fifty attacks, killing four people, injuring hundreds more, and damaging countless buildings and homes” (BBP 101).

From 1970 to 2016 the L'Armée Secrète Arménienne de Libération de l'Arménie (ASALA) is responsible for 49 attacks in France. ASALA opposed the repression of the Armenian minority in the Turkish state. They exploded bombs in synagogues and airlines. Most notably, ASALA killed 8 and injured 60 after they exploded a bomb on a Turkish airline at Orly Sud airport (Gregory, 2003).

Resistenza was a terrorist organization formed after the first FLNC split in 1990 in France. Active for only six years, the group perpetrated seventy-three attacks, second only to the FLNC. The group's most active year was 1996 and carried out the majority of its attacks in Corsica. The Resistenza fought for Corsican nationalism and can therefore be classified as an ethno-nationalist communal terrorist group.

4.4 FRENCH COUNTER-TERRORISM INITIATIVES

In its attempt to assuage terrorism, France has established a plethora of different organizations. These organizations are tasked with individual responsibilities that range from intelligence gathering to police intervention in an effort to collectively prevent terrorism. I will present ten agencies total. I will use these agencies in my data analysis to determine, according to the choice theory, how they influence attacks in France. If, for example, the French counter terrorism programs add or detract from the costs of committing an attack. The ten agencies work under the direction of the Comité Interministériel de Liaison Anti-Terroriste (CILAT) which serves at the top of French counter-terrorism initiatives and the Unité de Coordination de la Lutte Anti-Terroriste (UCLAT).

Though CILAT is positioned at the center of the French counter terrorism effort, I contend that UCLAT is more influential seeing as how UCLAT is responsible for steering the CILAT body. The UCLAT functions as “the principal coordination body for the various agencies tasked in the fight against terrorism,” (Gregory, 2003). UCLAT’s mission is three-fold: *le renseignement*, *la prevention*, and *la repression*. *Le renseignement* focuses on “intelligence gathering and analysis to understand and anticipate the terrorist threat,” (Gregory, 2003). *La prevention* is tasked with “the prevention of terrorist acts including both active operations against terrorists and the protection of potential targets,” (Gregory, 2003). And finally, *la repression* is trusted with “the suppression of terrorist and terrorist related activity,” (Gregory, 2003).

The UCLAT works closely with French intelligence agencies to accomplish its trifold mission. The three main intelligence agencies are the Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure (DSGE), the Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (DST), and the

Renseignement Généraux (RG). Part of the Ministry of Defence, the DSGE plays a “primarily external security role in the defense of the French state and the pursuit of French interests,” (Gregory, 2003). DST is different; as it is responsible for internal security of France. Also, important to note, operating within the DST is the Division Nationale Anti-Terroriste (DNAT) which “concerns itself mainly with threats within French territory arising from foreign state and non-state actors,” (Gregory, 2003). RG focuses on the “monitoring of French nationals, a role which brings it most sharply into tension with issues of political freedom and individual liberty,” (Gregory, 2003). All of the aforementioned agencies are concerned with the *le renseignement* mission of the UCLAT.

La prevention mission of the UCLAT is carried out by six agencies: Recherche, Assistance, Intervention, et Dissuasion (RAID), Groupe d’Intervention de la Police Nationale (GIPN), Groupe d’Intervention de la Gendarmerie (GIGN), Nationale Escadrons de Parachutistes et Intervention de la Gendarmerie (EPIGN), Service de Protection des Hautes Personnalités (SPHP), and Groupe de Sécurité de la Présidence de la République (GSPR). RAID was formed originally to combat terrorism in Corsica but eventually it widened its scope to include all of France. GIPN functions as a regional force with the same tasks as RAID. GIGN and EPIGN concentrate on “direct action against international terrorists on French soil,” (Gregory, 2003). The last two agencies under the *la prevention* mission are SPHP and GSPR which are both tasked with the protection of the members of the Ministry of the Interior and the President. These agencies are active in their attempt to thwart terrorism.

La répression mission of the UCLAT “includes the coordination of almost all instruments of the French state in creating a difficult context within France for terrorists to operate,” (Gregory, 2003). One example of a *la répression* agency is the Police Judiciaire (PJ). The PJ is a division of the national police force that detects and arrests those in terrorist acts (Gregory, 2003).

Along with these government programs, there have been many policy-making efforts to counteract terrorism. In the *Le Code Penal* there are provisions to fight terrorism – specifically Titles II and XV. Further, France signed three additional international documents to inhibit terrorism, UN Resolution 2625, European Convention on the Repression of Terrorism of 1979; later updated in 1996 to include a series of G-8 national declarations (Gregory, 2003). Other operational anti-terrorist cooperation methods have been established in France. Notably, France constructed a national emergency plan called *Vigipirate* that formed a “blueprint for France to take control of national territory for public security,” (Gregory, 2003).

It can be argued that at the very least, France has been proactive about its efforts to minimize terrorist activity within its borders. The three-pronged approach of the UCLAT is a comprehensive plan that allows each organization to do a specific task in a much larger mission. Established in 1984, UCLAT gives France structure. Table 4.1 is organized by the objectives of UCLAT and lists the agencies that serve each objective. Alongside each agency is the year that that specific program was established. I will use these in my data analysis to test their impact on the choice theory as it relates to the perpetration of terrorist attacks.

Table 4.1 France Counter Terrorism Agencies

Le Renseignement	La Prevention	La Répression
RG (1907)	SPHP (1934)	PJ (1812)
DST (1944)	EPIGN (1971)	UN Resolution 2625 (1979)
DGSE (1982)	GIPN (1972)	UN Resolution 2625 – G-7 Inclusion (1996)
DNAT (1998)	GSPR (1983)	Le Code Penal Titre II (1996)
	RAID (1985)	Le Code Penal Titre XV (2006)

4.5 HYPOTHESES


I hypothesize that France has seen the greater number of terrorist incidents, due in large part, to separatist terrorist group activity. The majority of which I think stem from Corsica. I also predict that various French national counter terrorism agencies have had an impact on decreasing terrorist attacks by making the costs associated in doing so higher.

4.6 DATA AND ANALYSIS

In this section, I explore French separatist terrorist organizations, the spikes in terrorist activity in 1979 and 1996, and the impact that French national counter terrorism efforts on the amount of terrorist incidents from 1970 to 2016. First, though, it is important to revisit previous findings. In Chapter 3, I displayed the results of the fractionalization, population, number of borders, and time in years against the total number of terrorist incidents. These findings from Table 3.1 established that the more people are in a country, the more likely that terrorist incidents occur. Then, it would stand to reason that the country from my sample with the highest population should also have the highest number of attacks. One exception to this finding can be seen when looking at Germany and France. Figure 4.2 depicts the population rate from 1970 to 2016 of each country in my sample. Germany has higher population rates than France, which should


mean that Germany has higher attacks rates. This is not true. Although France has lower population rates, it continues to be an outlier as it has the highest amount of terrorist activity from the countries in my sample.

Figure 4.2 Population, 1970-2016




Since 1970, there have been 2,641 terrorist attacks in France accounting for 73% of the total number of attacks from the five original Schengen member-states. GTD categorizes nearly two hundred different terrorist groups that have attack France over the past forty-six years. The six most active in France from 1970-2016 include the following: Front de Libération National de la Corse (FLNC), Action Directe (AD), Front de Libération de la Bretagne (FLB), Iparretarre (IK), L'Armée Secrète Arménienne de Libération de l'Arménie (ASALA), and Resistenza. Figure 4.3 shows the percentage of each groups activity which is based on number of attacks. These groups accounted for 65% of the total attacks perpetrated in France when you don't count the attacks for which GTD labelled unknown.

Figure 4.3 Percentage of Attacks by Perpetrator Group



When subtracting the number of unknown perpetrator groups from the total, the FLNC accounts for nearly half of all terrorist attacks. Interestingly, Resistenza has the third highest attack rate among the 198 other terrorist groups that attacked France between 1970 and 2016 with 5.2%. Fourth is the IK at nearly 4%, followed by ASALA at 3.5%, AD at 3.8%, and FLB at 2.3%. I argue that four out of the six terrorist groups, FLNC, FLB, IK, and Resistenza, can be classified as separatist terrorist groups.

Figure 4.1 Number of Attacks by Country 1970-2016



Revisiting the Figure 4.1 from earlier in the chapter, I would like to take a closer look at the circled spikes in incidents in 1979 and 1996. In 1979, out of the 212 recorded attacks in France by the GTD 132 were committed by the FLNC. From January to March, the FLNC launched forty-six attacks. By May and June, the number of attacks nearly doubled. However, in the latter half of the year, the FLNC was mostly inactive, carrying out only 7 attacks from July to the end of the year. This is due in large part to several FLNC members getting arrested and sentenced to long prison terms in July (Ramsay, 1984). I postulate that the conflict theory could have had an effect here. After the arrests and sentencings of FLNC members, the costs of committing terrorist incidents on behalf of the organization outweighed the benefits. Therefore, FLNC members refrained from active pursuit of their mission for a while until the costs of committing attacks went down again. I argue the spikes seen in 1979 and 1996 in France can be attributed to FLNC and the onset of Schengen, respectively.

The GTD logged 270 attacks in France in 1996. Of those 270, 160 were classified in the database as *unknown*. One explanation for this may be Schengen. With the implementation of Schengen into force in 1995, I hold that the increase in unknown attacks and the spike in the total number of attacks in 1996 might be attributed to the fact that Schengen was inexperienced as a program. It wasn't until 1999 that programs started to develop in order to counteract terrorist attacks.

I will now investigate the relationship between Schengen/national counter terrorism efforts and the number of terrorist attacks. I seek to explore if Schengen or French national initiatives have been the more effective in suppressing terrorist incidents. Schengen, IS (information sharing), and BC (border control) are coded using the same

method as before. FR_Intel, FR_Repression, and FR_Prevention are coded using agencies that work for each objective according to the year they were established. The coding table of this process can be found in the appendix.

Table 4.2 France and Counterterrorism Efforts, 1970-2016

Coefficients^{a,b}

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	81.244	43.237		1.879	.068
	Schengen	-.182	46.189	-.002	-.004	.997
	IS	-9.726	9.838	-.335	-.989	.329
	BC	-27.339	30.607	-.513	-.893	.377
	FR_Intel	-88.843	28.606	-1.279	-3.106	.004
	FR_Repression	37.439	12.605	.697	2.970	.005
	FR_Prevention	45.273	17.146	1.226	2.640	.012

a. Dependent Variable: Num_of_Attacks

b. Selecting only cases for which Country = France

Table 4.2 above explains 44% of the total number of attacks. The results of the table suggest that French national counter terrorist initiatives (FR_Intel, FR_Repression, and FR_Prevention) are more influential than the supranational Schengen counter terrorist initiatives (IS and BC) in France. Further, they indicate that out of the three objectives that make up French counter terrorist initiatives, national intelligence agencies significantly decrease terrorist attacks; while repression and prevention programs seem to increase terrorist attacks.

CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION

5.1 LARGE-N CONCLUSIONS

Even in our globalized world, borders are relevant. They outline national sovereignty, which designate the extent of national power. In Schengen, member-states have essentially agreed to waive some of the sovereignty. They ceded control of internal borders thus entering a security community (Alkopher & Blanc, 2017). Schengen member-states created a community where weakest-link technology is employed (Tanguay & Therrien, 2010). By this logic, the contracting country with the smallest provision of security determines the collective provision (Tanguay & Therrien, 2010). In other words, the country with the least amount of security becomes the standard for all. One reason that Schengen member-states are willing to surrender a portion of their sovereignty and enter into the weakest link technology is because of the economic gains that the Schengen agreement elicits.

My main hypothesis was that because Schengen member-states ceded power over internal border checks there would be less regulation and that would lead to an increase in terrorist incidents. Additionally, I hypothesized that there would be more international attacks. I believed that because Schengen changed the way borders are structured then it also changed the way terrorist perpetrate incidents. Particularly, I thought there would be a shift from traditional terrorist methods to new terrorist methods. With this shift, I predicted that fatalities would increase because of the shift to new terrorism in which perpetrators seek to inflict maximum. I used the conflict theory to explain these hypotheses.

The results represented in this paper validate some but not all of my original hypotheses. I found that while an increase in terrorist incidents did not occur after Schengen, there was an increase in the amount of fatalities after Schengen. This means that terrorist commit deadlier attacks after Schengen than before Schengen. My hypothesis was half correct. On one hand, I was proven wrong because Schengen decreased terrorist attacks. This decrease is not chiefly the result of Schengen but of the Schengen inspired border control programs: Europol and CEPOL. On the other hand, I was correct in my assumption that fatality rates would increase after Schengen. Time is a factor that I did not anticipate to have an effect on terrorist attacks, but since the beginning of Schengen, time proves to be an important indicator. As time progresses, incident rates increase.

Two aspects of the perpetration of terrorism changed after Schengen: weapon and attack type. Target type saw no change in reference to Schengen. Both, weapon and attack type, experienced shifts from traditional terrorist methods to new terrorist methods as a result of Schengen. Specifically, there was a significant change in the number of bombing attacks. There is a significant association in which the number of bombing attacks decreases as information sharing agencies increases. This suggests that Schengen is not necessarily responsible for this change. Rather, Schengen inspired information sharing programs are responsible for this effect.

Another important factor of perpetration that I did not foresee to be significant is distance. My results revealed a significant relationship between where attacks are carried out. My data analysis solidifies this finding by proving a relationship between Schengen and information sharing and attacks happening within a 450-mile radius of a capital.

An additional factor that relates to distance is international versus domestic terrorism. Analysis implies that international attacks have decrease since the implementation of Schengen, specifically because of border control measures. This finding does not support my hypothesis, as I thought that Schengen would increase international attacks.

Overall, my analysis proved that terrorism in the time of Schengen has decreased. Border control practices, stimulated by the implementation of the Schengen area, are responsible for much of the decrease seen in the number of attacks. Schengen has not detracted from the costs of being apprehended but added to it instead. Terrorists are more likely not to commit attacks in the Schengen area for fear that they will be detained.

My analysis confirmed that there have been overarching changes in the way that terrorism is perpetrated with the area. Although target type showed no variation before or after Schengen, there is evidence that weapon and attack types have shifted. After Schengen was started, there has been an increase in new weapon and attack types.

5.2 SMALL-N CONCLUSIONS

In my small-N analysis, I found that the majority of France's terrorist incidents are the responsibility of separatist terrorist organizations. Particularly, the largest percentage of separatist terrorism in France is the result of FLNC, which is concerned with Corsican independence. These results confirm my first two hypotheses about France. My third and final hypothesis stated that French counter terrorist agencies make the costs associated with committing attacks in the country higher. Table 4.2 confirms the missions and programs connected to UCLAT have decreased terrorism in France.

5.3 LIMITATIONS

Some limitations of my research include time and access. If the conflict theory does not explain the relationship between Schengen and terrorist incident rates, then additional research must be done to investigate other sources of the connection. These factors might include recent increases in organized crime activity that are putting a strain on the Schengen Area, pitfalls of individual governments in adhering to the policies of the area, or global changes in terrorism. All of these alternative explanations for the Schengen Area would require separate analysis, data collection, and research designs. Because of the extensive reconstruction required to investigate these factors I will not be able to pursue them in the allotted time. Finally, a rather inescapable limitation to my research design is the possible impact that the international atmosphere might have on the fluctuation of terrorism across time. To address these, looking towards globalization will enhance our outlook of the Schengen Area by exposing how international symptoms affect particular countries.

5.4 SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE STUDIES

A possible area for investigation is to expand analysis to all Schengen area countries. Running regressions on all twenty-six countries would form a larger platform to test connections between the Schengen Area and terrorism. Future research could involve a further analysis on advancements of technology in Schengen. These technologies include Blockchain technology and EU Passenger Name Record (PNR). Blockchain technology is a method in which the authenticity of goods is ensured (Lehmacher, 2017). EU PNR is a program where “information is provided by every passenger, collected by air carriers and used for their ticketing, reservation and check-in systems,” (Bigo, 2015).

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Appendix

Codes for Border Control and Information Sharing

Border Control	
1	Schengen
2	Europol
3	CEPOL
Information Sharing	
1	Schengen
2	SIS I
3	Frontex
4	RAN
5	eu-LISA
6	SIS II

Codes for Target Type

1	Abortion Related
2	Airports and Aircraft
3	Business
4	Educational Institution
5	Food/Water Supply
6	Government (Diplomatic)
7	Government (General)
8	Journalists/Media
9	Maritime
10	Military
11	NGO
12	Other
13	Police
14	Private Citizens and Property
15	Regional Figures/Institutions
16	Telecommunication
17	Terrorists/Non-State Militia
18	Tourists
19	Transportation
20	Unknown
21	Utilities
22	Violent Political Party

Codes for Attack Type

1	Armed Assault
2	Assassination
3	Bombing/Explosion
4	Facility/Infrastructure Attack
5	Hijacking
6	Hostage Taking (Barricade)
7	Hostage Taking (Kidnap)

8	Unarmed Attack
9	Unknown

Codes for Weapon Type

1	Biological
2	Chemical
3	Explosives/Bombs
4	Fake Weapons
5	Firearms
6	Incendiary
7	Melee
8	Nuclear
9	Other
10	Radiological
11	Sabotage Equipment
12	Unknown
13	Vehicle (No to include vehicle bombs)

Codes for French National Counterterrorism Agencies

	Le Renseignement
1	RG (1907)
2	DST (1944)
3	DGSE (1982)
4	DNAT (1998)
	La Prevention
1	SPHP (1934)
2	EPIGN (1971)
3	GIPN (1972)
4	GSPR (1983)
5	RAID (1985)
	La Répression
1	PJ (1812)
2	UN Resolution 2625 (1979)
3	UN Resolution 2625 – G-7 Inclusion (1996)
4	Le Code Penal Titre II (1996)
5	Le Code Penal Titre XV (2006)