ABSTRACT

AMBER BREANN MALONE: Exogenous Barriers to the Incorporation of the Second Generation North Africans in France
(Under the direction of Alice Cooper)

Immigration is a polemic subject in French society today. The 2005 riots in the banlieue and the government’s response to the outraged and discontented immigrant populations brought forth a topic left out of public discourse for years before the heavily televised protests. At the forefront of this public debate surrounding identity and incorporation was one of France’s largest immigrant populations, North Africans. Marginalization of a particular group often appears in the terms of social and cultural conflict. While this is true, incorporation of the culture of migrants and their representation in French society are not the only exogenous factors that must be considered when analyzing the underrepresentation of North African immigrant descendants in education achievement and labor market participation in relation to the relative success of Southern European immigrants. Political-economic factors are largely influential in determining the opportunities available to immigrant groups. Through databases such as the Institut National des Statistiques et des Etudes Economique and the Direction de l’Animation des Recherches and Etudes Statistiques, it was possible to measure and compare socio-economic mobility of North Africans and Southern Europeans in France. This research then applied this information to the theory of scholars Koopmans, Guiradon, and Gondola. Through an analysis of the secularism, public discourse and the welfare state (childcare accessibility, tax/benefit systems, education policies, residential market, and housing policies) this paper determined the extent to which the political economy and culture as exogenous factors influence the incorporation of second generation North African descendants. Findings proved that Koopmans, Guiradon, and Gondola’s theories do apply to the French case and that North Africans experience more obstacles to incorporation than Southern Europeans.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION .................................................. 5

HISTORY OF IMMIGRATION ............................................... 7
LITERATURE REVIEW ...................................................... 18
METHOD ................................................................. 22

CHAPTER 2: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY ................................. 24

THE WELFARE STATE ..................................................... 24
TAX/BENEFIT SYSTEM .................................................... 25
QUALITY AND ACCESSIBILITY OF CHILDCARE ...................... 28
IMPACT OF RESIDENTIAL/HOUSING POLICIES ON THE HOUSING MARKET ............................. 33
MAINSTREAMING AND STRUCTURE OF EDUCATION .................. 42
IN VOLUNTARY INHERITANCE OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC MOBILITY .................................. 48

CHAPTER 3: INCORPORATION BY VALIDATION ........................ 52

LAÏCITÉ ....................................................................... 53
PUBLIC DISCOURSE ....................................................... 60

CONCLUSION .................................................................. 66

BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................. 69
## LIST OF TABLES

| Figure 1.1 | Post World War Two Southern European and North African Immigration.........8 |
| Figure 1.2 | Country Origin of Immigrants.................................................................8 |
| Figure 1.3 | Success of Integration Policies in European Countries..........................21 |
| Table 2.1  | Mother’s Choice of Childcare in Relation to Employment..........................32 |
| Figure 2.2 | Urban Macro-Segregation among Immigrants.............................................35 |
Chapter One: Introduction

Introduction

In October of 2005 civil unrest erupted in the banlieues across France. Three young boys became representative of the tensions between French authority and the minority youth. Finishing up a game of soccer in a Parisian suburb, Clichy-sous-Bois, the boys began to make their way home. Upon encountering policemen at the entrance of their domain, the boys fled and hid in an electrical substation to avoid confrontation with the police. While Muhittin, Bouna, and Zyed searched for a way out, the boys were electrocuted in the 10,000-volt substation (Tshimanga 2009, 10).

The deaths of Zyed, Muhittin, and Bouna not only resulted in weeks of rioting in 274 towns throughout France but also forced an uncomfortable, heated discourse on French identity and the marginalization of immigrants and their descendants in French society. The immigrant’s perception of being forced out onto the periphery was not without basis. The statistical data of the educational proficiency and unemployment rates among 2007 immigrants points toward a divide between the “French” and the “non-French.” The events that proceeded discontent with the status quo and the riots were a government response that seemed to only add more fuel to the fire. The political community during the time of the French presidential campaign of 2006-2007 brought immigration into the limelight (Thomas 2013, 66). It was particularly Sarkozy’s “zero tolerance” stance as Minister of the Interior during the youth rioting and the policies of
his presidency that resulted in restrictions on immigration. Sarkozy's administration was a recipient of criticism in the face of such strong social division. This divide became more apparent in 2007 with French media’s coverage of the riots. In the midst of the *banlieue* riots, many media outlets presented participators mostly as *Francais issus de l’immigration* (nationalized immigrants), although it was often the case that the younger generation among them were born in France. Consequently, media outlets contributed to the hardening of public opinion on the migration question. Depicted as the French sickness, immigrants and their children, who had been living in France for decades, began to face societal discrimination from French of all political sides (Martingy 2009, 28). Attention was also given to the debate on national identity due to Sarkozy’s attempt to garner the support of the right during the presidential election and his aggressive policies after his inauguration (Martingy 2009, 21).¹ The national debate revolved around three issues: the dissolution of the French identity due to the country’s unfavorable economic situation in the midst a globalizing world, the challenge of multiculturalism as a response to the waves of immigrants, and the post-colonial question on how to reconcile national pride and national repentance (Martingy 2009, 26).

Upon looking at the media representation of rioters, it is evident that this feeling of marginalization did not rest in all immigrants. Second and third generation non-Western European immigrants became the image of this discontent. How can marginalization appear to be an experience typical of non-Western European immigrants? Are there specific corners of society in which this racial marginalization manifests itself?

¹ The creation of the Ministre de l’Identité Nationale et de l’Immigration was in May 2007.
decolonization era was a catalyst for waves of migrants surging into Europe from former European colonies and from other European countries that underwent democratization at later periods. France experienced immigration of both kinds.

**History of Immigration**

Today’s statistics of the levels and origins of France’s immigrant population are generally similar in pattern the immigrant population census of the late post-World War II years, from the 1960’s to 1970’s. North Africans and Southern Europeans have continued to compose the majority of France’s immigrant population. Italy, Spain, and Portugal, specifically, led a steady flow into the *pays d’accueil* on Europe’s end for some time. Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria compose the majority of the African migration to France. According to a 2013 study by the Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques the weight of these two regions continues to be overwhelming in comparison with other countries of emigration (see Figure 1.1). The years of 1960 in France witnessed a larger immigration of Southern Europeans relative to North Africans inhabitants until 1968 after which the Southern European population slowly tapered off. Around approximately the same time, there was growth of the representation of North African inhabitants in France (see Figure 1.2).

---

2 Although Southern Europeans and North Africans are generally head-to-head in regard to the percentages of the arriving populations in France, the statistics concerning the proportion of immigrant inhabitants demonstrate that the immigrant distribution between these two regions has experienced a reverse throughout the years.
Post World War Two Southern European and North African Immigration

Figure 1.1 This table shows the rate of immigration in millions from 1962 until 2010.
Source: INSEE 2010

Country Origin of Immigrants

Figure 1.2 This table depicts the reparation of immigrants according to their country of origin.
Source: INSEE 2010
Studies show that France has been the beacon for many Southern Europeans and North Africans since the post-War World II years, and it is the historical context, including political and economic agents, that catalyzed this pattern of immigration. Following the end of the Second World War, many European countries witnessed the disintegration of their colonial outposts. Although Africa was for the most part still under European direct influence or indirect influence (through indigenous locales), a growing nationalist sentiment proliferated activist groups (Judt 2005, 279) The surge of nationalism in these colonies led to the eventual collapse of these empires, and the effects reverberated throughout Europe by destabilizing an empire that was economically dependent on the exports of colonialism. For France, its prized colonies were located along the Mediterranean (for the most part, on the coast of Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco) (Judt 2005, 282).

After the end of World War II, France and other European nations were concerned with social reform and political stability, and such change was not possible without economic reconstruction (Judt 2005, 82). One of the crucial solutions to this infrastructural reform was “temporary” work emigration to France which led to an opening of a multitude of jobs in the tertiary sector. At the end of the war, many countries experienced a deficiency in skilled labor in the coal, textile, and steel industries (Judt 2005, 332). Consequently, the demand led to labor substitution in two forms: political refugees and economic immigrants. Between 1945 and 1970, Italy was depleted of seven million of its inhabitants and Portugal, one and a half million (Judt 2005, 334). Spain lagged behind Italy and Portugal in regard to its contribution to France’s immigrant
population. While males took up the labor production in the tertiary sector, Southern European women (most of whom were of Portuguese origin) found jobs in concierge, childcare, maintenance, and domestic services. Economic ambition was not the only push behind Southern European immigration. Political ideologies conflicting with democratic principles were also an incentive behind Southern European immigration. Only after 1974 did the French economy stabilize and labor production increase. Immigrant workers were no longer a necessity, the result of a diminishing presence of Southern Europeans (see figure 1.2).

Concerning immigration on the end of Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria, the labor agreement in France with its colonies and the labor shortage after WW II in Europe spurred a wave of North African “single” men to relocate to Europe as “temporary workers” (Bouyarden 2013, 104). Large-scale North African migration to France was facilitated through two types of channels: “preferential migration arrangements” and irregular resettlement. Algerian migration was coordinated through bilateral agreements that gave Algerians privileged status. On the other hand, Tunisian and Moroccan migration to France was regulated by the Office National d’Immigration (ONI) (Bouyarden 2013, 109). Similar to Southern European migration patterns, Maghreb migration was, for the most part, generated by males. Females and families were not a strong part of the migration demographics until less restrictive immigration policies in the 1960’s and 1970’s (Bouyarden 2013, 104). The striking difference between the

---

3 France was one of many Western European countries to join the EEC. The European Community was composed, at the beginning, of the nation-states reflecting a Christian Democrat platform which favored the notion of a trans-national executive power to protect the sovereignty of the people (Judt 2005, 157). Given the ideological platform backing the European Community, Spain, Italy, and Portugal did not join the EC until years later. In the case of Italy, there was a transition to democracy (though an imperfect) one given the prevailing Fascists administrative structures in the Mezzogiorno (Judt 2005, 257). Before these shifts to democratic structures, many Southern European nationals sought out opportunities in France.
advantages of migration for the Southern Europeans and North Africans was the quality of the positions waiting for and held by these immigrants. While Southern Europeans seemed to fair well with jobs in the tertiary and domestic sector, North Africans were often consigned to employment with “highly exploitive conditions” (Bouyarden 2013, 109). The quality of the employment was often indicative of the residential location of these immigrant workers. Whereas Southern European females found work in the domestic sector with jobs that permit them to live around the more affluent French population, Maghrebian women tended to be segregated off from the prosperous population around poor quality housing in bidonvilles (1960).

Disparities similar to quality of employment between these two immigrant groups continue to prevail into the 21st century despite the creation of administrations and policies targeting equal integration. The status of the children of these immigrants seems to reflect a pattern present during the first few years of the post-World War II immigration: the lack of success of North Africans in comparison to Southern Europeans. Roughly 80 percent Southern European immigrant descendants finishing their education in 2004 experience an employment rate not too far off from that of native French while a reported 60 percent of North African descendants found employment within 3 to 5 years after their education (Jugnot 2012, 63). The accessibility of any type of employment is heavily dependent on the “qualification” or the possession of a degree. The level of academic success influences which jobs are available. Although it is expected that immigrant descendants generally will have higher “non-degreed” rates than the “non-immigrant/non-immigrant descendant” French (taking into account the language barrier), explaining the discordance between the Southern European and North African immigrant
descendant is more difficult. Apropos of the rate of non-degreed immigrant descendants, 41 percent of North African immigrant descendant males (aged 20-35) are without a diploma above the *brevet*, below secondary education, while 33 percent of Southern European males do not hold at least a secondary education diploma (Brinbaum 2012, 47). The pattern is similar for women as well; more Southern European than North African women has a secondary degree. Beyond access to employment and possession of a CAP degree, it is evident that this disparity persists in relation to which group has greater access to jobs of a higher status. Although immigrant descendants have benefitted from socio-professional mobility between generations, North African immigrant descendant have not seen as much socio-professional mobility. Research on immigrant descendants from age 35 to 50 exhibits that certain employment (*employé/ouvrier, profession intermédiaire, cadre*) is restricted based on the social status of the father and nationality.

How is the lack of socio-economic mobility of North African immigrants compared to the Southern European second generation explained? Exploring how particular factors influenced the manner in which the North African French population became and continues to be so marginalized and less incorporated than its Southern European counterpart is the issue this thesis will attempt to unravel. This research will elucidate the role of “othering” and the French political economy with the range of socio-economic opportunities of North Africans and Southern Europeans. Through of an analysis of scholarship and statistic reports, I examined how the influence of these factors is linked to socio-economic mobility and how their effects materialize in French society. This linkage will be substantiated through a comparison study among second generation
immigrants with Italian, Portuguese, Spanish, Tunisian, Moroccan, and Algerian lineage. In these six demographic groups, I examined and compared at the general rate of success for each regional group. This term “success” relates to the socio-economic status of North Africans and Southern Europeans French. This is based on their access to employment or integration into the job market after education, level of academic certification, and household income.

In order to examine the extent of the influence of these determinants on the socio-economic mobility of North African immigrants, this study will focus only on the second and third generation immigrants, the children of the immigrants who came between the later years of the 1960’s and 1975. According to a 2012 population study, a majority of those immigrant children are between the ages of 25 and 50 (Insee 2012, 109). Immigrant descendants approximately from the age of 30 to 50 will be studied. This population focus allows limits as much as possible factors such as the difference between the size of the Southern European and North African immigrant population from being a variable in the opportunities allotted to each group. However, there is still decent gap in the population size which will be taken into account in later chapters. The 2012 dossier presents statistics reflecting that the smallest gap is among those aged 30 to 50. Given that these immigrants were born and educated in France, the disparity between North African descendants and Southern European descendants cannot be attributed significant influence on the circumstances. This research will focus on unearthing the possible determinants: “othering” or the French political economy.

Scholars have previously to explain is the difference of the socio-economic mobility of these two groups: Southern European and North African. Scholars like Didier
Gondola, Jean-Loup Amselle, and Dominic Thomas attribute this socio-economic disparity to a visible factor: race. For one author in particular this explanation of the marginalization of African immigrant groups is rooted in France’s role in colonial history. Frederick Cooper links the term “republican” to French culture by saying that this term has become definitive of French identity and those who are not French. The riots of 2005 are representative of how this “republican model” impedes the integration of certain immigrants and, more specifically, Muslim immigrants. Cooper argues that race becomes a defining factor in inclusion due to the fact that this French republican model has its roots in colonialism (Gondola 2009, 91). The result is a system that actively works against an “equalizing initiative.” Although Cooper asserts that France’s history of colonialism has contributed to France’s current issues of ethnic marginalization, he emphasizes that colonialism should not be depicted as the sole source of France’s social mobility issue.

Gondola builds on Frederick Cooper’s argument by claiming that ethnic marginalization is not only an issue of historical racism (colonialism) but also of media-generated perceptions and “semantic representation” of Blacks and Beurs, which is a legacy of colonialism (Gondola 2009, 147). Gondola further elaborates her explanation through an analysis of popular narratives on Africa and the discourse surrounding “blackness.” She claims that there is a paradox in this language or narration of colonialism: Africa is fantasized, but the tales and “iconization” reflect France’s difficulty to accept its African immigrants in the same manner as it has done with its European immigrants. “Hoisted as the cornerstone of “New France” and given prominent place within Greater France, Africa became so heralded in the French imagination
(Gondola 2009, 151).” The result of this discourse is a depiction, criminalization, and stigmatization of “African” as inferior to the superior French master. This all arises under the lack of “policing” of derogatory terms referencing “black” (Gondola 2009, 153).

Gondola bridges this concept of criminalization over into foreign policy to exhibit how the foreign policy between France and African countries has a double effect. France’s intervention or interest in African nations can be defined as “predatory” and degrading (Gondola 2009, 156). The effect is this inability of African immigrants to accept the treatment of their origin country and, thus, their inability to feel at home in French society. The author further expounds on this “othering” of African immigrants through the racialization of “immigrant.” She claims that although France has avoided ethnic identification, terms such as immigré and immigré née en France are simply a code word for race in the political realm which does not affect European or American immigrants in the same way as it does African immigrants (Gondola 2009, 158). Politicization of this type of termination does not contribute to social fluidity but confines all groups, immigrant and non-immigrant, to a racial hierarchy.

To detail how semantics, discourse, and media contribute to the success gap between European and African immigrants, Gondola declares that integration is more than social equality. According to her article, integration denotes a “moral membership (Gondola 2009, 159).” She argues that this moral membership fits W.E.B DuBois’s definition, “the public and psychological wages of whiteness.” She argues that whiteness is euphemism of Frenchness, and this has allowed the successful integration of European immigrants. The omission by scholars of “whiteness” having a role in this issue is proof of the invisibility of whiteness and visibility of black and beur. The author concludes that
the visibility of the immigration and their exclusion is due in part to their racialization in public discourse, media, culture, etc. European immigrants achieve economic privileges through their invisibility or whiteness (Gondola 2009, 160).

Dominic Thomas does not veer far off from Gondola and Cooper’s assertion that race is a factor in the differentiating reception of African immigrants and European immigrants. Through an exploration of the literature of African French writers, Thomas examines how the relationship between France and African countries is conceptualized and interpreted through the eyes of immigrant descendants. Through Franco-African literature, the author argues that discrimination various among minorities meaning that some minorities realize that their skin is a factor in their marginalization. African French will always suffer the burden of suspicion unlike French of “other origins (Thomas 2013, 153).” According to Dominic Thomas, this idea that some are more French than other is reinforced on the discourse and policy level.

French-African relations were conceived from the beginning in terms of cultural and racist supremacy, and they continue to define patterns of neo-colonial domination and exploitation that contribute directly to the very problems of destitution and emigration France bemoans (Thomas 2013, 85).

Thomas discusses institutions under Sarkozy’s presidency and the National Identity Debate of 2007. He argues that the French approach to immigration is a reflection of how the European identity and integration is conceptualized and fails to acknowledge the relationship between European populations and non-European populations (Thomas 2013, 69). By asserting that there is a privilege of selectivity, the “global south” is often left out these communities and marked as “undesirable (Thomas
It is this very concept of who is European and who is not that gets played on the 2007 National Identity Debate in France. The connection between the international regime and the national institutions is that immigrant policy affects not only migrants but well established foreigners as well. This concept of the “other,” according to Dominic Thomas, has evidently been ethicized and racialized in relation to non-EU communities or third party nationals. Third party nationals often evoke the image of the southern hemisphere; they are the migrants who don’t have the resources to contribute to society and are held as the cause for that receiving society’s ills (Thomas 2013, 76).

Whereas Gondola and Frederick argue that race becomes the basis of this “othering,” Nancy Foner and Richard Alba approach this “othering” from a different standpoint: religion. The two scholars analyze a comparison study of the role of religion in the United States and in Western Europe and the reason for which religion has a different social and economic impact in these regions. Alba and Foner declare that the influence of religion is dependent upon three things: the religious background of the immigrant group, the religiosity of the native population, and the historical relationship between the state and the immigrant population (Alba and Foner 2008, 361).

Their assertion is that Western Europe tends to have more difficulty accepting new religions than the United States. Religion, in the case of the U.S., aids the integration of immigrants and their descendants. Creating communities and stability, religion becomes a passage to many socio-economic opportunities (jobs, language tutoring, and housing) and becomes the foundation of and a method of preservation of an immigrant group’s identity and culture (Alba and Foner 2008, 363). For the second immigrant generation, social mobility is more attainable due to education in churches and protection
from criminal activity. Social mobility is also more attainable given the link between religious communities and civic engagement. Immigrants are more likely to be active participators in the political culture of a country (Alba and Foner 2008, 364). What allows the advantages of religion in the U.S. is the generally accepted concept that differentiation is okay and, thus, the lack of intervention of U.S. institutions in the development of religious immigrant populations (separate school systems) (Alba and Fone 2008, 366). For Western Europe, the case is far from similar. Upon broaching the topic of religion, European scholar often mention Islam, cultural difference tends to be the center of the Western European debate on Islam (Alba and Foner 2008, 368).

The view of Islam in Europe tends to focus on how it is culturally different and far from republican or pre-modern values. The result of this comparison is a de-humanization or demonization of Islam through various mediums (Alba and Foner 2008, 369). This perceived threat of Islam has aided in issues of cultural racism and Muslimophobia that have been witnessed by the second generation. Their chances of obtaining a good education and having decent representation in the labor market suffer as a result (Alba and Foner 2008, 371). Unlike the American case, Islam faces institutional barriers and becomes the framework of “cultural isolationism (Alba and Foner 2008, 373).”

**Literature Review**

While religion does have a role in both societies, Alba and Foner note that the U.S. and Western Europe have different contexts. In the U.S. most immigrants and their descendants are Christian; in Western Europe Islam is the majority religion of the immigrant populations. An even more crucial element is the level of religiosity in the
U.S. and Europe; while the United States puts great stock into religion and, more specifically, the belief in God, Europe finds religious principle to be illegitimate (Alba and Foner 2008, 378). In conclusion, whether a society is particularly open to religion or not plays a crucial role in how compatible an immigrant population is in the receiving country.

Several authors attribute this exclusion or marginalization to the role race and culture play in the conception of European and French identity and how race and culture is presented in public discourse. However, other researchers such as Ruud Koopmans and Viriginie Guiradon believe that this marginalization can be connected to catalyst outside of race and “othering.” Koopmans’s article stress that France’s assimilationist approach to integration does not precisely denote the lack of integration of immigrant populations (Koopmans 2010, 1). He compares European states with generous welfare systems to those with lean, strict, or assimilationist welfare system. His comparison also takes into account the type immigration policies of different nation-states. Through cross-national studies, Koopmans supports his theory that states that give out heavy amount off aid and with multiculturalist polices actually do very little to expand the social mobility of immigrants. There is a progressive dilemma between sustaining an inclusive welfare state with a high provision level on the one hand, and polices of multiculturalism that facilitate immigrants’ access to welfare-state arrangements on the on the other (Koopmans 2010, 2).

According to the author, multiculturalist policies allow immigrants to become overly dependent on the welfare state and, thus, lead to cultural marginalization. From the gathered data, France does moderately well in terms of equality and cultural rights in
comparison with other EU states (Figure 1.3). Koopmans argues that excessive accommodation of immigrants, which often does not necessitate the acquirement of the host language above a proficient level, is ineffective towards the goal on integration policies. The welfare state influences to a great extent the results of integration policies. Looking at the degree to which a service is provided on the basis of “right” and the ability of an individual to live independently of those services (de-modification), Koopmans proclaims that there are three types of welfare states: social democratic, liberal, and conservative (Koopmans 2010, 8). France falls into the conservative category. The importance of the classification is that it denotes the socio-economic mobility of immigrants.

![Graph](image)

**Success of Integration Policies in European Countries**

Figure 1.3 Ranking of European countries according to their efficiency in approaching integration. “0” meaning (more effective handling) to “100” (least effective handling)

**Source:** Migration Policy Index Report 2015
The author explains the manners in which the level of benefit generosity influences social mobility: unqualified and low-educated immigrants will tend to seek out countries the most “generous,” immigrants’ motivation to improve their social mobility will be hindered by whether there are domestic penalties for dependency on benefits, and the socio-economic disparity between the hosts and immigrants will be higher in generous welfare states (Koopmans 2010, 9). Koopmans supports his assertion with data from the International Center for Prison Studies which exhibit that the foreign population in prisons in highest among countries with relatively lax welfare states and immigration policies (Koopmans 2010, 19). In regard to policy, assimilationist policies encourage immigrants to acquire the knowledge and skills to enter the labor market whereas multiculturalist policies only increased the social divide between the host and immigrant. The differences in policies can determine who gets to be involved in the labor market of a European nation (Koopmans 2010, 10).

Veering away from the integration policy approach, Virginie Guiradon chooses to focus on economic policies and the political economy the host country. She relates how the downturn or the slowing of European economies in in the 70’s resulted in the limited labor market participation among immigrants (Guiradon 2014, 1298). The effects of this period have been felt by the first and second generation. She argues that this focus on an “identity crisis” related to ethnicity leaves no room for another relevant factor that explains more the circumstances of the second generation. Economic and demographic differences have a considerable amount of influence on the labor market participation of immigrants (Guiradon 2014, 1303). Guirdaon grounds her hypothesis on studies that reflect how tax incentives, childcare availability, household size, gender, local policies
and education determine the socio-economic mobility of immigrants and their descendants. Concerning the education of immigrants, Guiradon states that education is the bridge to labor market participation. Obtaining a good education is completely dependent on location and income rather than family model or structure. For Guiradon, this is where local policies begin to have an influence. Her claim is that immigrants who are established in growing metropolitan labor markets are more successful than those who try to establish themselves in local labor markets (Guiradon 2014, 1306). She concludes, therefore, that ethnic boundaries are not as significant as economic and institutional boundaries.

**Method**

Having stated the control and the empirical focus of the independent variables, this thesis will focus on explain how lack of socio-economic mobility of North African French can be due in part to the political economy: few tax incentives, inadequate access to childcare, segregating residential policies and markets, and discriminatory mainstreaming in education. Beyond the aspect of the political economy, my analysis of social barriers to incorporation (*laïcité* and public discourse) will show that incorporation “by validation” has failed to facilitate North African French socio-economic advancement. The following chapters will approach my hypothesis by focusing on the exogenous factors that privilege Southern European French over North African French. Chapter two will explore how the political economy and differentiating demographics disadvantage the North African second generation in their pursuit of socio-economic success. Chapter three will focus on how public discourse and *laïcité* perpetuate harmful stereotypes that stigmatize and limit North Africans to a status of “undesirable” in French
culture. The conclusion of this thesis will focus on determining which of these variables has the greatest impact on North African immigrant descendants in French society.
Chapter Two: The Political Economy

The Welfare State

Discourse on the incorporation of immigrants often revolves around multicultural policies and cultural rights. However, previous studies exhibit the role of what Koopmans calls “benefit generosity” in the socio-economic status of immigrant descendants (Koopmans 2010, 5). Koopmans claims that the over-generous welfare state will attract more unskilled and lower educated immigrants. Guiradon, on the other hand, claims that there are internal political economic barriers that hinder socio-economic advancement. Both agree that the political economy does have an impact on the improvement of human capital. This chapter aims to dissect the extent of this impact for Southern European and North African French from various corners of the political economy: tax/benefit system, childcare system, residential policies, and education structure. The incorporation of North African French into the country’s political economy follows a different trajectory than that of Southern European French. Through these pillars of the political economy, this chapter will explore the socio-economic advantage and disadvantages of both groups in comparison with socio-economic status of non-immigrant French natives.

In the four decades following the massive waves of immigration from Southern Europe, Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria, immigrants encountered a series of social, economic, and political structural obstacles. These structural obstacles accumulated into an EU economic crisis linked with the integration crisis of the European Union in which
immigrants and their children performed poorly in comparison to the socio-economic success of Franco-French. Consequently, the mainstream population and politics of each European nation depicted these under-privileged groups as economic and social burdens (Guiradon 2014, 1298).

MIPEX reports and Rudd Koopmans’s research reflects that the French welfare state, in comparison with those of other European Union nations, rates fairly well; France’s welfare state has a similar trajectory to many other EU nations, however France’s condition is still not the worst in comparison. Similar to Koopmans, Guiradon, through her in depth research on European policies and the consequences of those policies, claimed that the political economy is the most influential factor in the socio-economic success of immigrants and immigrant descendants. Studies from the OECD, INED, and other institutes reveal the structure of the welfare state in France and how far the ripple effects of the policies extend in regard to education and labor market participation. In this section of exogenous factors, statistics from various sources will be used to determine whether these policies combine to disadvantage immigrant descendants in France or adequately supply North African French with tools to increase their human capital.

**Tax/Benefit System**

As Guiradon mentioned, certain aspects of socio-economic mobility such as the labor market participation of women can be linked to tax policy. The correlation between the tax system and the socio-economic status of North African French citizens can be found particularly in the low labor market participation of second generation North African
French women. Social demographics such as family size are strong markers of differences among North African French, Southern European French, and Franco-French. These demographics result in consequences for each immigrant group concerning tax policy. This section will explore how a tax policy that disfavors dual-earner households effects larger than average household sizes of North African families. Through an explanation of the French tax system, this section will demonstrate how the lack of tax incentives for North African immigrants can lead to low labor market participation of women and little investment in childcare facilities, the effects of which extend to the potential academic and professional success of their children.

The tax and benefit system hold the capacity to have a significant impact on immigrant households in France. France is one of a handful of European countries that have joint taxation as an option for “families.” The term family references married couples and couples with children (OECD 2015, 1). Among these countries that offer joint taxation, Germany and France are the only two with a tax/benefit system that does not favor dual-earner households (OECD 2015, 2). The common perception is that families with higher incomes will pay more in taxes. However, the French tax system is not essentially based on income as an individual but as a household. Single-earner households in France do not contribute as much as dual-earner households in tax payments to the government (see fig. 1).
2013 Distribution Net Transfers to the Government in France

Figure 1. Portion of Tax Payments in French Households

Source: OECD, Family Database, 2015

Given the nature of the tax benefit system, it is evident that this would have a significant impact on the households of North African immigrant families which are larger than the average native French and Southern European family. A defining demographic between immigrant descendants of Southern European origin and North African origin is the size of the household. For each North African family, the amount of children to one mother is significantly larger than in a Southern European family. To be more specific, in 2005 there was an average 5.4 children for a North African mother and

---

4 However, all of this information does not take into account the cost of childcare and is based on the assumption that each family has access to informal care systems (friends, family, and neighbors) (OECD 2015, 5).
3.9 for a Southern European mother (Okba 2012, 2).\(^5\) Furthermore, a tax system that favors single-earning households would prove as a deterrent to the labor market participation of either the mother or the father. According to a study from the Institut National des Etudes Demographiques concerning the integration of immigrants into the job market, immigrant women are more likely to be inactive than their male counterpart (Domergue and Jourdan 2012, 34). Considering the lack of tax incentives for dual-earner households compared to single-earners and the general large size of North African families, North African women do not really have many encouragements to participate in the labor market. Occupied with more children than the average in France, it would not be beneficial financially or time-wise.

**Quality and Accessibility of Childcare**

Subsequently, childcare falls within the ripple effect of France’s tax benefit system. The utilitarian value of formal childcare is the opening of employment possibilities for the non-working parent and investment in the academic potential of the child. Until the 1980’s childcare was considered to be informal. The government’s decision to subsidize formal systems of childcare pushed families, immigrant and native, to seek public and private childcare facilities. In the 1980’s, the enrollment rate of children into head-start programs reached around 17% with family daycare as the most popular form (OECD 2000, 132). The European Platform for Investing in Children deems that the inclusive childcare and preschool services in France are adequate given

\(^5\) There was an average of 6.8 children for an Algerian, 4.7 for a Moroccan and Tunisian, and 3.9 for a Southern European mother (Okba 2012, 2).
that it is available to children as young as two months. A major benefit is the free of charge preschools which are accessible to children between the ages of three and six (Europa 2015). Upon taking into account the cost and types of childcare, the question arises as to who uses which sources of childcare. Given that formal facilities tend to denote more academic resources and qualified teachers/childminders, the accessibility of formal childcare services to certain mothers influences not only a mother’s decision to work or stay inactive but also the education attainment of the child.

The accessibility of childcare and socio-economic status of the mother and father determines the form, informal or formal, of childcare services they will opt for. In other words, the occupational level of the parent influences access to certain types of childcare. In France, mothers who send their infants to crèches are often active in the labor market (see Table 2.1). It is not incorrect to deduce that these women have jobs in high-intermediate paying sectors such as clerical work, mid-level occupation, and management. They are three times more likely to put their children in crèches than mothers who work in sectors with menial pay (manual labor or unskilled labor) (OECD 2000, 135). The mothers who tend to occupy those remunerative jobs are mostly native French females. The significance of these statistics regarding working mothers is to show that women who have a superior education and a firm financial foundation have more access to childcare which gives mothers more time to dedicate to a career and sets their children up for academic success. While North African mothers from larger families are

---

6 Before the age of three, however, parents contribute 18.6% of their household incomes to childcare services. This is a significant percentage considering that parents contribute between 14% and 38% of the cost depending on the type of service: occasional care or a collective or family crèche. The price rises considerably for parents who employ registered childminders (OECD 2015, 137).
7 The status of their employment stems from a high education.
8 One out of five working women who obtain secondary schooling participates in the labor market.
limited to being inactive with little or no experience, Southern European women are dealt a better hand that does not give them as much professional mobility as the native French but more mobility than North African women.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation of the Mother</th>
<th>Informal Care</th>
<th></th>
<th>Formal Care</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Family</td>
<td>Neighbor</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Crèche</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farming</td>
<td>81.1%</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Craft, trade, management</td>
<td>51.6%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>13.3%</td>
<td>10.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management/supervisory(^\text{10})</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
<td>18.1%</td>
<td>16.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid-level Occupation(^\text{11})</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>13.7%</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
<td>14.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration Work(^\text{12})</td>
<td>38.4%</td>
<td>11.2%</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
<td>13.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Skilled Labor(^\text{13})</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mother’s Choice of Childcare in Relation to Employment\(^\text{14}\)

Table 2.1 Family and Neighbor Care is an aggregate of in-home and outside care. 
Source: OECD, Directorate for Social Affairs, Manpower and Education, 2003

As stated beforehand, there is a correlation between childcare accessibility and employment. The objective of the study SOCCARE, a project focused on the

\(^9\) Childminder references registered and non-registered services organized independently and are not preoccupied with educational advancement. It is worth noting that affluent families tend to prefer childminders capable of providing in-home services which are more expensive

\(^{10}\) Secondary teacher is a position that would fall under this range.

\(^{11}\) Mid-level occupations would include primary teachers, social workers, and employees in commerce and administration.

\(^{12}\) Administration workers would be in the field of civil service, business administration, and commerce.

\(^{13}\) Low skilled labor would fall in the domain of industrial work and unskilled work.

\(^{14}\) This table concerns children under three years old.
organization of social care among families in Europe, was to analyze the structural, socio-economic, and demographic changes in Europe and families of various backgrounds: lone parent, dual earner households, and immigrant families.\textsuperscript{15} Full-time employment is high among females in France compared to part-time employment (Kröger 2003, 6). This indicates the probability that women with lower income are inclined to stay inactive when family size, taxes, and childcare accessibility is taken into account. Another factor of employment is employer flexibility. Women who maintained full-time employment often benefited from medium to high flexibility in hours or leave in relations to the status of their employment (Kröger 2003, 6).

According to the report, the higher the qualification of the individual, the more “family friendly” or flexible the individual’s employment can be (Kröger 2003, 7). This designates that these parents can afford more hours of childcare services and have jobs that are willing to concede to “unsocial and atypical working hours” (Kröger 2003, 7). The case is the exact opposite for parents coming out of low income situations and menial pay jobs. Immigrants, who dominate the supply of unskilled or manual labor, tend to be more preoccupied with “extensive cost delegation and leaving the children alone,” or the mother often choses to cut her work hours in order to look after the children (Kröger 2003, 9). Among the immigrants who hold skilled professions (most of whom are of European descent), there is an emphasis on “medium to high extensive delegation” meaning they are more likely to choose external childcare (Kröger 2003, 9). Depth findings concerning families of African origin show that these families are more disposed

\textsuperscript{15} This report gathered information concerning female full time/ part-time employment, paternal participation in childcare, and employer flexibility.
to mother-centered childcare arrangements.\textsuperscript{16} This includes dual-earner households in which the mother either partially or completely cuts back her hours (Kröger 2003, 64). This report specifies the impact of the accessibility of childcare on the professional opportunities and decisions of first generation parents. These parents are essentially role models for the second generation. The likelihood of the parent(s) to be employed in unskilled labor decreases professional mobility of their children given that they would not have much cultural and economic capital (Aebehardt 2015, 573).

The domino effect of the infrastructure of the childcare system extends to education as well. It can be expected that parents take into account the quality of the childcare that they choose for their children. Unfortunately, this is not the only criteria. As in any country, high quality childcare, childcare that renders educational services, costs more than childcare that is simply concerned with childminding. Even though the government aims to subsidize childcare, aiding kids in becoming more academically competitive in the future is not always the first priority. The minimal amount of care is often acceptable. This bare minimum increases the price value of childcare that not only focuses on childminding but also enhancing the social and academic skills of children. The effect then follows a pattern similar to employment rates. Only families (often native French and sometimes Southern European) can benefit from a majority of these highly sought after services (OECD 2000, 133). Consequently, parents lay out a blueprint for their children’s futures.\textsuperscript{17}

\textsuperscript{16} This estimation includes families of North African, West African, and Central African origin.

\textsuperscript{17} Among Southern European immigrant children (between the ages of 20 and 35) who received their primary education in France, only 33 percent of men and 25 percent of women are without a diploma above brevet. Among North African immigrant children, only 41 percent of men and 37 percent of women are without a high level diploma (Brinbaum 2012, 47).
Impact of Residential/Housing Policies on the Housing Market

Similar to tax policy, French residential/housing market has been shown to be a physical representation of its striated society. The banlieus and zones d'éducation prioritaires signify the peripheral of French society, immigrants of under-developed or developing countries. The residential housing market and the distribution of France’s population within this system have economic as well as educational consequences. By zooming in on the residential market and policies, this section will illustrate the manner in which wealth is concentrated outside of ZEP, banlieus, and CUS zones. North African immigrants and their children are characteristically linked to these socio-economically weak areas. I will explore how residential policies and structures contribute to the poor academic success rate and the lack of professional opportunities of North African descendants.

Similar to residential patterns in several other developed countries, the residential background has residual effects on the labor market participation and education attainment of any individual regardless of ethnicity. Controlling for ethnicity allows the magnification of the importance of income and social status of the family of a student. As to be expected, there is a gap in terms of the quality of education available, academic success, and access to moderately remunerative employment. Upon taking into the account country of origin of these students, it is evident from previous research that the gap widens further among native French, Southern European French, and North African French students.
The issue concerning residential policies and the housing market is often met with the argument that residential segregation and the low labor market participation of certain immigrant groups is a result of their tendency to favor interaction with those who look as they do. Guiradon researches the issue in a comparison study of immigrants’ labor participation rate cross-locally in the same country. The consequences of local dynamics in post-industrial cities outweigh the drawback of ethnicity. More specifically, a lack of labor market participation cannot be solely attributed the propensities of the individual to associate or interact with others “just like them” (Guiradon 2014, 1306). Therefore, I expect to draw from my research the conclusion that the socio-economic barriers within certain locales hold a greater weight than the “choice” of immigrant descendants to live among the same ethnicity.

In France there is an apparent strong concentration of certain populations in certain “quartiers” characterized by wealth, lack of income, and the ethnic groups that live in these areas. These quartiers are often referenced as the quartier “huppés” and “ghettos” (Ké Shon 2011, 1). A majority of French public housing is found in urban areas or on the outskirts of urban cities. The 1960’s and 1970’s of France saw waves of immigrants relocating from Southern Europe, Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria settle in a majority of France’s public housing (Verdugo 2011, 10). To restrict attempts at permanent resettlement the French government severely limited immigrants’ access to housing projects. As a result, many immigrants (mostly males) lived in slums on the outskirts of urban areas. During the late 1970’s, the French government loosened

---

18 Until the middle of the 1970’s, French national authority considered the immigration of African immigrants to be temporary, and the government explicitly discourage family reunification which would lead to permanent settlement (Verdugo 2011, 11).
restrictions on immigrants and granted more access to public housing facilitating family reunification (Verdugo 2011, 11). Nevertheless, the typical quality of this “new” housing was relatively low. Quality was traded in to accommodate a large population; therefore, tall apartment complexes with living quarters insufficient for the usual immigrant families that inhabited them (Bourdon 2007). These became to be known as “taudis” or HLM (habitations à loyer modéré).

Urban Macro-Segregation among Immigrants

Figure 2.2 Dissimilarity index of the presence of certain immigrant groups in French public and private housing in 1982, 1990, and 1999.

Source: Verdugo 2011, 17

---

19 It was not until la Loi de Debré and Vivien that the French government attempted to find a solution to the miserable living conditions, also called bidonvilles, in urban areas.
In the latter half of the 1990’s, some of these areas became ZUS areas, zones urbaines sensibles, or CUS, contrat urbain de cohesion. Ridden with high rates of unemployment, poor economic activity, and low income rates, these zones became a priority for the French government (Aeberhardt 2015, 573).\textsuperscript{20} As one would suspect, North African immigrant descendants compared to Southern Europeans immigrant descendants were heavily over-represented in these areas. From 1968 this opening of the housing market to immigrants revealed macro-segregation across urban areas. Figure 2.2 exhibits immigrant access to private and public housing in urban areas with a population greater than 50,000 and neighborhood segregation in 1968 and 1999 (Verdugo 2011, 20).\textsuperscript{21} The statistics relate a large percentage of immigrants in public housing in 1999, 18.2\%, and in 1968, 14.1\%. Their share in public housing is greater than their share in private housing. On average, European immigrants who take up residence in public housing tend to do so in areas with fewer immigrants. To be more specific, in 1968 European immigrants (Italians, Portuguese, and Spanish) had the tendency to live in “census tracts” where Southern Europeans composed 10 percent (highest of all immigrant groups in 1968) of the population even though the general populations consisted of only 2 percent Southern Europeans. This was the case in 1999; the lowest record of segregation, 2 percent, among immigrant groups belonged to Southern Europeans. Although indexes of segregation decreased between 1968 and 1999 for North African immigrants, residential segregation was still higher than that for Southern European immigrants (Verdugo 2011, 21). Figure 2.2 reinforces the fact that general macro-level segregation

\textsuperscript{20} 2,500 ZUS and CUS zones were designated at the establishment of this system.

\textsuperscript{21} The indexes demonstrate that all immigrants made up 8.63\% and 10.12\% of the total population in France in 1968 and 1999, respectively (Verdugo 2011, 20).
declined over the course of time but distribution of European and non-European immigrants in public and private housing persisted.

The divide in the housing market is attributable to a few factors: poor distribution of infrastructure, lack of public transports and services, and blatant disparities in the education system (Aeberhardt 2015, 568). The previous section mentioned income levels and employment status of immigrant groups and proved the connection between low incomes levels and access to certain services. Therefore, it is deducible that minority groups with low income levels are more dependent upon public transportation services (Aeberhardt 2015, 570). Access to public transportation is dependent upon which area an immigrant family chooses to live in, and some urban zones are situated too far from centers making public transportation unavailable or inadequate. Furthermore, housing complexes or public housing is usually constructed in manner that leaves urban zones on the periphery (cite radieuse).\textsuperscript{22} These areas were built for families that could not afford the average cost of living of city centers. As to be expected, poorly built houses meant poorly paved roads and lack of various adequate resources and facilities (Dubarle 2002, 198). This information shows how these urban zones lack resources that would be conducive to the socio-economic mobility of its residents.

Housing policies in France have proved to be just as insufficient as residential planning in relation to the education provided for the younger generation. A main objective of French housing policies is to maintain or advocate social cohesion. The Social Cohesion Plan was designed to diminish the disparity between social groups and

\textsuperscript{22} This was a direct consequence of national and international migration.
regions (Dubarle 2002, 182). Furthermore, past and current urban polices aim to diversify social housing. Often the promotion of a social mixture falls behind given the conflict between priorities: providing affordable housing to families in precarious situations and remaining within financial constraints (Dubarle 2002, 203). The effectiveness of such policies can be determined by statistics regarding the distribution of immigrants in the public and private housing market.

The effects of macro-level segregation, similar to the tax/benefit system and the availability of childcare, on the second generation manifest in the education attainment and labor market participation of immigrant children. Furthermore, the concentration of immigrants in certain zones proves to be one of the many facets of the explanation for the outcomes characterize, or rather, stigmatize immigrant groups in France (Aeberhardt 2015, 568). Among non-immigrant men 4.3% of the mainstream population (16, 032) completed their education in a ZUS or CUCS. The percentage was 29.1% for minorities (1, 4389). Taking into account gender divisions, women reflected the same pattern. Approximately 5% of the non-immigrant French female population was located in a ZUS or CUCS upon completion of their education; this is a stark contrast to the 28.9% of minority women who came out of disadvantaged zones. There are two processes going on that hinder the socio-economic mobility of the second generation immigrants: socialization in these disadvantage zones and concentration of efficient educational resources outside of these areas.

Factoring in residential location and the socio-economic demographics of the Southern Europeans and North African second generation, there is evidence of “territorial

---

23 Usually these policies call for financial support of these ZUS and CUS areas (Dubarle 2002, 203).
inequality of educational provision” (Aebeharft 2015, 570). By educational provision, this study is referencing the quality of the teaching, the experience and background of professors, the financial support of the school, the academic resources available to students through the school, and the number of students per class. ZUS and CUS zones are stigmatized as zones lacking the essential resources. There is a correlation between neighborhood socialization and a child’s academic success. There are consequences of educational underachievement being concentrated within a certain urban zone. The minority students in these priority zones grow to recognize how academic achievement in highly concentrated within certain areas and ethnic groups, and they normalize this systematic underachievement. According to Aeberhardt’s research, this “trigger effect” is the normalization of academic underperformance among one’s peers (Aebehardt 2015, 569). If an individual is not surrounded by models of academic or professional success within his or her ethnic community, the possibility of “failure” becomes greater.

An aspect of Aeberhardt’s “trigger effect” is “postcode discrimination.” “Postcode discrimination” occurs when individuals are stigmatized by their quartiers. This stigmatization persists in a manner in which those who mature in locales where a large portion of the residents are unemployed, not wealthy, and not actively looking for employment have a more difficult time moving out from under the stigma of economic and professional failure. The demographics of these families are not conducive for setting an example of professional and academic success for the children. In these zones sensibles, mothers are often unemployed or inactive, and fathers are either unemployed or employed in manual labor. At the origin level, the employment gap between mainstream and North African women is especially wide. Nearly six percent of Maghrebi women are
inactive, whereas only approximately three percent of mainstream women do not have and are not looking for employment (Aebehardt 2015, 573). It is not surprising that first generation North African mothers are more likely to be unemployed. The employment gap is significant; approximately 64 percent of non-immigrant French parents were employed according to Aebehardt’s study. Meanwhile, employment for North African parents was recorded to be approximately 28.5 percent.

Given that research shows that North African origin children come from families less socially and economically prominent than those of Southern European origin children, it is not a stretch to assume that the areas in which these Maghrebi families can afford to live in do not often have efficient resources or adequate infrastructure: adequate school system, recreational centers, and public transportation. Although both immigrant groups peaked within the same two decades, 1960’s to 1970’s, Italians, Portuguese, and Spanish were usually able to find better employment. Thus, it is deducible that this particular set had an average income higher than those from Maghreb.

On average, students with Moroccan, Tunisian, or Algerian heritage drop out more frequently than their French-born and Southern European peers (Aeberhardt 2015, 573). However, women of all origins generally drop-out less frequently than their male counterpart.²⁴ For those children of North African parents who go on to complete their education and obtain a baccalaureate, there is dissimilarity in the types of baccalaureate that they achieve. North African origin females are more likely to obtain a tertiary baccalaureate while men are more successful with industrial baccalaureates (Aebehardt

²⁴ In fact, by just comparing all immigrant women to French male students and controlling for social origin, research shows that even immigrant women are doing almost as well in relation to drop-out rates (Aebehardt 2015, 580).
The limits of the educational provisions most likely set these children on the vocational tract. Among those minorities dropped out in 2004, 27 percent came from a zone urbaine sensible or a contrat urbain sensible. Only six percent of mainstream children that completed their education came from these areas (Aebehardt 2015, 573). Although this data relates to a more recent time period and, therefore, a younger portion of the second generation, factors influencing education and the structure of education in France have not changed so much that applying the conclusion of this data to the old portion of the second generation would be fallible. Consequently, there is a correlation between residence in a ZUS and CUS zone and the academic underperformance of students, more specifically immigrant students.

In conclusion, the public and private housing market has established certain social and economic boundaries for certain ethnic groups. Research on the second generation proves that residential policies have allowed these boundaries to persist and perpetuate the marginalization of immigrants and their children. These boundaries have come to shape the quality of education that an individual has access to and the social network that influences their advancement or stagnation in society. Although, first generation immigrants generally do move away from these “distressed areas” over the years, African immigrants are more likely than non-European immigrants to stay in these distressed zones (Verdugo 2011, 6). It is evident that social background and residential location can only be applied as a facet of the explanation regarding the lack of socio-economic mobility of North African second generation compared to Southern European immigrant descendants. From Aebehardt, Okba, and Verdugo’s research, there is a trend. However,
a causal effect cannot be firmly substantiated. The extent of the influence of discriminatory mechanisms remains in question.

**Mainstreaming and Structure of Education**

Education is significant in that it is overall responsible for the socialization of children during their adolescent or developmental years. The structure or character of this particular institution is a marker of the extent of integration of immigrant descendants. According to Amanda Garret’s article in the Journal of Political Science, a country’s education system is a mirror of the national model, its “structural and ideological characteristics” (Garrett 2005, 26). Although education has been previously discussed as an outcome of policies, this section focuses on the structure of education itself and its influence on socio-economic mobility. Consequences from a lack of resources in underprivileged *quartiers*, ill-equipped teachers in CUS or ZEP zones, and the mainstreaming of education influences the education attainment of children as well. The structure of French education is not adaptable to the needs of immigrant parents and, consequently, penalizes the minority second generation. This section magnifies how social division materializes in the assimilationist foundation of the education system and schools’ methods of mainstreaming minority students. Studies show that minorities are more often than not pushed onto a precarious route of low income jobs and poor academic performance.

The institution of education is essential in integration in that it helps immigrant descendants reconcile the ethnic and geographic origins of their parents with the culture
they were born into (Garrett 2005, 5). Koopmans relates how France, in comparison with other countries, tends to rely on policies and institutions that are less “generous” or multiculturalist. The model of the pays d’accueil exemplifies more assimilationist principles, and the concept of republican assimilation is present in its education system. This system in relation to immigration and integration is founded on the participation in the individual as “a French person” and the full immersion into French culture and language (Garrett 2005, 5). Is the foundation of this institution conducive for facilitating the social and economic incorporation of the North African second generation?

The French education system privileges the concept of a uniform environment in which, ideally, any child, regardless of social or economic background, can receive the same quality of education. Those in “vulnerable” situations would have the opportunity to receive adequate education as those in less vulnerable situations (Garrett 2005, 11).25 The French government aspired to create an institution that relied on meritocracy more than aristocracy and to push closer to an egalitarian education system.

The structure of the French education system is very simple. Primary school is available to all, and children’s performance is supervised.26 It is at the age of 15 that students are given the responsibility of determining their educational and professional route. Through an examination students are placed on one of two trajectories: lycée to study for the baccalauréat and vocational training. If a student achieves the route of lycée, continued examinations and obtainment of the bacc opens the opportunity of placement in a classe préparatoire and, then, the possibility of acceptance into one of

---

25 First, the education system is centralized meaning that both public and private schools function under the regulations and standards imposed by the French government (Garrett 2005, 11).
26 Although there are no exit exams from primary schooling, a pupil’s monitored progress is recorded and sent on to a secondary school (Garrett 2005, 13).
France’s *grandes écoles* (Garrett 2005, 13). This route opens access to France’s high status and high paying jobs. Thus, the vocational route is not the ideal of any student. During the vocational route, students work toward a *certificate d’aptitude professionelle* which would give access to an entry level job or a vocational baccalaureate. This very program has been criticized due to its lack of efficiency in regard to the occupational progression of immigrants and their children (Safi 2014, 14).

France has taken measures to diminish the education disparity among different ethnic, social, and economic backgrounds. During the 1980’s, *zones d’éducation prioritaires* were established to support schools in generally disadvantaged areas. Even though France has invested in a plan to combat this academic inequality, this investment has not proved to be very efficient in the same way as the vocational programs when one takes into account the ethnic divide. The fissure between native French and the “immigrant French” is still apparent (OECD 2008, 5).

The establishment of priority education areas was intended to correct these and other inequalities by allocating financial resources and staff to encourage smaller class sizes and provide specific support programmes in disadvantaged schools, which are identified, in part, according to the share of students of foreign origin. However, evaluations of this positive support have concluded that the impact is uncertain (Kurzbaum 2009, 41).

Despite attempts to resolve this recurring issue, mainstreaming methods of school administrations, regional segregation, and the parents’ lack of knowledge of the French education system and lack of education in general is still an issue. To perform an analysis on these variables or obstacles, studies on regional school systems will be used to observe
the student population. Previous research has pointed to the high concentration of immigrant students in some of the worst schools.  

A study by Felouzis on schools in the Bordeaux region concluded that levels of segregation on the basis of ethnic origin are much higher than segregation based on social class and/or educational success (Kurzbaum 2009, 32). The study included an aggregate of young adults as old as 35 and at the end of their “initial education” (Aeberhardt 2015, 571). Only 4.45% of native French received their education in these priority zones whereas 29% of immigrant children received their education in these areas (Aeberhardt 2015, 574). Within the immigrant group there is an even greater gap between North African origin and Portuguese children, 37 percent and 12 percent, respectively (Kurzbaum 2009, 40). Through the regional distribution of ethnicities in schools, French schools generally tend to reinforce and emphasize divisions based on origin: French vs immigrant and European vs. non-European immigrant.

Parents, native and immigrant, seek out the maximum opportunities for their children and do so by attempting to sidestep residential restrictions (Kurzbaum 2009, 40). The expectations and wishes of the parents drive the education market, and the relationship among the immigrant portion of a school’s population, the reputation of an academy, and the plans of the parents is apparent. Parents have preconceived notions of competitive schooling, and schools respond to this by streaming or selection procedures that do not inhibit segregation. For example, a school administration will direct certain students to low-performance courses. Immigrant descendant students are often the target

---

27 These immigrants were particularly of North African, Sub-Saharan African and Turkish origin (Kurzbaum 2009, 33)
of this method. This is done to prevent the loss of the “best students” to other private or public schools with possibly better reputations (Kurzbaum 2009, 41). The combination of parental strategy, streaming, selection methods for special courses all have a direct impact on the attainment of education and the quality of the education of immigrant descendants.

Unfortunately, the support of the parents is not enough to ensure the success of their children. Educational segregation by post code and administration, ZEP’s, and vocational programs reflect how the education system is ineffective in the promotion of the social and economic advancement. The dropout rate for second generation immigrants is twice that of native French in secondary French education. The children of immigrants are more likely to take the vocational route (Kurzbaum 2009, 37). Similar to the trajectory of North African immigrant children, Portuguese children exhibit high dropout rates as well as an inclination for the vocational route. However, second generation male North African immigrants prove to be less successful on the vocational tract and encounter more obstacles. These vocational careers often do not fit the professional aspirations of North African males. In the case of Portuguese immigrants, these children gain greater access to careers fitting their aspirations after training programs or stages (Kurzbaum 2009, 37).

It is simply not enough to measure the types and obtainment of degrees, but the kinds of opportunities available to these students should also be taken into account. Thus, measuring unemployment rates in accordance with education level should be a marker to determine whether the French education system has a crippling effect on North African immigrant descendants. For the purpose of reflecting the mobility of each regional
ethnicity, Portuguese and Moroccans will stand representative of the Southern European and North African second generation, respectively. The unemployment rate of Portuguese immigrants (18-40 years old) in 1999 was relatively equal to that of French immigrants (Simon 2003, 1111). Taking into account the level of education did not produce unexpected results. Among those who dropped out, approximately 48% of Moroccans and 22.65% of Portuguese were unemployed in 1999. For those who chose the vocational tract, the Portuguese second generation had the lowest unemployment rate while Moroccans had the highest. Even Moroccans with a baccalaureate had an unemployment rate twice that of Portuguese with a baccalaureate as well (Simon 2003, 1112). Portuguese tend to be more concentrated in construction and trade jobs. Thus, this Portuguese niche serves as an advantage in that the second generation can rely on family and peer connections to gain entry into the job market. This is not the case for Moroccans who do not really have strong ethnic or peer ties in a particular market (Simon 2003, 1114).

Observation of the French education system and the performance of North African and Southern European immigrant groups in the labor market and collèges establish that the structure the French institution does not work efficiently and perpetuates the ethnic and economic boundaries that are permitted by other policies and structures: residential structures and tax/benefit policies.
Involuntary Inheritance of Socio-economic Mobility

Some scholars have argued that the lack of educational success of immigrants compared to French natives stems from the parental support and how their peers and/or family value education. The French education stems places a lot of importance in the participation of the parents in the academic growth of their children (OECD 2008, 5). Assistance with homework and simple motivation are essential. However, this aspect of education can be limited according to the parents’ educational background. The division between aspirations and realization is a tense subject especially for North African parents and their children. This division is amplified in school systems through the limited cultural and educational capital of the parents and their unfamiliarity with the French system. This occurs through the parents’ often limited knowledge of French which leads to awkward interaction with the schools (Kurzbaum 2009, 31).

Because the unemployment rates among fathers of North African origin are three times the rates among their Portuguese counterparts and because most of the mothers are not economically active, the families are limited in their ability to use networks to help their offspring gain access to the labor market (Kurzbaum 2009, 47).

Social reproduction theorists argue that the possibility of academic success is reliant upon the social characteristics of the immigrant parents, and these characteristics are usually negative. The lack of education of the parent(s) and their type of job can influence the education trajectory of the children (Kurzbaum 2009, 38). However, immigrant children, who started and finished their education in France, generally do fair better than their parents. This can be attributed to the increased interests of their parents.
in their education (Simon 2003, 1107). Immigrant parents tend to uphold high expectations or aspirations for their children. Kurzbaum argues that these aspirations tend to surpass those of native French parents of the same social class (Kurzbaum 2009, 38). For immigrant parents who are completely invested in the education of their children, the education system usually should manage to aid their social mobility (Simon 2003, 1108).

Even though personal choices should be taken into account to explain the general low employment rate and high employment in menial careers, residential segregation combined with the socio-economic status of peers and family have much influential power on second generation immigrants. Socio-economic mobility, therefore, becomes more of an involuntary inheritance. If the likelihood of the mother being employed and the father maintaining employment in heavy manual labor is great, there is an increased possibility that their children will possess low economic and cultural capital (Aebehardt 2015, 573). This is apparent from DARES analysis of the link between the type of employment of an immigrant father and the type of employment of the son and/or daughter. Consideration of the working-class origin becomes important when analyzing North African and Southern European immigrants. DARES analysis supports previous findings regarding the employment status of two immigrant groups. Algerian fathers are 50% more likely to be non-qualified workers while Southern European fathers are as likely to be qualified (Okba 2012, 2). The majority French population was more often employed as clerical or sales workers. Only 28.1 percent of male (28.3 percent for female) immigrant descendants declared that his or her father was a clerical/sales

---

28 This analysis studies descendants between the ages of 35 and 50 who were born in France to foreign born immigrant parents.
employee. Minority parents were more likely to be employed in manual labor: 42.7 percent for men and 47.2 percent for women (Aebehardt 2015, 575).

The second generation, thereafter, encounters many difficulties in professional advancement and access to employment. The daughters of North African parents spend approximately twice as much time finding their first job as the majority population; it takes a North African descendant female 2.5 years. This is less than the time for a French female, 1.3 years, and Southern European female, 1.3 years. The gap widens even further in the time it takes a female of each origin to find stable employment: 2.1, 0.9, and 1.0 years, respectively (Okba 2012, 3). While the time to access a “first job” varies, not all North African second generation girls are successful. Only 67 percent of women (79 percent for men) succeed in finding stable employment whereas 80 percent of Southern European women (90 percent for men) are successful. The pattern repeats itself in relations to years of unemployment and inactivity. Three years after individuals of the sample completed their education research revealed that North African children were more often unemployed than the majority population (Aebehardt 2015, 573). These statistics are not solely dependent on the socio-economic status of the parent. The level of education and limited or lacks of social connections are factors that should be taken into account and can be linked to residential location.

Analysis of previous research focused on the pattern among parents with poor social and economic capital and the socio-economic mobility of their children reinforces the concept that one’s parents in particular have an influence over the professional advancement of the children. The professional mobility of immigrant descendants is measured according to two indexes: mobility across different socio-professional
categories (ouvrière, employé; profession intermédiaire, cadre) and mobility between qualified and non-qualified jobs (Okba 2012, 4). Generally, females across all immigrant groups experience more difficulty achieving mobility. It is intriguing, however, that this limited advancement of North African men is no greater than that of the second generation of Southern European females. While only 17 percent of second generation North African men succeed in attaining higher employment status than that of their fathers, Southern European women encounter the same level of difficulty. In summary, an individual’s access to adequate education (above Bac+3 or a Bac in general) and the professional models in his or her immediate environment can have a favorable or unfavorable influence on the professional success of immigrant children.
Chapter Three: Incorporation by Validation

By analyzing the political economy of a country, it is possible to designate the causes of socio-economic stagnation in relation to demographic patterns within a group. However, Gondola, among other scholars, asserts that the creation of ethnic peripheries in French society is due in part to the conflict of historical racism (colonialism), “semantic representation,” and the media-generated perception of black and beur (Gondola 2009, 147). Gondola titles this stereotyping and active marginalization of the blacks and beurs born in France by the “invisible” French as “othering.” This invisibility is the privilege of not being stigmatized as an outsider based on ethnicity or religion. This term will be used throughout this chapter to indicate the active cultural exclusion of North African immigrant descendants through various means: laïcité and public discourse. This chapter will outline as well how Southern European descendants and native French inherit this invisibility on the basis of the inconspicuousness of their ethnicity and majority religion.

To broach the subject of the politicization of black and beur, a comprehensive outline of the French model of incorporation should serve as the foundation of this chapter. In this way, “othering” can be understood as having an origin. The French model of incorporation renders much control to the state over immigration affairs and, more
specifically, the integration of immigrants. In other words, integration in France is set up to occur at the national level. A significant consequence of this construction is the absence of middle institutions that would inevitably lead to the creation of collective or group identities. The French have a term for this: *communautarisme* (Garrett 2005, 9). France places ample importance on the incorporation of the individual immigrant. The most common case in point of France’s ideals is the country’s reluctance to collect or include ethnic data in studies. This reflects how the French state in regard to integration works under the “assumption that all individuals can and should be recognized as uniformly equal with respect to the state” (Garrett 2005, 9). How does the rejection of communities link to equality and uniformity under the eyes of the state? The French model relies on assimilation which creates obstacles for immigrants. These barriers challenged and debated through the channels of secularism and public discourse. This chapter on *laïcité* and public discourse will exhibit the manner in which visible ethnicity and religion continue to come into conflict with France’s reliance on assimilation as a method of incorporation.

Laïcité

What becomes of those who are not perceived to be assimilated according to the mainstream population? The fact behind “othering” is that it disregards whether or not

---

29 Consequently, the manner in which France’s incorporation model is construed creates a direct link between immigrants’ access to institutions and the power of the State (Garrett 2009, 8).
30 The English translation of this French term is the promotion of communities, which are often immigrant communities that do not fit the French idea of unification and egalitarianism (Garrett 2009, 8).
31 The French state does not officially or legally note neither ethnic nor racial identities of its inhabitants. It is very difficult (nearly impossible) to find French data that denotes the ethnicity or race of the subjects surveyed (Garrett 2009, 9).
the immigrant or immigration heir, the immigrant descendant, views himself or herself as having successfully integrated into French society and culture. An individual’s “feeling” of strong cultural ties with French society and their ethnic origin culture becomes irrelevant in the incorporation process leaving the incorporation in the hands of the invisible majority. *Laïcité*, or secularism, as a concept became over time a tool of marginalization in France.

Although the progress towards the separation of church and state began much earlier (18th century), secularism did not come into conflict with ethnicity until the late 19th century. The *Ancien Régime* of France rested, for the most part, on “monarchic religion” and the overarching power of the church. The superiority and authority of the Church during the revolutionary period of France did not coincide with objectives of the democratic revolutions sweeping Europe in the 18th century (Garrett 2005, 11). In brief, *laïcité* depended upon three ideological pillars: neutrality, religious liberty, and pluralism. The secularization of the French state required that all public service be neutral to religious opinions. However, French secularism does not simply boil down to state neutrality and tolerance; the state is obligated to reconcile religious liberty with public order. Finally, pluralistic French secularism specifies that each religion has a right to expression, and no religion should have a monopoly over the state (Garrett 2005, 20). It was not until 1882 with the establishment of the Law of Jules Ferry that secularism penetrated the French school system firmly separating religious doctrine from school curriculum. The gap of religion was filled by the teaching of patriot values or rather “the religion of the fatherland.” Geared to focus on Republican and civic values, the French education system took on secularism as a mode of uniformity (Garrett 2005, 12). In 1905,
the French state deemed that there would not be public recognition of religious communities in the public space. The conflicts among these three values and the expression of religion in the public space are precisely where secularism becomes a tool of differentiation and exclusion.

The Affaire du Foulard of 1989 was the culmination of an incorporation system that relies on othering and secularism. It continues to polarize French society into two camps: catholic European and non-Europeans. In 1989, three Muslim female students were denied entry to a Créteil junior high school on the grounds of their headscarves. This scandal brought to the forefront of the secular state the challenges of laïcité and whether or not this law, created to prevent the exclusion, was, in retrospect, a law of exclusion. The hijab scandal revolved around two opposing sides: permit headscarves in public schools or prohibit the wearing of such religious symbols. The French minister of education reaffirmed the views of the French government by stating that the wearing of headscarves is inconsistent with the values of secularism and presents an obstacle to the objective of a uniform state.

If racism can be defined as a system of thought and discriminatory practice founded on “race,” “origin,” “ethnicity,” or “culture,” then the anti-headscarf law is indisputably racist, because it establishes a glaring inequality. By banning the headscarf in the classroom, it directs violence against Sikhs and veiled Muslims, but casts a blind eye toward Christians who wear a cross under their sweaters (Tévanian 2009, 194).

Although France does not take national religious censuses, the Catholic population in France was estimated to be approximately 37.9 million or 60% of the population in 2010. In addition, Southern European countries are traditionally Catholic
with an average Muslim population of 2.03% (Wormald 2013).\(^{32}\) Even though the number of self-identified Catholics has declined over the years, values and social codes that have root in Catholicism have been institutionalized in secular laws and policies. A new form of religious politics that emphasizes social order has emerged since the twentieth century. Religious politics in France proclaims to accept diversity but only if it submits to its democratic liberal principles. These principles not only require respect for practical rules of civil democracy but for moral values with ties in liberal philosophy as well. An example of this would be the concept of gender equality (Portier 2012, 13). These principles have been integrated into the French identity. Coming from traditionally Catholic countries, the Southern European second generation does not encounter conflict. The native French do not penalize the Southern Europeans for their immigrant origins due to their EU status and the perception that French values epitomize European values. One can anticipate the conflicts that arise between a Muslim individual and liberal French society.

French secularism has become synonymous with assimilation. Its application in the public space implies a process that veers away from the idea of multiculturalism. Assimilation requires individuals to conform to the mainstream culture, the native culture. Assimilation is not only about the “foreigner” feeling as if they are almost a native but also about the native feeling that the foreigner belongs within his/her society (Gondola 2009, 13). National discourse concerning the model of the French state generally arises regarding Muslim immigrants of North African origin (Garrett 2009, 20). Why are Muslims so strongly implicated in the debate on French secularism while

\(^{32}\) The study by the Pew Research Center included those who self-identified as Catholic (Wormald 2013).
Southern Europeans are not? Aside from its religious dominance in France (second to Catholicism), Islam is the only predominant religion in France that could most notably disrupt the status quo given the cultural and religious identities attached to it. Furthermore, second and third generation Muslims (les Français de sol) in particular are perceived to have either fully assimilated or not. The possibility of their insufficient assimilation or perceived lack of immersion into the French identity is assumed to be a threat to the French model of social uniformity. Southern Europeans do not pose a threat given their “shared experience” and common values with the French as simply Europeans (Garrett 2005, 20). The possibility of their insufficient assimilation and their semblance as an “alternative to French secularism” and has led to “othering” which can be summed up to the extensive fear and suspicion by the catholic French society (Garrett 2005,21).

As to be expected, this classification of Muslim as being “not one of us” subsequently leads to feelings of alienation or a sense of not belonging from the perspective of second generation North Africans (Garrett 2005, 21). This is exactly what happens when secularism shifts from egalitarian, libertarian secularism to sectarian secularism (Tévanian 2009, 194). Secularism sets up an institution that penalizes those whose differences are “too” apparent. In this form it is a concept that goes beyond the workings of religious institutions and the French state, it extends into the social domain as well. When these secularist republican ideals extend into the social sphere, ethnicities are either paralleled (to an extent) or polarized. The perception that Islam encroaches on the French/European model is a result of this polarization, and the hijab is a perfect example of how Islam and Muslims are differentiated from the French model. Religious independence is perceived as a threat to the norm (Garrett 2009, 24). There is evidence of
the Muslim identity being equated with oppression of women although some Muslim women have voiced that for them headscarves are not a symbol of male dominance over their lives but an appreciation of their identity and autonomy (Garrett 2005, 29). The view of the hijab or burka as “oppressive” in relation to other religious symbols is just one of the many ways in which Muslims are portrayed as the “other,” or apart from French.

In the domain of education, laïcité maintains significance for the North African population. Education as an institution embodies the ideology of the French national model. Garret asserts that comprehension of secularism in the education system assists in understanding the relationship between the national model and the incorporation of Muslim immigrants (Garrett 2005, 26).

Therefore, the character of educational integration can be considered an important indicator of the future integration of these Muslim groups in terms of language mastery, socio-economic position, and feelings of social inclusion (Garrett 2005, 26).

French education relies on the equal treatment of all students no matter his or her origins. It is for the purpose of equality that the French government advocates for uniformity (Garrett 2005, 12). The secularism in public schools emphasizes the purpose of minimalizing the inequalities that are present outside of the school system and facilitate social advancement based on meritocracy. The use of secularism to undermine cultural difference creates a public model founded on what Garret calls “a formidable assimilationist machine” (Garrett 2005, 13).
The set-up of the French education requires Muslims to abandon their “identity” in order to adapt (Garrett 2005, 27). The conflict between secularism and public schools creates a sense of inherent rejection by the French state of Muslim bodies which is manifested in the headscarf disputes. In French society, the foulard denotes a distinctive marker of difference among students and citizens (Garrett 2005, 28). There is no distinctive marker for Southern Europeans nor is there one that comes into conflict with “European values” or the “European identity.” Although there seems to be no conflict with individuals wearing a cross, Islamic representation such as the headscarf is stigmatized. Secularism seems to no longer focus solely on the avoidance of religious preference but on the perceived brazenness of that religious marker. “I feel like I have to take off who I am. So I have to come to school empty. When I wear my veil, I just feel so good (Massi 2015).” If French identity depends on “invisibility” or individual’s ability to blend in, then anything that identifies them as other or makes them more “visible” is an issue. Skin color, headscarves, and country origins are all characteristics that penalize North Africans but not Southern Europeans. For Southern Europeans these characteristics do not differ from those of native French and, therefore, give them “invisibility.”

The limited labor market participation of Muslim North African women is a significant domain in which French citizens of North African origin experience the consequences of being fixed in a position of the “other.” According to Amnesty International, women of immigrant origin are often discriminated against based on their form of dress. “To find a job, you need to open up a business yourself. To get in with them, you need to act like them. I don’t want to do that (Massi 2015).” France is one of the few western countries that insists on uniformity (in the place of “retention” of an
ethnic identity) to achieve full assimilation. Irene Bloemraad argues in her research on race that even claims of “hyphenated identity,” claiming France and a foreign/minority culture, is seen negatively (Simon 2012, 3). Among the second generation (ages 18-50) in France, 66 percent of North Africans feel that they have a French identity as opposed to feeling separate from the French identity. Approximately 68 percent feel that France is their home. In the case of Southern European immigrants, the statistics are unsurprisingly higher, 85.5 and 81.5 percent, respectively (Simon 2012, 9). How immigrants conceive themselves in French society is often reflective of “othering” or incorporation, and Southern Europeans evidently do not experience “othering” as much as North Africans. North Africans’ placement as the other extends beyond secularism and invades the public discourse.

Public Discourse

In domain of public discourse, the idea of who is and who is not an immigré is contested. Koopmans emphasizes that the framework of public discourse regarding immigrants in general is determined by “institutional and discursive opportunity structures (Koopmans 2005, 16). Apropos discursive constructions, labels that are used to denote immigrants are not “coincidental and inconsequential.” These terms and the contexts to which they are employed specify the relationship between immigrants and the receiving countries (Koopmans 2005, 19). Discursive constructions have influence over the self-definition of immigrants and how non-minority actors mobilize against or in support of them. Discursive opportunities function in relation to discursive constructions. They influence which collective groups have “high” visibility in politics, media, and
literature. These opportunities determine which groups are able to establish ties with other collective groups and gain legitimacy in public discourse (Koopmans 2005, 19). When applied to the question of the socio-economic mobility of North African and Southern European second generation French, it is apparent that there are discursive constructions in French society that determine the discursive opportunities or rather the lack of visibility of the second generation North African French that second generation Southern Europeans do not experience.

It is possible to claim that North Africans’ visibility and Southern Europeans’ invisibility in the pays d’accueil is due to colonial legacy. North Africans’ history with France widely differs from that of Southern Europeans. One group has the history of being the colonized, and the other has a history of being the colonizer. Similar to blacks, beurs have a historical context (colonization of Algeria) that has influenced their discursive construction in French society, and no markers in relation to Southern European immigrants have had the same influence in French society as those of blacks and beurs. The label of immigrant in France alone does not hold a fluid connotation; it is a permanent racial status (Gondola 2009, 158).

In the realm of public discourse, North African French are bombarded with exemplifications of their lack of invisibility in French society. Their “separation” from the French identity influences their prevalence in politics, films, and other forms of media. The term, invisibility, references the politicization of race. The manner in which race is politicized, particularly for North Africans, alleviates other immigrant populations, mainly Southern European, of the burden of the label immigré (Gondola 2009, 158).
The *immigré* has become a code phrase for race in political and popular parlance. According to this schema, there is little doubt that, let’s say, a German or a white American who settles in France would ever suffer the indignity of being labeled an *immigré* (Gondola 2009, 158).

Politics from the early 70’s to the present times is one of the many ways in which North African immigrants are consistently put in the position of the “other.” Several scholars call this the politicization of “Muslim” in French society. Regarding the “Muslim” label in France, many scholars have renounced the country’s tendency to portray its North African population as a “monolithic community”. There is conflict in the political and ideological titling of the North African community as Muslim. The racialization of Islam makes “Muslim” an obstacle to inclusion (Fellag 2014, 3). To apply Muslim as a blanket term denies the fact that there are North Africans who are not “Muslim” and creates a false linkage between North Africans and a uniform Islamic identity.

Jean Marie Le Pen, the head of the Front National in 1974, led this politicization of the *immigré*. It became problem not only for France but for all of Europe despite the fact that Western European immigrants were just as present as North African immigrants during this time period (Garrett 2005, 23). Today North African French are not seeing themselves as much as native French or Southern European French in French media or French popular culture. At the same time, the far-right media and politics only contribute to their negative visibility in French society (Boubeker 2009, 74). The image of a deteriorating France, a France in danger, and a France risking internal ruin due to the lack of representation of its values has often dominated the perception of an immigrant threat (Boubeker 2009, 78). Although such a link is not always intended, it is a result. As one would assume, the use of political rhetoric in this sense only serves in eventually creating
obstacles to the incorporation of individuals whose origins were neither French nor European.

Presentation in politics is not the only realm of influence concerning the visibility of the North African second generation. Media such as films, music, journals, and news broadcasting equally contribute to the portrayal of the North Africans in French society. Similar to the unpleasant portrayal in politics, North Africans find themselves presented as the least-desired citizens. The music and movie industry is not any different. Jean-François Richet’s 1997 film *Ma T-6 va crack-er* adequately describes the gray area in which North African or “visible” minorities exist. The film depicts three young boys of the *banlieues* who wait day to day for the train, France, to stop and allow them to board. Each day they spot the train, yet it never stops. Each time it passes, they are left with feelings of hopelessness and dread because they will never be able to escape the racial and political boundary (*the banlieue*) and enter French society. The most important aspect of the movie is the depiction of those who are allowed on the train: people who look nothing like the three young boys and assume that “people who practice Ramadan and wear a hijab have no place in France” (Gondola 2009, 158). Richet’s film hints to the stigma given to North Africans of France and the term “*immigrant nee en France.*” The terminology alone implies a disconnection or disinheritance of a people despite their connection to French soil. The ethnic/ immigrant discourse surrounding Maghrebian French serves to show how “othering” is perpetuated in popular media.

The conflict surrounding representation and the visibility of North African French in the news sources tends to be a bit more complex. Major French news outlets have been credited more than once with the use of taboo or “insensitive” language in reference to
North African French. A recent poll by the Eurobarometer exhibits the influence the general French population believes the media has on tensions between ethnic collectivities. Seventy-one percent of the respondents believed the media (the news, in particular) plays a strong role (Marsh 2003, 6). Previous research has revealed a pattern of blanketing visible minorities with some form of the broad terms “immigration” or “immigrant”. This tendency inevitably distances visible minorities from the “general French population” (Gondola 2009, 160). It is very subtle but still renders the effect of framing visible minorities or Maghrebi French regardless of generation as the “other.” These immigrants under these colloquial blankets tend to be French natives, but, as Jessika ter Wal mentions, their status is overlooked given a propensity to immediately label them as immigrants or foreigners.

When a rebeu or a Renoi makes a mistake they (the French media) report about it but when he (the white French Person) makes a mistake they don’t or, if they do, they say he is merely French (Gondola 2009, 160).

The interview with young Muslim Fatima Mane demonstrates how the black and beur North Africans are racially categorized by the media. When situation concerns an achievement or something positive, they are French. When the situation concerns a failure or crime, they are only “immigrants.” Yannick Noah, a well-known tennis play, is an example this categorization. Headlines such as “le Camerounais Noah a perdu” and “le Français Yannick Noah a gagné” represent how incorporation tends to be conditional for non-European, non-Catholic French (Gondola 2009, 160). Aside from the social distancing, French news outlets often present more crimes that can be tied to black and beur individuals than non-blacks/beurs (ter Wal 2002, 207). Forty percent is the average
amount of crime reports linked to blacks and beurs that are released by the press. *Blacks* and *beurs* have dominated crime reports despite their lack of representation in film and TV dramas (ter Wal 2002, 208). The imbalance of Maghrebian representation in positive popular media and more specifically their dominant representation in journalized and televised social/civil conflicts only result in their negative portrayal compared to the European population’s dominant representation in “convivial forms of social interaction” (ter Wal 2002, 208).

Obstacles to North African French incorporation into French society is rooted in the traditional Republic French model with espouses assimilation not just through the outsider’s renunciation of group identities beyond “French” but also through the mainstream population’s acceptance of the visibility of the minority group. *Laïcité* and public discourse are facets of French society that demonstrate the Franco-French’s relationship with the North African French identity and culture. *Laïcité* to a large extent is what Gondola calls a “litmus test” that these *immigrées nées en France* must pass in order to access full incorporation. However, the challenges involving *laïcité* and public discourse reflect how “othering” is not only passive but also active in various corners of the conversation surrounding those who are and are not considered to be French. Incorporation of immigrant-origin populations is still a challenge in French society. The North African second generation in particular faces more challenges to incorporation due to the high visibility of their ethnicity and their confinement within a system that racializes Islam.
Conclusion

The analysis of the socio-economic mobility of Maghrebian and Southern European French aims to uncover driving force behind the imbalance of socio-economic incorporation between these two dominant ethnic groups in France. The comparison of the access and success in superior studies and labor market incorporation between the French, North African, and Southern European born in France implies that passive and/or active actors are at play in the marginalization of Tunisian, Moroccan, and Algerian French. This analysis has discussed the different historical contexts that define the identity and experience of these two immigrant groups and how they play a role in setting the possible present and future socio-economic trajectory of Maghrebian and Southern European French.

Focusing on the exogenous factors of French society, this exploration of France’s political economy and active marginalization of immigrants as “not truly French” aims to discover the political and social obstacles to incorporation that can only be attributed weakness within the French institutions and public discourse. While many scholars emphasize the willingness of the immigrant and the descendants to integrate and importance of the barriers within the ethnic community, I chose not to focus on endogenous factors in this thesis. However, I do acknowledge that barriers within an ethnic community does have a role in this conflict of socio-economic advancement. Nonetheless, I believe the influence of such endogenous elements to be not as significant
or marking as the issues within French society that push against the socio-economic mobility of the North African second generation. Research from the Migration Policy Institute shows that the majority of second generation immigrants identifies as French. In addition, these policies and methods of social exclusion would still have an effect regardless of the willingness or reluctance of the individual to integrate.

As the first part of this analysis elucidates, the political economy of France is a factor that holds significant influence on the manner in which certain groups are propelled into or gain access to the resources of socio-economic success. By scrutinizing the influence of tax/benefit systems, residential policies, and the education structure, the question of the disparity of socio-economic success rest on whether or not the French government construes these policies in a fashion that is not conducive to the incorporation of some immigrants. The fact that the North African immigrants are the most subjected to the failings of these policies is due in part to obtainment of a superior education, family size, the employment status of the parents and peers, and other demographic characteristics. The information on the policies and the status of second generation North African French during the application of these policies all confirm that the North African French are often overlooked in creation of the policies leading to their eventual lack of success in education and the labor market. This information rightfully calls for a reconfiguration or restructuring of the aims of these policies and how they should be implemented.

Regarding the role of social barriers to incorporation, the conflict surrounding secularism in the French States implies two different concepts: freedom from religious influence in the government and the public space and acceptance of religious
representation that is not “too ostentatious.” The debate over the headscarf and the professional marginalization of women who attempt to enter the workforce exhibits how the visibility of the North African second generation serves to penalize them in the incorporation process. The stigmatization of “Muslim,” *blacks*, and *beurs* in public discourse (news broadcast, film, music, etc.) displays how “Muslim” has become racialized in a negative sense. Evidently, *blacks* and *beurs* are depicted as undesirables who will never be “really French”.

Political economy as an exogenous factor focuses more on the passive marginalization of North African French while public discourse and secularism imply a more active marginalization of the North African second generation and the inherent acceptance of the Southern European second generation. Based on the historical context behind North African immigration and North African culture’s interaction with French culture, the social aspect of the exogenous factor holds more weight than the political economy. By analyzing policies and structures, it is evident that these policies perpetuate the exclusion of North Africans. There are specific demographics that turn political economy into a tool of marginalization. However, these social barriers are conflicts that one could say any North African French would encounter regardless of social and economic demographics. It is the stigmatization and active exclusion of North Africans that influence the creation of these policies and their goals.
Bibliography


