THEIR BROTHER’S KEEPERS? ETHNICITY, REBEL DIPLOMACY, AND STATE SUPPORT FOR INSURGENCY

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A thesis presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements for completion
Of the Bachelor of Arts degree in International Studies
Croft Institute for International Studies
Sally McDonnell Barksdale Honors College
The University of Mississippi

University, Mississippi
May, 2016
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I cannot begin to thank the following individuals enough; without their help, support, and patience, this project would have not been possible. My thesis committee members, Yael Zeira, Kees Gispen, and Ben Jones, provided me with invaluable feedback that helped me develop my paper into the refined product it is today. I am in gratitude to each of them. Dani Miodownik at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem deserves special thanks for supervising my initial research efforts during my time abroad. Comments and critique from Shawna Meechan, Joseph Weinberg, Jim Piazza, Jamie Kent, and Nathan Kalmoe all proved hugely helpful to my revisions. I thank my parents for their support and ceaseless confidence in me; I literally would not be here without them. Lastly, I thank Georgia Wood. Her compassion, humor, and empathy helped me through the bleakest parts of this year, made the brightest parts brighter, and always kept me moving forward. I am forever fortunate to have her in my life.
Glendower: I can call spirits from the vasty deep.
   Hotspur: Why, so can I, or so can any man;
   But will they come when you do call for them?

-William Shakespeare, *Henry IV, Part One*
Abstract: This thesis aims to contribute to the filling of a theoretical lacuna by asking: “what role do ethnic ties play in rebel groups’ efforts to lobby for state support?” Researchers have examined many facets of state support for armed rebel groups. Most literature on this topic has been dedicated to decision calculi of states choosing to support rebel groups. However, comparatively little has been said about the other side of this relationship: the demand for these goods and services by rebel groups themselves. Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham (2011) introduce the concept of the “demand side” into the literature, maintaining that “rebel organizations [must] evaluate the costs and benefits of accepting external support.” However, despite the fact that the role of ethnic ties in civil war and its internationalization have been thoroughly examined, no scholars have sought to explore the role of these ties in the “demand side” of the state-armed group relationship. I hypothesize thus that rebel groups that share an ethnic tie with the majority of a state’s ruling coalition and/or population are more likely to lobby them for support. I also maintain that said lobbying will strategically invoke shared ethnic ties and historical memories, framing appeals in “ethnic terms”. I find that such ethnic framing is more salient in lobbying diaspora and refugee populations for support than states. States were lobbied through other means, including the invocation of ideological frames. This work’s contribution and aim is to start a broader conversation on the role of the “demand side” in state support and framing processes in rebel diplomacy.
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Chapter One: Introduction and Literature Review

1.1: Introduction

What is the impact of ethnic affinity on rebel groups’ international diplomatic efforts? Researchers have assessed ascriptive identities’ impact on support for rebel groups and rebel behavior at the domestic level, but something of a theoretical lacuna exists at their intersection. In this thesis, I intend to begin the filling of this gap of knowledge by further expanding scholarly research on the demand side of the state-armed group relationship. My purpose is to disaggregate other potentially relevant categories that could impact rebel diplomacy and isolate the effect of ethnicity in rebels’ strategic use of talk. To accomplish this goal, my procedure is to examine case studies chosen from the Palestinian National Movement from 1967-1982, seeking to assess whether or not these rebels were more likely to lobby states with a shared ethnic linkage and use language that invokes ethnic ties in doing so. Although these case studies yielded mixed results, I discovered useful insights into the demand-side framing processes at play in the state-armed group relationship.

In the first section, I review the extant literature on ethnic identity and its impact on conflict at the domestic and international level. After assessing work by Salehyan, Saideman, Kalyvas, and others, I find that while internationalized ethnic conflict is well-examined, most works are framed around the supply-side. In the second section, I survey
the extant literature on rebel diplomacy, as it provides a clear starting point in assessing rebels’ demand-side behavior. I then develop, what is to the best of my knowledge, the first theoretical explanation of ethnic ties’ impact on rebel diplomatic behavior. This theory, which I entitle Strategic Ethnic Affectation (SEA), maintains that rebel appeals should involve the strategic use and invocation of shared language, cultural symbols and historical memories in a bargaining context. This follows a rational-choice model of politics, averring that rebels are utility maximizers who seek to present their own interests as convergent with those of potential patrons. Following work by Saideman (2002), it maintains that ethnicity is a credible, ex ante signal of shared preferences. I likewise maintain that rebels will lobby populations within states as a means of influencing states as well as directly lobbying their governments. In the third section, I present my research design and test my hypotheses. I hypothesize that rebel groups that share an ethnic tie with the majority of a state’s ruling coalition or population are more likely to lobby that state than others and to do so using SEA. In order to test these hypotheses, I conduct case studies from the Palestinian national movement in the fourth section of this paper. Using Kirisci (1986)’s logic of cognitive linkages, I examine the diplomatic efforts and rhetoric of Fatah and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) between 1967 and 1982. I find mixed support for my hypotheses. Ethnic ties were shown to be salient, but other frames, like ideology, were employed either alongside this frame or in its stead. Likewise, I did not find an abundance of evidence for indirect lobbying. In the fifth and final section, I outline opportunities for future research and this work’s contribution to the study of ethnic conflict and rebel
diplomacy. This thesis succeeds in examining the role of strategic framing processes in rebel diplomacy and contributing to an ongoing scholarly conversation.

1.2: Ethnic Identity and Ethnic Groups

Ethnicity matters, particularly as an organizing principle in conflict situations. A large body of literature has analyzed the impact of ascriptive identities on civil war and its internationalization (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010; Saideman 2002; Koga 2011, and others). Other works examine how identity can be a key variable in territorial disputes, irredentism, and on the recognition of new states (Ayoob 1995; O’Lear, Diehl, Frazier, and Allee 2005; Coggins 2008). These authors aver that ethnic identity is a significant factor in conflict. However, it is important to begin this analysis with a conceptualization of identity itself. Fearon and Laitin (2000) maintain that identities are social categories that are distinguished by rules of membership and behavior categories. Yet this conceptualization may not be sufficient for the purposes of this study, as I am primarily concerned with the substance of ethnicity as it pertains to the outcomes of its invocation. Enter Hale (2004) and Volkan (1999). Following psychological research by Mead (1934), these researchers develop the logic of identity as a means of distinguishing between self and others; a kind of “radar” that aids navigation through the social world through means of shared symbols and rituals.”. This work will apply this definition to its conception of ethnic groups and identity. Coser’s (1956) concept of in-group bias, defining oneself as a member of an ethnic group is as much a statement of belonging to a group as it is a statement of not belonging to others (Young 1976). Hale (2004) corroborates this by stating that, like other identities, ethnicity is a means of distinguishing oneself from others, albeit by means of categories commonly referred to as
“ethnic”\(^1\). The abundance of scholarship on the origins of ethnicities and their political salience has influenced scholarship on conflict. Yet some work disputes the labeling of conflicts as “ethnic” or posit that the term lacks empirical validity (Mueller 2000; Gilley 2004). Indeed, Gilley maintains that “there is a strong case for severely limiting the field of ethnic conflict studies, if not abandoning it altogether”. However, an abundance of literature\(^2\) finds that ethnic cleavages and the usage of ethnic affinity as an organizing principle have a significant impact on conflict processes and behavior. Following this, I maintain that ethnicity is a form of “radar” that individuals use to rally others to support for a group, cause, or movement. This is apparent in the case of Northern Ireland. Protestant identity is reinforced through shared rituals, such as the parades of the “Marching Season”, symbols, such as the Union Jack, and employed as a tool for mobilization, both violent and nonviolent.

### 1.3: Ethnicity and Conflict

Conflict is a form of collective action, which means that ethnic conflict is a form of ethnically-oriented collective action, or “ethnic mobilization”. Olzak (2006) defines the latter term as “collective action based upon ethnic claims, protest, or intergroup hostility that makes reference to a group’s demands based upon one or more cultural markers”. Such processes were visible during the collapse of Yugoslavia. In a 1989 speech commemorating the 600\(^{th}\) anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo\(^3\), Slobodan

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\(^1\) Hale cites Weber (1978) to identify these categories: “perceptions of common descent, history, fate, and culture, which usually indicates some mix of language, physical appearance, and the ritual regulation of life, especially religion”

\(^2\) Such as Carment and James 1995, 1997, Davis and Moore, 1997, and many others

\(^3\) A battle in which Serbs were defeated by the Ottoman Empire, invoked to stir up feelings of resentment against Muslims in former Yugoslavia
Milosevic called Kosovo “the heart of Serbia”, invoking nationalist myths and stirring up anti-Muslim resentment ahead of the Bosnian War (Tromp 2016).

A significant body of scholarship explicates the importance of such affiliations within intrastate wars albeit through different theoretical frameworks, such as Posen (1993)’s application of international relations theory and Sambanis (2006)’s discussion of power relations between groups within an ethnically-biased polity. These conflicts are theorized by some as being difficult to resolve due to the “stickiness” of ethnic identities and their tendency to be reified by warring parties (Kaufmann 1996a, 1996b; Horowitz 1985). Others still reject this reasoning about the role of ethnicity and take a constructivist approach that emphasizes the potential for identity change and ethnic defection to occur within conflicts (Kalyvas, 2008). This position, which Kalyvas, Chandra, and others maintain can indeed offer insights into the dynamics of conflict behavior. This work, while acknowledging that ethnic identities are fluid and that ethnic defection occurs, notes that certain actors—such as rebel diplomats and elites—have incentives to frame their identities in primordialist terms, strategically reifying them to aid mobilization. As Jones (cited in Walter and Snyder 1999) notes, the case of Rwanda illustrative of this phenomenon. Indeed, the manipulation of the different social categories that constituted the labels “Huti” and “Tutsi” at the hands of elites within the ruling Rwandan *akazu*⁴ was a major contributing factor to the 1994 genocide. Oberschall (2000) develops another explanation of this phenomenon by examining the usage of strategic framing: individual the in former Yugoslavia did not perceive their neighbors of different ethnicities as threats until a “crisis frame” was promoted and activated. It is thus

⁴ “Little house” in Kinyarwarda: the clan-centric oligarchs that surrounded Rwandan president Juvenal Habyarimana
apparent that ethnicity can be manipulated by “ethnic entrepreneurs” and made into a salient organizing principle for violent actors, even in the absence of obvious racial and linguistic differences.

An abundance of literature theorizes the ways in which ethnicity influences intrastate conflict dynamics, but what of the salience of ethnicity within international contexts? Davis and Moore (1997), following work by Zinnes (1980) and Carment and James (1995, 1997) maintain ethnicity is an attribute that can make certain dyads more conflict prone. These works find that the odds of a conflict are increased when one “advantaged” ethnic group receives political or economic benefits that others lack. The transnational dispersion of minority groups also has a significant effect on conflict dynamics and behavior. Piazza and Arva (2015) find that the transnational dispersion of minority groups increases terrorism, playing a “pivotal role in the funding and functioning” of ethnic terrorist organizations. Likewise, Forsberg (2014) explores the transnational “contagion” of ethnic conflict and finds that transnational kin ties can result in ethnic warfare spilling across borders. Though these studies identify the salience of ethnicity as an explanatory variable, they do not entirely address the specific processes and mechanisms through which it becomes actionable.

It follows that many civil wars become internationalized. Indeed, according to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, this is one of the most common forms of war in the world today, with 13 internationalized intrastate conflicts occurring in 2014. One form of this phenomenon is state support or intervention on behalf of an ethnic group in conflict. Byman, Chalk, Hoffman, Rosenau, and Brannan (2001) note that between the end of the Cold War and the publishing of their article, 44 of 74 insurgencies received state support.
They maintain that states will support insurgent groups for a variety of reasons, including a desire for regional influence, to destabilize neighboring states, spark regime change, further irredentist aims, and to support members of the same ethnic and religious groups. Such support can take a variety of form: the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP)’s External Support Dataset codes seven different types. These include troops as secondary warring party, access to territory, access to military or intelligence infrastructure, weapons, materiel/logistics, training/expertise, funding/economic support and intelligence material (Högbladh et. al 2011).

Saideman (1997, 2002, 2012) and Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham (2011) provide an excellent starting point for examining the salience of ethnicity in determining whether or not states give support to rebel groups. Saideman (2002, 2012), following scholarship by Mayhew (1974), examines the state-level role of ethnic politics in states in determining their foreign policy behavior. He argues that states will give support to rebel groups outside their borders because of the ethnic affiliations of “politically relevant individuals”, i.e. the winning coalition⁵, and maintains that leaders will suffer audience costs if they do not credibly back up their paeans toward threatened kin abroad. Koga (2011) follows this logic and identifies three assumptions of the ethnic tie hypothesis: that “ethnic identities influence the preferences of individuals… that politicians care primarily about gaining or retaining office…that politicians need the support of others to maintain political office”. Likewise, politicians will oppose groups with whom they share a history of ethnic enmity due to pressure from their constituents. Saideman’s (2002, 2012) quantitative tests find a statistically significant relationship between ethnic

⁵ See Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, and Morrow (2002)
ties and states’ support for external groups. His results were insignificant when he
disaggregated ethnicity into different (racial, religious) categories, but he found that the
existence of a state near the conflict area dominated by an ethnic group’s kin significantly
influenced the level of support an embattled group received. This suggests that more
powerful kin will give support to nearby co-ethnics. Byman et. al (2001) suggest as
Saideman has that domestic politics are salient in determining state support for ethnic
rebels, but also maintain that support for members of a state’s dominant ethnic group
abroad can be a convenient guise for expansionist actions, as in the case of Russia’s
support for Russian-speaking insurgents in Moldova and Tajikistan. The previously
substantiated logic, though aimed at explaining the behavior of states, presents the idea of
ethnicity as a proxy for shared preferences and demonstrates its significance in
international contexts. This thesis proposes that such decision calculi are also employed
by rebel leaders as well.

1.4 Ethnicity and Principal-Agent Theory

Salehyan, Gleditsch and Cunningham (2011) take a different approach to the
question of state support for insurgent groups. Instead of examining the role of domestic
politics in this phenomenon, they posit that ethnicity can act as a “screening device” in a
principal-agent relationship. Salehyan et. al explicitly acknowledge that this relationship
has both as supply side (states and other patrons) and a demand side (armed groups
seeking support).

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6 The role of such realpolitik aims are a distinct confounding factor this work’s theory, and will be
discussed later

7 To conceptually define what an “insurgent group” is, we follow Staniland (2014)’s definition: “a group of
individuals claiming to be a collective organization that uses a name to designate itself, is made up of
formal structures of command and control, and intends to seize political power using violence.”
Mainstream economics has long explored the dynamics of principal-agent relationships and problems in the scope of behavior within firms and markets (See Smith, 1776; Akerlof, 1970; Laffont and Matimort, 2001; many others), but efforts to apply this theory within political science are comparatively limited (See Miller 2005; Raucchaus 2009; some others). Following Raucchaus (2009)’s work on humanitarian intervention, this work will apply principal-agent theory to internationalized civil conflict.

In such a relationship, states (principals) will contract rebel groups (agents) to fight for them. In a principal-agent relationship, principals will, to the greatest extent possible, seek to avoid the costs imposed by delegating responsibility to other groups. Raucchaus (2009) details the types of costs that principals can face through delegation, i.e. moral hazard and adverse selection. Moral hazard occurs when insured or supported groups behave irresponsibly because they are guaranteed support by a third party. These actions occur in the absence of information after support has been assured (the contracting period). The other risk that principals face from delegating responsibility to agents is the risk of adverse selection. This occurs due to an absence of information in the pre-contracting phase about agents’ preferences. As Salehyan et al. (2011) note, this is where ethnicity is salient. States examine ethnic ties ex ante to determine preference similarity between themselves and potential agents, thus reducing the probability of adverse selection. This logic is highly important to my theory: it gives me a theoretical toolkit with which to analyze the state-rebel relationship from a rebel-centric perspective rather than a state-centric perspective. The trend of analyzing this phenomenon from the

8 Raucchaus details how supported groups who are adversely selected can engage in atrocities
9 Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham (2011) provide another intellectual starting point for this in framing the state-rebel relationship as one of supply and demand
perspective of states is ubiquitous in the literature. As previously noted, Saideman, Koga, and others frame their studies around how ethnicity influences the domestic politics of states and how leaders choose which groups to support based on its influence. Though undoubtedly important, there is fertile intellectual ground to be broken through studying the other side of the coin: how ethnic ties are salient to rebel groups’ efforts to gain state support.
Chapter Two: Rebel Diplomacy: An Ethnic Dimension?

2.1: What is Rebel Diplomacy?

Sir Earnest Satow defined diplomacy as “the application of intelligence and tact to the conduct of official relations between the governments of independent states” (Satow 1917). Historically, scholarship on diplomacy focused exclusively on the usage of talk between states. Indeed, as Coggins (2015) notes, it has been defined as the exclusive province of states, and that the term “rebel diplomacy” may at first appear to be a contradiction in terms. However, rebel groups and other non-state actors can and do engage in diplomatic activity. Such activity mimics state diplomacy, as rebels seek to apply the norms of legitimacy afforded to state actors in the international system to themselves (McConnell, Moreau, and Dittmer 2012). Non-state diplomacy in general is theorized to be “more functionally specific and targeted” as well as “more opportunistic and experimental” (Keating 1999, cited in McConnell et. al 2012). Rebel groups’ diplomacy often takes the form of efforts to lobby for support from external patrons: a means of engagement that is targeted, opportunistic, and likely experimental (Coggins, 2015; Bob 2005; Jones and Mattiacci, 2015; Huang 2015: Asal, Conrad, and White 2014). Coggins (2015) introduces the term “rebel diplomacy” to describe this tactic and other forms of external engagement by rebel groups. When engaged in civil conflict, rebel groups will often engage diplomatically with external actors to gain support and legitimacy for their cause. This strategic use of talk abroad is employed in addition to
violent tactics domestically as a tactic in civil wars. The literature on this topic is still nascent, but several clear assumptions can be drawn from the extant material.

First, rebel groups dedicate time and effort to non-violent international engagement with state and non-state actors. Bob (2005) maintains that since external support is of critical importance to many groups, competition in the global marketplace for the material and normative goods that support provides is frequent and fierce. Rebels have employed a variety of different diplomatic strategies, including “Creating political parties, relief funds and pseudo embassies abroad”, “using media outlets and personal contacts to spread the insurgents’ ideology, propagandize, and inform [to] win the favor or neutrality of key constituencies”, and “diplomatic envoys and lobbyists [to] influence third party states' policies” (Coggins 2014). Likewise, rebel groups have been prodigious in establishing front groups to serve as lobbyists, as Huang (Forthcoming) avers.

Movements will both contact potential patrons directly and engage in “rebel public diplomacy” over social media sites like Twitter (Bob 2005; Jones and Mattiacci 2015). Indeed, such non-violent engagement over social media was key in Libyan rebels’ efforts to gain international support during the 2011 effort to overthrow the Qaddafi regime as it gave rebels a quick and effective means of presenting their narrative, clarifying their aims, and framing it to appeal to an international audience (Jones and Mattiacci 2015).10

Next, such engagements are strategic and targeted at achieving specific outcomes. These outcomes may be normative-seeking the same privileges and legitimacy under

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10 Jones and Mattiacci note: “Public diplomacy allows rebels to shape foreign perceptions of the potential benefits of intervention by framing their own beliefs and preferences as commensurate with those of foreign audiences”
international law usually accorded to recognized states-or material, i.e. arms, training, and financial resources. These objectives are broadly conceived of by the CIA as efforts to “reduce or neutralize the government’s coercive power while strengthening the capabilities of the insurgency” (Central Intelligence Agency, 2009). Coggins notes that “if the rebels convince outside states of their cause, they may provide the rebels with resources, training, or other wartimes support” or engage in mutually beneficial trade, alliance formation, or other symbiotic behavior. As Bull (1977) posits, the international state system is a high-status social group with strong barriers to entry. As rebel groups seek, through secession or the overthrow of their host state’s government, to become part of this group, rebel diplomatic efforts are as much attempts to gain international political capital and legitimacy as they are attempts to gain material benefits (Huang, forthcoming). Huang thus maintains that rebel diplomacy is, like statecraft, a form of “rebelfraft”, and “through it, rebel groups aim to signal to international audiences that they are serious political contenders for state power, can adopt state-like behavior, are amenable to peaceful talks, and champion causes that may have wider international appeal”.

Lastly, rebels will choose communication strategies tailored to their audiences and frame their cases so as to increase their appeal to potential supporters. Sociological theory can provide further insights into this phenomenon. Actors within social movements such as rebel groups, according to Snow and Benford (1988) are “signifying agents actively engaged in the production and maintenance of meaning for constituents, antagonists, and bystanders or observers”. Frames are interpretive modes that allow

11 See Fazal (2014) for further insight on rebel behavior
individuals to ‘locate, perceive, identify, and label” phenomena in the world (Goffman, 1974). The framing employed by rebel groups in their efforts to gain external support is strategic. Benford and Snow (2000) identifies such strategic framing processes as “deliberative, utilitarian, and goal directed” in that they are “developed and deployed to achieve a specific purpose-to recruit new members, to mobilize adherents, to acquire resources, and so forth”. This work seeks to identify the means by which movements seek to “link their interests and interpretive frames with those of prospective constituents and actual or prospective resource providers”. These four strategies, or frame alignment processes are frame bridging, frame amplification, frame extension, and frame transformation (Snow et al 1986; Benford and Snow 2000). Frame bridging occurs when a group links two congruent but unconnected frames together, as when activists successfully mobilize support across different issue frames (Gerhards & Rucht 1992). Frame amplification is the “idealization, embellishment, clarification, or invigoration of existing values or beliefs” (Benford and Snow 2000). Berbier (1998) identifies an example of this phenomenon in efforts of white supremacist groups; such groups employ “ethnic affectations” to invigorate their supporters. Frame extension is when a movement depicts its interests as extending beyond their primary concerns to issues that may be of concern to its potential constituents, and, lastly, frame transformation occurs when a movement “[changes] old understandings of meanings and/or [generates] new ones” (Benford and Snow 2000).

12 Leftist rebel groups linking their local struggles to broader struggles against colonialism and imperialism provide an example of this
13 Such affectations are a key variable in this work
Within the study of rebel diplomacy, Jones and Mattiacci (2015) work to identify the means by which rebels engage external actors, positing that they will seek to increase their likelihood of gaining support through such strategic usage of framing. Rebels will promote specific accounts of events, such that they can show “their side of the story” and their host government’s purported atrocities against them (“diagnostic framing”) while promoting themselves as strong and worthy opponents of the regime (“prognostic framing”), capable of defeating their opponents: if supported (“motivational framing”).

The extant literature on rebel diplomacy provides an excellent starting point for this project. However, there is substantial room for increasing this body of work’s theoretical depth. The extant work on this topic details the means through which rebels pursue diplomatic engagement, the reasons why they engage in such activities, and the nature of the groups that are diplomatically active. However, theories of rebel behavior are common, as are discussions of the role of ethnicity in conflict behavior, such topics have thus far not been introduced into the scholarly conversation on rebel diplomacy. This work strives to accomplish both of these aims. I argue that shared ethnic ties are of deep salience to the efforts of rebels to gain support from external patrons such as states. This assertion is based on several judgments that will be substantiated in the following pages.

2.2: A Theory of Ethnically-Based Rebel Diplomacy

My first contention is that ethnic ties will play a significant role in determining to whom rebel groups address their diplomatic efforts. As previously evinced, rebels’
diplomatic efforts are undertaken with the purpose of gaining normative and material goods from patrons. However unlimited rebels’ desires for support may be, the resources they have at their disposal to establish support-providing relationships and states’ willingness to supply said support are both finite Bob (2005) maintains that the level of “material resources, technological know-how, preexisting contacts, and organizational expertise” needed to engage a potential supporter varies greatly across groups, and states may not be willing to support certain groups at all. As Smith (1776) notes, “the workmen desire to get as much, the masters to give as little as possible”. To “get as much” rebels will seek to limit the transaction costs of bargaining with potential sponsors and maximize the likelihood that they will receive support. This is where ethnic ties become salient. In and of itself, an ethnic tie implies shared history, cultural memories, and language. These different dimensions can make the bargaining environment more favorable for rebel groups seeking support from states. Shared history and culture can be credible, *ex ante* signals of common preferences. To quote de Borda (1781), a principal’s ideal contracting relationship with a potential agent is a “scheme only intended for honest men”. To assure potential patrons of their “honesty” (i.e. their credible commitment to the contracting relationship), rebels that share a common ethnic tie with the government will engage in a strategy that I will henceforth refer to as “strategic ethnic affectation” (SEA).

I conceptualize SEA as the strategic use and invocation of shared language, cultural symbols and historical memories in a bargaining context. Some argue that at the domestic level, ethnic violence can result in the reification of such ascriptive identities

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15 See Hale (2004) and Anderson (1983)
and that identity change is highly unlikely during periods of conflict due to the impact of “national memories” (Lake and Rothchild 1996; Van Evera 2001). However, as will I soon note, this may not actually be true across all cases, ethnic “entrepreneurs” and activists can enhance the salience of ethnicity as an organizing principle and drive leaders to take more ethnically-aligned positions (Van Evera 2001; Mueller 2000). This theory expands their logic, positing that rebel diplomats will seek to influence opinion at the international rather than domestic level. Likewise, it extends Salehyan et. al (2011)’s logic of ethnicity as a “screening device”: it follows that rebel groups should target states whose populations or governments share a common ethnicity with them.

Like other strategies of rebel diplomacy, SEA employs multiple frame alignment processes. First, it includes the usage of frame amplification through the previously described strategy of ethnic entrepreneurship. Rebel groups need to present themselves as capable representatives of the interests of their respective ethnic group to credibly signal their capabilities to potential patrons, such as when Palestinian armed groups framed themselves as at the forefront of an “Arab Revolution” (Mishal 1986). Implicit in this is the assumption that leaders and populations care about the well-being of their co-ethnics. In addressing this assumption, I must be careful to not reify ethnic categories through reliance on “ethnic common sense” and “folk sociologies” (Brubaker 2002; Hirschfeld 1996). As Brubaker notes, “Participants, of course, regularly do represent ethnic, racial and national conflict in such groupist, even primordialist terms. They often cast ethnic groups, races or nations as the protagonists—the heroes and martyrs—of such struggles. But this is no warrant for analysts to do so. I must, of course, take vernacular categories

\[16\] In ethnic conflict
and participants’ understandings seriously, for they are partly constitutive of our objects of study. But one should not uncritically adopt categories of ethnopolitical practice as our categories of social analysis.17"

SEA can also involve frame extension. As previously mentioned, frame extension is when a group presents its cause “as extending beyond its primary interests to include issues and concerns that are presumed to be of importance to potential adherents” (Benford and Snow, 2000). Such framing strategies are common in rebel diplomacy, but what of their specific relevance to ethnically-based appeals? Individuals have a diverse range of motivations for participating in war, including personal values, the potential for financial enrichment, and personal grievances manifested as a desire for revenge. For some individuals, these motivations may prove to be more salient than ethnic affiliations and we may witness the phenomenon of ethnic defection. Kalyvas (2008), working from constructivist theories of ethnicity (such as those presented by Chandra) notes that, contrary to the assumptions of Van Evera, Kaufmann, and others, individuals can support actors explicitly opposed to their own ethnic group. This logically follows the assertion that the framing of conflict is a conflictual process in itself (Brubaker, 2002) Citing the example of the Mau Mau insurgency, Kalyvas notes that thousands of members of the Kikuyu ethnic group supported the British colonial government against their kin through service in the colonial Home Guard. Anderson (2005, quoted in Kalyvas, 2008) notes that: “these people did not like colonialism. In taking a stand, these so-called loyalists were in fact motivated by more prosaic and personal concerns: by the interests of their families; by the need to protect their property; by their sense of social status; and by their

17 Emphasis mine
own values”. Though this is an extreme example, it makes a point of fact starkly clear: members of an ethnic group will not always support their kin and may in fact work against the efforts of rebels within it. This poses a challenge to rebel diplomats engaging with members of a state’s population. “Prosaic concerns” such as those that Anderson mentioned may drive them to stay neutral or even oppose the efforts of a rebel group, even if this rebel group shares a common ethnicity with them. Thus, rebel diplomats will engage in the “ethnic entrepreneurship” described by Mueller and Van Evera by means of the strategic usage of frame extension. Rebel groups will seek to make their cause seem as germane as possible to the ethnic affinities of their potential patrons in an effort to make this identity frame more salient and actionable. These affinities can be described as part of a sense of “we-feeling”, rooted in individuals’ senses of ethnocentrism (Sumner 1906). Brubaker (2002)’s conceptualization of “groupness” is a similar concept: an “event” or process that results from the reification of ethnic categories and can result in the mobilization of actors around these categories. Following Brubaker’s reasoning that increasing levels of groupness can result from ethnic entrepreneurship and result in mobilization along ethnic lines, an increase in such sentiment should thus have a positive effect on rebels’ efforts to win support. By accepting Kalyvas (2003)’s assertions that the actions of actors in civil conflict are driven by “local motives and supralocal imperatives” and that “actions “on the ground” often turn out to be related to local and private conflicts rather than the war’s driving (or “master”) cleavage”, it logically follows that rebels, seeking to overcome this difficulty, will work to increase the salience of the “master” cleavage, exploiting ethnic affiliations to win material rewards. Brubaker and Laitin (2000) note: “there may be positive incentives to frame such contests in ethnic terms.
With the increasing significance worldwide of diasporic social formations (Clifford 1994, Appadurai 1997), for example, both challengers and incumbents may increasingly seek resources from dispersed trans-border ethnic kin (Tambiah 1986, Anderson 1992).

Ethnic categories are easily accessible and actionable especially when placed into organizational and mobilization-based contexts (Brubaker 2002). When engaging with potential constituents or supporters, rebels cannot address their prosaic concerns, yet they can amplify their feelings of ethnocentrism and link workaday issues to this frame.

Kirisci (1986) further elucidates this process in his study of Palestinian rebel groups. In his study, he draws upon work by Mansbach and Vasquez (1981) and others to develop a theory of cognitive issue linkages. Kirisci maintains that, in bargaining contexts, actors will appeal to emotionally or politically charged symbols to raise the salience of an issue to other actors. Though he does not explicitly reference Benford and Snow’s theory of frame extension, his logic is almost identical, noting that a cognitive linkage can occur “when actors come to evaluate a new issue by establishing similarities between this new issue and an already recognized salient issue” (Kirisci 1986). In describing the efforts of Palestinian groups to mobilize support, he notes that such mobilization occurred among Palestinian populations, state governments, and in intergovernmental forums.

Following this, I note that rebel diplomats may utilize SEA both in dialogue with leaders and in outreach to states’ populations. Davis and Moore (1997) maintain: “even if members of an ethnic group are divided by an international border, their ethnic affinity will serve as a conduit for the exchange of information and as a potential motivation for action”. Strategic ethnic affectation serves to provide a theoretical explanation for how
communication through said affinity functions. Following this logic, I assert that if members of an ethnic group are dispersed across two or more states, they will monitor the status and behavior of their brethren across the border”. This reflects the assertions of Anderson (1983), who conceived of ethnic groups as “imagined communities” whose members feel connected to one another despite geographic distance and, in some cases, a lack of shared historical experiences. Though many states within the international system are nation states, the members of many ethnic nations live within more than one discrete political entity in the international system.

This component of the rebel-state relationship can be explicated by the domestic politics model presented by Saideman, Mayhew, and Koga. To reiterate their assumptions, politicians care about maintaining power and need the support of their constituents. Ethnic lobbies and minority interests are of particular importance to states’ conduct of foreign affairs. Though perhaps a unique case due to the relatively high responsiveness of its government, within the United States, lobbying by ethnic groups is common: “Irish Americans lobbied 19th-century presidents to endorse Irish autonomy, and they joined with German Americans in pressing Woodrow Wilson to keep the United States out of World War I” and “The Greek lobby had brief success in persuading Congress to impose an arms embargo on Turkey, and the Armenian lobby has made Armenia one of the highest per capita recipients of U.S. aid” (Lindsay 2002). Even so, as Lindsay notes, ethnic lobbying is only employed-and employed effectively-in certain contexts. One such situation is one of crisis: “Ethnics whose real or symbolic ancestral homelands are threatened by their neighbors (think Armenia, Greece, or Israel) are also more likely to lobby than those who come from countries that are secure (think Norway
or Portugal)” (Lindsay 2002). A situation of civil war would provide just such an impetus for ethnic lobbying, and rebel diplomatic efforts would doubtlessly amplify this. If, in such a context, politicians fail to support a group’s their kin abroad, they could suffer a loss of credibility and subsequent political consequences at home: audience costs (Fearon 1994). Such costs can be severe.; or even fatal Abdullah I of Jordan was assassinated by a Palestinian activist over his perceived acquiescence to Israel, and his son King Hussein, nearly suffered the same fate (for very similar reasons) in the 1970s.

If rebel groups directly engage with members of the state’s population and utilize frame amplification to “radicalize” their opinions towards the conflict they are engaged in, then the potential costs of not supporting the rebels increases as the state thus risks inflaming an already incensed segment of the population.

To theorize this critical component of diplomatic interaction between rebels and populations, a return to the literature on domestic ethnic mobilization-and the behavior of “ethnic entrepreneurs”-can be highly useful. Olzak (1983) provides us a starting point in the form of her definition: “the process by which groups organize around some feature of ethnic identity (for example, skin color, language, customs) in pursuit of collective ends”. Jones (cited in Walter and Snyder 1999) makes light of this phenomenon by using the case of the Rwandan genocide. Noting that Rwandan identity was “fluid enough to manipulate”, the genocidaires and Akazu elite were successfully able to play upon fears of the encroaching Tutsi RPF, “[raising] the stakes around ethnicity”. These actors deemed the Tutsis “cockroaches” who would “take revenge on all Hutu, regardless of clan or religion” making it necessary for Hutu to stand together and take up arms against them. The tragedy of the Rwandan genocide gives us an example-albeit horrifying-of the
efficacy of SEA, albeit in an offensive rather than cooperative frame. The literature on elite manipulation and competition can offer further insights into the nature of this phenomenon. Gagnon (1995) notes that, when threatened, elites will shift the focus of the population “by drawing selectively on traditions and mythologies and in effect constructing particular versions of that interest”. This “ethnification” of politics was practiced by elites in Rwanda, former Yugoslavia, and elsewhere. De Figueiredo and Weingast (cited in Walter and Snyder 1999) further explain this phenomenon through the case of the collapse of Yugoslavia. De Figueiredo and Weingast identify three factors that produced ethnic violence in this case: “leaders with a tenuous hold on power fear among the citizenry, and uncertainty about the true intentions of propagators of violence”. They argue that their second assertion was, in fact, entirely rational: “citizens are willing to support extreme ends when they fear for their lives, livelihoods, and families”. Frame extension via SEA provides a mechanism that makes this phenomenon possible.

These domestic nationalist invocations can offer insights into the ethnically-based lobbying strategies of armed groups. Like Gagnon’s embattled elites, actors will strategically frame their causes to appeal to the “subjective security demands” of potential patrons (Jervis 1978). In essence, they must present their struggle and the threats that they face as ones shared with those whom they are lobbying. By creating and reinforcing affectations along the easily accessible dimensions of ethnicity, it is logical to assert that rebels should be able to internationally employ similar strategies to those employed by leaders at the domestic level of analysis.

Actors, however, can mobilize along different lines and be driven to conflict by “prosaic concerns” (Kalyvas 2008). Rebels, being rational actors, will seek to maximize
their utility and the likelihood of their diplomatic efforts’ success. To emphasize the “master” ethnic cleavage, ethnic entrepreneurs will “selectively [draw] on traditions and myths to construct suitable and popular versions of their own interests”, “exaggerate threats” to legitimize political mobilization along ethnic lines by making such ascriptive categories more salient (DeMaio 2009). Though not explicitly mentioned in DeMaio’s work, such ethnic entrepreneurship utilizes the framing strategies previously described in this work. As aforementioned, when Hutu elites in Rwanda fomented hatred of the country’s Tutsi population, they strategically employed frame bridging and frame amplification processes, as evidenced through their rhetoric that played upon existing ethnic insecurities (amplification) and linked Tutsi political and economic empowerment to Hutus’ political worries (bridging). Identities that are both easily malleable and easily accessible, like ethnic identities, are thus the easiest to emphasize. Thus, we may see variation across cases of strategic ethnic affectation.

There is an implicit assumption in all of the following: that, from the perspective of the potential patron, the benefits of providing support to an ethnic rebel group must outweigh the costs. Byman et. al (2001) note, states will support rebels for a number of reasons, ethnic or ideology affinity is not central to their decision: these “less strategic” categories have figured in to their decision calculi, but realpolitik aims are more central. Though Saideman (2002; 2012) disputes this assertion, this point is important to address: and not irreconcilable with the broader thesis of this analysis. If I assess that states are predominantly concerned with military performance and strategic goals, I must also accept that these goals are costly to attain and that rebel groups, especially near the start of their insurgencies, will lack the manpower and materiel to completely signal their
resolve. Likewise, it is important to recall that states are concerned with agency costs (Raucchaus 2009). If I incorporate Brubaker (2002)’s reasoning into this analysis, I can further assert that ethnic groupness is a variable category that can be increased through the activities of ethnopolitical entrepreneurs. Taking these factors into account, the literature indicates the following important points. Rebel groups will seek to signal that they have similar preferences to state patrons, as, facing a dearth of resources, they will choose less-costly (or costless) means of signaling their preferences to risk-averse states. Rebels will thusly employ SEA strategies to signal similar preferences to states, with this strategy taking the form of frame-extending ethnic entrepreneurship. States will thus assess that their expected agency costs are sufficiently low and that they will be able to accomplish their strategic aims due to rebels having similar preferences.

In international interactions, the actors involved face a lack of information about the motives of the other involved parties. Uncertainty of motives is a critical component of much of international relations theory; as Rathbun (2007) notes, “it is arguably the most important factor in explaining the often unique dynamics of international as opposed to domestic politics” and figures in different ways to the different theoretical approaches to the study of international relations. Following this scholarship, I can thus maintain that uncertainty will be of critical importance to rebel groups seeking transnational support. Elitzur and Gavious (2003) note that information asymmetry between two actors is especially important when one party is concerned about the other’s intentions. Hence, I should expect rational actors to attempt to resolve this asymmetry via signaling. SEA provides a means of accomplishing this aim. Spence (1973)’s seminal formulation of signaling theory utilized the labor market as an example: a candidate
seeking a job will signal their capabilities to an employer through obtaining educational qualifications. It is possible to continue this metaphor by following Bob (2005)’s concept of a “marketplace of rebellion”. If rebel groups are in competition for limited resources, the most (apparently) capable, resolved, or possessed of the most apparently convergent goals will be the most likely to receive support.

Scholars studying the role of signaling in diplomacy and conflict have maintained that signals need to have an associated cost in to be credible and thus effective (Fearon 1994; Fearon 1997; Morrow 1999). These “costly signals” signal “clear and direct positions from an external actor that are costly to establish and maintain”; they are expected to be effective due to the rational expectations of the signal receiver towards the sender’s future actions (Thyne 2006). The body of literature that maintains the effectiveness of costly signals dismisses that cheap talk can be as credible of a means of signaling. However, another, growing body of literature has countered this assertion and posited that cheap talk can be an effective means of signaling. Farrell and Rabin (1996) conceptualize cheap talk as: “‘costless, nonbinding, non-verifiable messages that may affect the listener’s beliefs’”. Sartori (2002) posits that cheap talk can be effective if an agent has a reputation for being honest, i.e. if previous cheap talk directed to the principle has been true. Thyne (2006) finds that costless signaling by a third party has a significant effect on civil war onset. Using experimental methods, Tingley and Walter (2011) find that bluffing—while costless—can still have an impact on actors’ behavior. Given the aforementioned, I assess that cheap talk can serve as an effective method of signaling.

When written in sequential order, the steps of SEA are:
1) An ethnic rebel group, i.e. an armed group in conflict with a state government, decides to lobby for external support.

2) This group, seeking to maximize their probability of success and minimize their costs, chooses to lobby for support from a co-ethnic sponsor.

3) In the process of lobbying for support from this sponsor, rebel groups will frame their situation and their demands using language that invokes common ethnic ties, historical memories, and other ascriptive links.

In summary, the previously outlined theory draws upon and extrapolates conclusions from several established bodies of literature. First, it draws upon the literature pertaining to ethnic entrepreneurship. Ethnopolitical entrepreneurs will “raise the stakes” around ethnic categories, reifying them and turning the “political fiction” of the group into an actionable category for mobilization (Brubaker 2002; Walter and Snyder 1999). The causal mechanism for this process is through reifying, invoking, and evoking ethnically-coded language, events, and memories.

Lastly, it draws upon established sociological research on framing and social movements. As previously evinced, rebels are “signifying agents actively engaged in the production and maintenance of meaning for constituents, antagonists, and bystanders or observers” (Snow and Benford 1988).

2.3: Factors influencing rebel decision making

Despite the aforementioned, there are conditions under which all components of this model may not hold. Ethnic rebel groups do not exclusively use SEA\(^\text{18}\), and even the

\(^{18}\) See the example of the PLO soliciting support from The Soviet Union and China
presence of an ethnically similar diaspora population, state, or other patron is a necessary but not sufficient condition for ethnically-based appeals to occur. In short, I may see a degree of variance in the dependent variable. What explains such variation?

First, some rebel groups may simply not seek external support. Salehyan et. al (2011) state that “rebels that are quite strong relative to the government [that they are fighting] and can rely on domestic constituencies and local resources have less of a need for foreign funding and will be unwilling to give up their autonomy”. Likewise, rebels may fear losing their autonomy: “accepting funding from foreign patrons will often come with strings attached as the principal assumes some degree of control over the rebel’s agenda; rebels give up some control over their aims and tactics in exchange for outside help as sponsors are not likely to offer resources for free” (Salehyan et. al, 2011).

I anticipate that rebel groups will seek external patronage when they require out. Though this statement may sound tautological, when one considers that rebel groups may solicit support from local networks or simply not require support due to a surfeit of materiel and financial resources, its logic becomes more apparent. States can provide qualitatively different types of support than private individuals or diasporas can: one’s neighbors usually do not have attack helicopters and tanks parked in their backyards. Rebel groups are rarely as well-armed as the governments that they oppose and may be significantly outnumbered and outgunned: states are the actors most capable of providing them with the necessary materiel (Salehyan et. al 2011). Rebel groups often require training and intelligence support: things that state actors can provide while local networks and diasporas cannot. Likewise, if a group has separatist aims, recognition by states-especially great powers—is key to the success of their statebuilding endeavors (Coggins
Rebel diplomacy could prove to be the start of a relationship that leads to such recognition.

Among groups that do seek support, SEA may not occur. Such groups may employ other framing processes and diplomatic methods. One variety of non-ethnic appeal common among rebel groups are those that appeal to actors whom Asal et. al (2014) refer to as “conscience constituents” and whom Salehyan et. al (2011) refer to as a “transnational constituency”. Members of this constituency of patrons may not share a common ethnicity with the group, but will support them out of concern for humanitarian and other normative concerns. Goulka, Hansell, Wilke, and Larson (2009) note how the Iranian Mujahidin e-Khalq “has become increasingly adept at crafting and promoting its image as a democratic organization that seeks to bring down Iranian tyrants, both secular and religious”. By framing its appeals around the group’s democratic character, it has gained support from non-Persian actors in the United States and Europe. (Goulka et al 2009). However, the authors of this paper note a pitfall that rebel groups seeking transnational support may encounter when seeking support: designation as a terrorist organization. They note: “despite the MeK’s ongoing attempts to build political support from the West through a multifaceted public-relations campaign, it was not enough to prevent the group from being designated an FTO by the United States as well as by the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and the European Union. According to U.S. law, providing any type of support—political, financial, or otherwise—for an FTO is a federal crime”. This issue may lead some groups to seek state support or support from groups or individuals in countries with more lax anti-terrorism laws.

19 A term from McCarthy and Zald (1977)
20 Foreign Terrorist Organization
Likewise, support-seeking groups may be sought out by patrons at the start rather than vice versa. Byman et. al (2001) maintain that state support for insurgents can be a form of “war by other means”; their claims are corroborated by statistical analyses by Saideman (2002) and Salehyan et. al (2011) that find rivalry between the government that a rebel group is fighting and the state that they receive support from has a strong, statistically significant effect on the likelihood of them receiving support\textsuperscript{21}.

Despite the aforementioned, I still anticipate that ethnic rebel groups will still seek support from co-ethnic state patrons. The literature on rebel diplomacy details the salience of the demand side of the state rebel group relationship, and ethnic ties have already been demonstrated to be salient to supply-side processes.

\textsuperscript{21} In Salehyan et. al (2011): regression coefficient of .962, significant at p<.05
Chapter Three: Hypotheses and Methodology

3.1: Hypotheses

Thus, from the previously outlined theory, I can discern that rebels are utility maximizing actors who will engage in strategic, ethnically-based framing processes to increase their likelihood of diplomatic success. As previously evinced, the ethnic balance of a population may have a significant impact on the bargaining behavior of rebels, as they might act as transnational ethnic entrepreneurs. From this, I derive these two hypotheses:

H1: Rebel groups that share an ethnic identity with the largest group in a state's population are more likely to engage in diplomacy with or in that state than other states.

H2: Rebel groups that share an ethnic identity with the largest group in a state's population are more likely to lobby that state using ethnically-based language than other states.

Alternatively, rebel groups may seek to directly lobby governments for support. This line of action is more accounted for in the previously described formal model than rebel groups engaging with the population. Indeed, it may be a more likely way for rebels to maximize their expected utility. Thus, I hypothesize:

H3: Rebel groups that share an ethnic identity with the majority of the ruling coalition of a state’s government are more likely to engage in diplomacy with or in that state than other states.
H4: Rebel groups that share an ethnic identity with the majority of the ruling coalition of a state’s government are more likely to lobby the state using ethnically-based language than other states

I will accept and reject these hypotheses on the following bases:

1) The presence of rebel diplomatic efforts
2) The presence of strategic, ethnically-based talk
   a. i.e. talk that invokes shared ascriptive ties, identities, and/or memories
   b. to achieve specific goals
3) The direction of said efforts
   a. Towards ethnically affiliated states
   b. Towards ethnically affiliated populations

3.2 Variables

Our independent variables are
A) The closeness in ethnic composition of a state’s ruling coalition to a rebel group
B) The closeness in ethnic composition of a state’s population to a rebel group

Our dependent variables are:
A) The presence of rebel diplomatic efforts
B) The usage of ethnic appeals within said efforts

Huang (Forthcoming)’s operational definition of rebel diplomacy, which defines its occurrence “as a rebel group’s conduct of foreign affairs during civil war for the
purpose of advancing its military and political objectives”. To reiterate, she operationalizes this as when a group:

A) “Opens a political office abroad”
B) “Sends representatives abroad on political missions; or”
C) “Creates a political body devoted to the conduct of foreign affairs (such as a ministry of foreign affairs)”

Huang opts for this operational definition as it: “identifies rebel groups that demonstrate their commitment to, and investment in, conducting foreign affairs; it helps to distinguish them from groups that may engage in propaganda or strategic talk but which fall short of these clear indications of intentional diplomatic engagement”. Insofar as this operationalization pertains to our hypotheses, H1 and H2 can be assessed on the basis of all of Huang’s categories: i.e. rebel groups will be more likely to create an organ for foreign affairs and use said body to open political offices and/or send representatives to states where they share an ethnic identity with either the majority of the government coalition or the population. H3 and H4 can be assessed on a similar basis.

I conceptually define SEA as the strategic use and invocation of shared language, cultural symbols and historical memories in a bargaining context. To operationalize this definition, it is necessary to set ex ante criteria to determine whether or not the rebels’ usage of talk is ethnically-based and strategic.

A) Do rebels use language in their appeals to potential patrons that invokes common ascriptive ties? (e.g. “Support your Irish/Palestinian/Armenian brothers!”)
B) Do rebels seek to achieve specific outcomes with said appeals? (e.g. gains in terms of recognition, material or financial support?)

For example, if a faction of the PLO framed their appeals as being for “the Arab people” or “the people of Palestine”, this would fulfill category A. Instead of speaking for “the third world”, Muslims, or another possible category, said group would have invoked an explicitly ethnic category. In order to fulfill category B, such an appeal would have to take place within the context of obtaining normative or material benefits. Such benefits are broadly conceived. Normative benefits include declarations of support, official recognition, and allowing for the construction of diplomatic offices (as a goal of furthering international recognition). Material benefits are conceived of as the provision of direct aid, be it military, financial, etc.

The presence of an ethnically similar state is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for SEA’s occurrence. As Kalyvas notes, individuals of the same ethnic group may not always support their kinsmen’s rebellious aspirations or may be mobilized to action along other lines. Likewise, some rebel groups may value external engagement more than others. Groups may prefer to rely on local networks for support rather than open themselves to the agency and legitimacy costs that could potentially arise from external patronage (Staniland 2014; Salehyan, et. al 2011).

As averred in the prior chapter, the effect of state interference in rebel groups could impact said rebels’ diplomatic behavior and rhetoric. If a rebel group is backed by a strong foreign patron from the outset—or created by one—it will have no need for diplomatic interaction for purposes of gaining support. The impact of direct involvement
by Arab governments in the creation and affairs of the PLO and its constituent factions is an example of this that will be further discussed in the case studies of this paper.

Likewise, states can directly intervene in rebel groups, taking control of factions within them and playing them against each other as befits their strategic interests. Staniland (2014) notes how this phenomenon occurred in Kashmir when the Pakistani government assumed direct control over some factions within the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) when they did not act according to their policy directives. The cases of Al-Sa’iqa and the Arab Liberation Front, Iraqi and Syrian proxies, respectively, indicate that said phenomenon occurred within the PLO.

I thus face a significant methodological issue: support and apparent diplomatic activity may be supply-side rather than demand-side driven. In some cases, the phenomena observed in this study will be endogenous. The following case studies will necessarily assess these potential confounding factors and seek to ensure to the greatest extent possible that the lobbying efforts I observe are demand-side driven.

3.3 Methodology

To assess the aforementioned hypotheses, I will assess the Palestinian national movement from 1967-1982\textsuperscript{22} and see if there is evidence that supports the previously mentioned hypotheses.

\footnote{22 These years were selected as they mark the year that the PLO was founded and the start of the Lebanese Civil War.}
To conduct a successful analysis I must assess the overall relationship between our dependent variables (the presence of rebel diplomatic efforts in general and SEA in particular) and our independent variables (closeness in ethnic composition between a rebel group and a government/population). A starting point for the development of this relationship can be extrapolated in the following Pearson correlations.

**Correlations**

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*Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).*

**Correlations**

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*Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).*

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23 Run by the author in SPSS
These were conducted with data from the Minorities at Risk project (Minorities at Risk Project 2009). Each test the relationship between nearby ethnic kin and state support\(^{24}\) for ethnic rebels. The variable for close kindred in this dataset is coded ordinally, with 0 representing a complete absence of international kin, 1 representing “close kindred across a border which does not adjoin [a group’s] regional base (including groups that have transnational kindred but not a regional base)”, 2 representing “close kindred in a country that adjoins its regional base”, and 3 representing “close kindred in more than one country which adjoins its regional base” (Minorities at Risk Project 2009). These levels are conceived of by the MAR project as substantively showing an increased level of co-ethnic presence. This correlation shows a relationship between close kindred and state support, conceived of at both aggregated and disaggregated levels. On the aggregate level, there is a positive\(^{25}\), statistically significant relationship between nearby kin and any form of state support. When state support is disaggregated into material and military categories, we see similar effects for both of these variables. Material support, however, was more strongly correlated with nearby kin than military support. This may be a result of the MAR project’s wide conception of material support as any form or amount of financial or development aid (Minorities at Risk Project 2009). Even so, state material and military support were significantly correlated with nearby kin.

Thus, with nearer and greater numbers of kin members relative to the base of a group, the greater likelihood that they will receive support from a state’s government as well as their kin. Though these two phenomena may be endogenous, SEA theory suggests that they share a common root in rebels’ lobbying efforts among populations.

\(^{24}\) Rather than kin support
\(^{25}\) +.189
Lastly, inputting the following variables into a regression can allow us to determine their impact on state support for insurgency:

1) KINSUP (Support from kindred)
2) GC10 (Kindred present nearby)
3) GC11 (Kindred groups in power)
4) GC2 (Kindred groups present in regional base)

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a. Dependent Variable: STASUP

These results indicate a statistically significant relationship between nearby kin and kin support and state support. Though empowered kin and kin in the region were not significantly related to state support, kin in neighboring states and existing kin support proved to be significant determinants of state support. I interpret this relationship as occurring due to several key reasons. First, rebel groups often face a dearth of resources, prompting them to seek external support. This lack is both what drives rebel groups to
seek support in the first place as well as a factor that limits many groups’ abilities to conduct diplomatic efforts far afield (Salehyan, Gleditsch and Cunningham 2011; Jones and Mattiacci 2015). Next, kin in countries adjacent to the rebel group’s host state are likely to share common historical memories and experiences with the members of the group targeted for lobbying. The case of the Palestinians (which will be explored in the next chapter) is illustrative, with thousands of Palestinians fleeing or being expelled from mandate Palestine in 1948 to the adjacent states of Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan (Morris, 2011). Palestinians living inside historic Palestine (i.e. Israel, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip) and the Palestinian refugees living in neighboring states share bonds of religion, family, culture, and the common historical memory of the 1948 Nakba (“catastrophe”)\(^{26}\). This common historical memory between members of this group lead to the concept of return to historic Palestine achieving great salience, so much so that rebel groups founded in neighboring states, such as the Abtal al-Awda (“Heroes of the Return”), incorporated it into their names and stated goals. These shared historical memories greatly increase the salience of ethnic linkages; i.e. the actionability of certain categories. Though certain scholars of ethnic politics, like Chandra, disagree that shared historical memories fit into the framework of ethnicity, this work takes a broader perspective, as these memories can shape cultural identity and become effective tools for grievance-based mobilization.

\(^{26}\) Khalidi and others note the importance of this event as part of the formation of Palestinian national identity
3.4: Assessing Relationships of Importance

To assess this relationship, I will begin by assessing the role of the independent variable, shared ethnic identity, in relevant group-state relationships. How shall I determine “relevancy”? As previously evinced, my hypotheses will be tested through case studies of the Palestinian National Movement between 1967 and 1982. I thus need to develop a criterion of political relevancy for states in this period to be examined across our cases.

Lemke and Reed (2001) assess the examination of politically relevant dyads-pairs of states that include at least one major power-in international relations and determine that the analyses of these pairs does not pose threats to valid inference. For the purposes of this study I need not ask what states are relevant exclusively to the broader international system, but relevant as potential patrons of Palestinian rebel movements. Expanding on the traditional conceptualization of political relevance, I can create four categories:

1) Major powers
2) Arab states
3) Muslim-majority states (Outside of the Middle East)
4) Communist states (Other than the USSR)

Major powers are deemed to be politically relevant as they are not only the most important actors in the international system, but are theoretically capable of providing more and better support than other state actors. Arab states are deemed relevant both because of their ethnic links to the Palestinian national movement but due to their
proximity to rebel groups’ areas of operations. The remaining two categories-Muslim-majority states and Communist states—were selected as religious and ideological identifications could provide additional categories for strategic framing. Palestinian groups such as Fatah incorporated elements of Marxist and Islamist thought into their ideologies, making these categories potentially usable in diplomatic framing. As the aim of this work is to test the salience of ethnicity in diplomatic appeals, we need to examine the fact that groups may utilize other categories around which to frame their appeals.

The sample\textsuperscript{27} of major powers consists of the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, France, and China. The sample\textsuperscript{28} of Arab States is Iraq, Syria, Egypt, Libya, and Algeria. The sample\textsuperscript{29} of Muslim-majority states consists of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Turkey, and Indonesia. Our sample\textsuperscript{30} of Communist states includes East Germany, Romania, South Yemen, Yugoslavia, and Poland.

In selecting these states, I assert that ethnicity, ideology, and/or religion are salient to the \textit{weltanschauungen}\textsuperscript{31} of the states that we have selected. Though some studies (see Freedman 1988) conceptualize of ideology as a “flexible tool” for justifying \textit{realpolitik} aims, others take a more holistic view, perceiving it as Hale (2004) does ethnicity: as a “radar” through which a state’s \textit{weltanschauung}, and hence its foreign policy, is developed\textsuperscript{32}. This point is corroborated by Nair (1997), who stipulates that the case of Palestine has “come to symbolize the significance of a religious identity in contemporary international relations”.

\textsuperscript{27} Selected based on permanent UN Security Council membership as a proxy for major power status
\textsuperscript{28} Selected based on a simple random sample of Arab states that existed between 1967-1982
\textsuperscript{29} Selected by a simple random sample of Muslim countries that existed between 1967-1982
\textsuperscript{30} Selected based on a simple random sample of Communist states that existed between 1967-1982
\textsuperscript{31} Ways of perceiving one or one’s state’s role in the world in the broadest sense
\textsuperscript{32} See Dannreuther (1998)
In selecting 20 states, I may be unable to find systemic evidence for each of these cases. The nature of this selection process raises several possible outcomes. I may be able to find and confirm cases of rebel diplomacy and attendant SEA processes. Alternately, I may be able to confirm that no lobbying occurred: or data may simply be missing, regardless of the historical record.

Historical context is likewise important to acknowledge. Supply side factors of the era, such as US-Soviet, Sino-Soviet, and other Cold War rivalries have been shown to be salient in external support for rebel groups in this period, such as the Angolan Civil War. Likewise, the Socialist, Anti-Imperialist, and Third-Worldist elements of the PLO’s heterodox ideology cannot be examined outside of the context of this era’s global communism. These affectations make lobbying efforts directed towards Communist states far more likely than lobbying directed at the NATO member states listed in our sample.

In the Arab world in general, and among Palestinians in particular, historical events that impacted the salience of Pan-Arab identity and Palestinian identity as organizing principles must be acknowledged. The 1962 dissolution of the United Arab Republic, the 1967 defeat of Arab armies in the Six Day War and the 1970 death of Pan-Arab icon Gamal Abd El Nasser all stand as important factors.

Having selected this sample of states, I need to determine, the largest ethnic group in each state’s population, the dominant ethnic group of the state’s ruling coalition, and whether or not a given Palestinian faction reaches out to them in each given period. Following the logic of King, Keohane, and Verba (1994), I assess that quantitative and
qualitative research share the same “logic of inference”. Thus, I will attempt to construct an unbiased metric of inference, parsing out separate causal factors while assessing my individual hypotheses.

Though Kirisci initially expected the provision of support to progress in a linear step function, it often occurred between levels, with higher levels (i.e. international institutions such as the UN and Non-Aligned Movement) causing greater support at lower levels (Such as from Arab or Islamic States). This behooves me to assess the role of rebel diplomacy in this process and find cases that show either the presence or absence of ethnically-based diplomatic appeals within this time period directed either at states or at populations within them (with the intent of using them to lobby a state’s government). Potentially confounding factors, such as the impact of ideology, rivalry, and the Palestinian diaspora will need to be analyzed and accounted for.
It is difficult, however, to obtain data that are sufficient for this analysis. The minutes of private meetings between Palestinian rebel leaders and foreign heads of state are unavailable. However, other methods of analysis can allow one to deduce the presence and efficacy of targeted, strategic ethnic appeals. This work will utilize such a method.

First, following Pearlman (2011), this analysis will disaggregate the broader Palestinian National Movement into constituent groups for the purposes of examining the diplomatic behavior of these specific actors. The groups that will be assessed are Fatah and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.

These particular cases were selected using the most–similar case method. All of the cases were selected from the same nationalist movement, though we expect to see a significant degree of variation in the dependent variable (i.e. in their diplomatic strategies). This will allow us to control for a number of different outcomes and have a high degree of internal validity in our results. However, for the sake of intellectual honesty, it is important to note the flaws of this particular method of case selection. Though it has relatively high internal validity, its external validity is relatively low: insights gained from the study of the Palestinian national movement may not be generalizable to other cases. Likewise, the reasoning inherent in it is deterministic rather than probabilistic, which may be problematic for analysis. Even so, it is the best possible tool to utilize to assess our hypotheses.

The 1967-1982 time period will be broken down into three five year periods (‘67-72, ’72-77, 77-82), allowing me to ascertain what states were lobbied in a given period
and if the demand-side dynamics of the state-armed group relationships surveyed changed over time. Next, using academic sources, the states and populations targeted for lobbying by each group will be identified for each of the three periods. Then, utilizing available documents released by these groups (Such as those listed in Kadi, 1967, and available online), the rhetoric of these groups can be analyzed to see if any examples of targeted appeals exist. The latter step is critical to this analysis, yet it also leaves open the most possibility for error, particularly causality error. As the first paper on the subject of strategic ethnic affectation, a certain degree of humility is required: this work does not pretend to give final answers on this topic, and its analysis will likely be flawed. However, given the nature of extant literature on this topic and the availability of suitable data, this method should still be able to provide insights into a topic not previously explored.

3.5: Sources’ role in the method

Even if one can assess the expected utility of SEA and note all the reasons that it should happen, one must still find examples of it occurring. However, this presents a critical problem: the private transcripts of diplomatic interaction between rebel groups and states are inaccessible for researchers, if said transcripts even exist at all. It is thus not possible to directly examine the process of strategic ethnic affectation. However, examining public pronouncements and documents by rebel groups within the periods of interest, their examining targets (or rhetorical objects), and then comparing this
information to the known supporters of these groups within these periods will allow us to deduce the presence (or absence) of SEA between rebel groups and their patrons.

Fortunately, such accounts were easily located. Works such as Kadi (1967), Lukacs (1984), and others contain primary sources from the representative time periods. Such primary sources that are included are:

1) Founding documents of organizations (i.e. the PLO charter)
2) Interviews given by members and leaders of organizations
3) Public pronouncements and documents released by members of leaders of these organizations (i.e. the PLO bulletin)

There are several issues with this method of deductive analysis that must be addressed. First, it cannot directly discern the presence of SEA. This is of particular concern due to the deterministic nature of case studies’ results. Next, public pronouncements may not be reflective of the material aims and intentions of the group: their appeals to ethnic affectations may simply be lip service rather than representative of a deeper salience of such ties. Likewise, as previously noted, a number of exogenous factors can cause variance in the dependent variable. Proclamations by groups may occur as a result of state support rather than as a cause of them. As Kirisci (1986) evinces, the fluid and dynamic processes of mobilizing support for a rebel group can often be endogenous and difficult to identify individually.

In sum, I can conceptualize this work’s chief research problem as an issue of separating potentially actionable issue frames from one another, identifying supply-side and demand-side factors, and determining which of these frames and forces were salient.
in Palestinian groups’ rebel diplomatic efforts. Our identification of different state categories will allow me to rigorously separate potentially endogenous demand and supply-side processes and successfully assess my hypotheses.
Chapter Four: Cases from the Palestinian National Movement

“Palestine is the homeland of the Arab Palestinian people; it is an indivisible part of the Arab homeland, and the Palestinian people are an integral part of the Arab nation.” - The Palestinian National Charter: Resolutions of the Palestine National Council July 1-17, 1968

4.1: Introduction

The Palestinian National Movement is a case that is both like and unlike many other rebel groups. This movement is rooted in Arab resistance to the British Mandate and to increasing Jewish immigration to historic Palestine. Indeed, as resistance to these outside forces continued throughout the first half of the 20th century, a distinct Palestinian identity developed through and alongside them. Nascent nationalism, often framed in Islamic terms, could be seen in the rhetoric of leaders such as Izz al-Din al-Qassam and Haj Amin al-Husseini. However, it was not until the 1960s that a truly cogent Palestinian resistance began to coalesce, spurred by the creation of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (Kirisci 1986).

The activities of the PLO and its constituent factions have taken place in a network of diplomatic interactions between Arab and non-Arab states, where ascriptive linkages have proven to be salient. The importance of transnational ethnic ties is elucidated by Fawcett (2014) and Barnett (1998), who notes that the Arab states of the
Middle East are “territorial states” rather than nation states, which has resulted in conflict over norms and identity in the international politics of the region. Indeed, the dynamics of support for the Palestinian cause are inseparable from regional rivalries and the domestic politics of Arab states. Indeed, the PLO’s creation resulted from such a rivalry: Egypt’s Nasser, not wanting to be perceived as weak in the face of an Iraqi appeal to establish a Palestinian government in the West Bank and Gaza, backed the creation of an armed organization to reclaim all of historic Palestine. This seemingly minor diplomatic footnote resulted in the birth of this highly influential guerilla organization. Though Yasser Arafat maintained that the Palestinian people “had to be rescued from the stranglehold of Arab tutelage, inter-party discord, and regional Arab policies” his Fatah faction and others never truly attained autonomy from their Arab neighbors (Rubin 1994). Miller (1983) corroborates this, noting that the contentious inner politics of Arab states and their strong influence over Palestinian groups limited the PLO’s autonomy. He avers: “The PLO’s dilemma is clear. Palestinian power, indeed, the success and survival of the movement, depends upon Arab support”.

The supply-demand framework that Salehyan et. al (2011) provide us with gives us a powerful theoretical lens with which to assess this national movement. The previously described dimensions of state intervention and rivalry fall under the purview of supply-side influences. However, the constituent factions of the PLO, as other rebel groups have done, weighed the costs and benefits of diplomatic engagement with actors, seeking to maximize their utility. Arafat plainly averred this notion in a 1969 interview: “After all, it is with the Saudi’s money that I buy arms from China” (Mishal 1986). One cannot wholly separate the influence of the supply side from the PLO’s external
engagement and diplomatic efforts, but it would be disingenuous to ignore the demand side of the equation for this reason.

In this historical analysis, I will assess the Palestinian national movement from 1967-1982 and see if there is evidence that supports the previously outlined theory of strategic ethnic affectation. I need to parse out confounding factors and find cases that show either the presence or absence of ethnically-based diplomatic appeals.

4.2: Palestinian Ethnic Identity

Ethnic affectation requires an ethnic identity. However, reaching a working definition of Palestinian ethnicity and its origin is both a necessary and difficult endeavor. The origin of Palestinian identity in particular has been a topic of lively scholarly debate. Al-Hout (1984) maintains a primordialist perspective on Palestinian identity, positing that a cogent Palestinian nationalism has existed since the time of the Canaanites. Muslih (1988) against this perspective, and argues that Palestinian identity is a product of two important developments that occurred during the First World War: the fragmentation of the Ottoman Empire and the fragmentation of Pan-Arab and Pan-Islamic ideology. Muslih’s assessment emphasizes that these factors lead to the development of a local form of nationalism, known as *wataniyya*. Khalidi (1992) and Migdal and Kimmerling furthers this argument, noting that this particular form of nationalism developed due to the religious and political importance of Jerusalem.
This study will follow the work of Sayigh (1997) who posits that Palestinian identity is both deeply related to\textsuperscript{33} and distinct from\textsuperscript{34} other Arab identities. This distinctiveness was emphasized by Palestinian nationalist leaders, corroborating Hale (2004)’s conceptualization of identity as a form of “social radar”. Outside of providing a working conceptualization of Palestinian identity, this thesis must accomplish two other goals. First, it must also acknowledge that Pan-Arab identity and affectations could prove salient as a means of signaling, because—not in spite of—supply and demand side factors. With states like Egypt, Syria, and Iraq jockeying for “leadership” of the Arab world\textsuperscript{35}, factions PLO often came under the sway of one or more of these polities as a tool for achieving their broader goals. I will need to assess the level of demand-side salience in this process.

4.3: Palestinian Rebel Diplomacy

Palestinian rebel groups were active diplomats. Indeed, Mishal (1986) notes that “the PLO considered engagement in diplomatic activity essential to furthering the goal of a Palestinian State”. If I am to follow Huang (Forthcoming)’s operationalization, Palestinian groups engaged in all three forms of rebel diplomatic activity, as they opened offices abroad, had a department for the conduct of international affairs\textsuperscript{36} and sent representatives on political missions. Palestinian armed groups conducted diplomatic activity with Arab States in the Middle East, non-Arab states outside of the region, and

\textsuperscript{33} “Palestinians have moreover stressed their commonality, rather than distinctiveness, of culture with neighboring Arab societies, with which they share language, religion, social custom, and family ties” (Sayigh, 1997)

\textsuperscript{34} “Collective memories, perceptions of common injustice, and the sense of belonging to a particular territory provided a basis for turning a latent collectivity into a community, and set Palestinians apart from other Arabs, with whom language, religion, and culture were shared” (Sayigh, 1997)

\textsuperscript{35} See Fawcett, Barnett

\textsuperscript{36} The Political Department
other armed groups. However, did these groups engage in diplomatic activity in the ways and for the reasons hypothesized in this work? To determine this, it is necessary to engage with the historical and political record of events and the context in which such diplomatic activities occurred, drawing several key assumptions from the extant literature.

First, the relationship of the PNM’s constituent factions to Arab states was by their subordinate status. Rubin (1994) maintains: “the Arab states often saw the PLO as a useful tool to manipulate but never considered it an equal partner, never consulting it nor respecting its interests when setting their policy” and that “When not ignoring the PLO, they interfered with it”. Even so, Palestinian groups were dependent on Arab states for “bases, supplies, training, money, arms, political backing, and protection against retaliation” (Rubin 1994). Though Palestinian groups such as Fatah sought to maximize their autonomy to the greatest extent possible, diplomatic relations with other states still occurred across a vast power differential. Arab states such as Egypt, Iraq, and Syria, “[controlled] large territories, huge economic resources, well-equipped armies, and populations far exceeding the total number of Palestinians” (Rubin 1994). This power differential, and Palestinian group’s inextricable linkages to the inner politics and rivalries of Arab states “crippled PLO diplomacy” (McLaurin 1989). However, these linkages ensured the survival the group. Demand-side incentives very likely influenced the PLO’s continued engagement with Arab states. Despite the severe costs to their autonomy, Arab governmental support gave Palestinian factions legitimacy on the “Arab street” and continued material benefits.
Next, influential individuals—rather than an organized diplomatic corps—were responsible for much of Palestinian groups’ rebel diplomatic activity. Leaders of groups, such as the PFLP’s George Habash or Fatah’s Yasser Arafat personally traveled to different states and lobbied on behalf of their factions: “Arafat traveled in perpetual motion among Arab capitals, preserving his connections and making deals” (Rubin 1994).

In many ways, the PLO is both like and unlike other rebel groups engaged in diplomacy. The PLO was active in diplomacy with state governments, but the Palestinian diaspora played an important role in Palestinian efforts to gain external support. As Byman et. al (2011) evince:

“..diasporas are largely motivated by ethnic affinity. Indeed, almost inherent to the idea of a diaspora is the concept of homeland. Communities abroad often feel a genuine sympathy for the struggles of their brethren elsewhere. At times, they may also feel a sense of guilt that they are safe while those left behind are enmeshed in brutal and bloody conflict. Insurgent groups actively play on this sympathy and guilt to secure critical financial and political support. When such support is not forthcoming, insurgents sometimes resort to coercion”.

Byman et. al (2011) also note that diasporas have been active in securing political support for insurgencies. Citing the cases of the Armenian, Kurdish, and Tamil diasporas,
the authors note that these actors have succeeded in pressuring governments to provide support to the rebel groups that represent them. Governments may choose not to-or be unable to-block support for diasporas. In the particular case of the PNM, Arab states chose to continue the provision of support to Palestinian groups due to the risk of reprisals from Palestinians angered by a perceived lack of resolve or of acquiescence to Israel. These risks were born both from dramatic events such as the assassination of Jordanian King Abdullah I as well as the high population of Palestinian refugees throughout the Middle East37.

As the role of the PLO in outreach to Palestinian diaspora/refugee populations is well documented38, the role that this paper needs to play is in establishing the link between the processes of mobilizing support among Palestinian refugees and ensuring support from Arab governments. I assess that these processes would take the form of the ethnic entrepreneurship that Kalyvas, Van Evera, and Mueller describe, using the framing strategies observed by Benford and Snow.

4.4: Ethnicity and Ideology

Though constituent parts of a national movement, Palestinian armed groups incorporated non-nationalistic elements into their ideological frames of reference. The doctrinal and ideological heterodoxy of these armed groups presents us with a research conundrum: what frames were most actionable and when? As these dimensions of

37 3,353,000 in 1977 (Kirisci 1986)
38 See Kirisci (1986), Sayigh (1997), others
ideology and identity could have been strategically invoked in negotiations in lieu of ethnicity, it behooves me to assess their salience relative to that of SEA.

I must first identify frames of relevance. Rubin argues that Fatah’s ideology evolved throughout the 1960s into an eclectic blend of “Islam [and] Marxism-Leninism [and also] Third World radical nationalism” (Rubin 1994). Due to this, I selected both Muslim states and Communist states as well as Arab states into this thesis’ criterion of political relevancy, allowing me to assess each of these categories’ importance to Palestinian rebel diplomacy.

4.5: The Role of Arab Nationalism

As Ayoob (1995) notes: “Most regimes in Africa and the Middle East do not meet the test of political legitimacy by a long measure because they preside over artificial colonial constructs that are very vulnerable to internal challenges”. The creation of the PLO-and the relationship between its constituent groups and Arab states-was highly moderated by the potential agency costs of that relationship, specifically to states’ sovereignty. As previously evinced, Fawcett (2014) posits that Arab states are not nation-states, but rather “territorial states”\(^{39}\), in which a transnational ethnic group dominates multiple states and no one state government can legitimately claim to speak for the “Arabs”. In this vacuum of legitimacy, the cause of Palestine provided an opportunity for Arab leaders to showcase their ethnic *bona fides* to their populations and in normative competition with other states (Barnett, 1998). Palestinian groups employed

\(^{39}\) Alternatively, “national states” (Sayigh, 1997)
the language of Arabism in their propaganda and in engagements with Arab states, which played both with and against the interests of Arab leaders.

Due to the factors that Fawcett (2014) outlined, Arabism has taken on a variety of forms both disparate and unified. No one individual has been able to legitimately speak for the entire “Arab street”, though some with pretensions to such a position, such as the leaders of Egypt and Syria, would perceive a vehicle for their ambitions in the factions of the Palestinian national movement. Indeed, to understand the successes and failures of these groups’ efforts at lobbying for support, it is necessary to understand the tensions that existed between the competing forms of Arabism.

Quandt, Jabber, and Lesch (1973), as well as other scholars, (See Baram 1983) identify the different varieties of Arab nationalism: *qawmiyya* nationalism and *wataniyya* nationalism. The former, derived from the word *qawm* (nation, people) is a variety of ethnic nationalism that signifies an affinity to the Arab people conceived as a whole. As previously evinced, the latter is derived from the word *watan* (homeland) and represents a local commitment to one’s own country rather than the whole imagined community of the Arabs (Muslih 1988; Anderson 1982). The ethnic –based appeals of Palestinian groups contended with and appealed to different aspects of these nationalisms at different points. Necesarilly, *qawmiyya* was utilized when appealing to Pan-Arabist sentiments, and *wataniyya* was employed when lobbying Palestinian populations within states.

*Wataniyya*, as a form of local nationalism, is inextricably linked to the concerns over autonomy and sovereignty that Ayoob (1995) identifies. Arab leaders, such as King Hussein of Jordan, sought to combat “regionalism” (*iqlimiyya*), i.e. the efforts of hardline
Palestinian groups to appeal to qawmiyya nationalism and seek the overthrow of conservative, “reactionary” regimes such as Hussein’s, which were perceived as being opposed to the liberation of Palestine and servants of Western interests (Sayigh, 1997). I follow Ayoob (1995)’s logic of third-world vulnerability to build an explanation for this phenomenon. Although heterodox, it both supports and is supported by my prior assertions.

To defuse these leaders’ concerns and ensure the ongoing provision of support, the leadership of Fateh framed its cause as one that sought to create a Palestinian state rather than a pan-Arab polity. They accomplished this by emphasizing the distinctiveness of their Palestinian identity and framing their efforts in the language of wataniyya. However, some Palestinian groups, such as the PFLP, employed the language of qawmiyya and won the support of revisionist Arab states such as Iraq, Syria, and Libya. These states were relatively small and dissatisfied with the regional status quo, as shown by their long-standing unwillingness to make peace with Israel. Heraclides (1990) found that such states are more likely to intervene on behalf of or support rebel groups for ideational or ideological reasons. Thus, “regionalist” appeals played into their interests. However, this interpretation contradicts the scholarly consensus on the matter, which posits that the PLO’s emphasis on the “specificity” of Palestinian nationalism is rooted in the failures of Pan-Arabism to provide a solution to the question of Palestine. Even so, through the case of Palestine, one can see ethnic appeals’ fluid nature.

Mishal (1986) notes: “a dual Arab-Palestinian identity, a shared commitment to pan-Arab political unity, and exposure to both symbolic and material influences from different Arab regimes increased the tendency among the Palestinian organizations to
endow their Palestinian national aspirations with an all-Arab meaning. No Palestinian could afford to be accused by fellow Arabs of preferring parochial Palestinian interests (iqlimiyya) over broad Arab nationalist ones”. Following this logic, he avers that Palestinian rebel groups “searched for differing formulas to balance the demands of Arab nationalism and the requirements of Palestinian aspirations”. Such rhetorical shifts are not surprising: as rebel groups will often alter their behavior to gain or maintain international recognition and support (Fazal 2013).

The oft-uneasy balance between the aspirations of Palestinian wataniyya and Arab qawmiyya is most starkly reflected in the language of the 1968 Palestinian National Covenant. Article 8 of the covenant states that: “The phase in which the people of Palestine is living is that of national struggle” and utilizes the adjective watani to stipulate the specific, Palestinian nature of this endeavor. Article 11, however, stipulates: “The Palestinians will have three mottoes, national unity; national mobilization and liberation”, describing their unity as part of wataniyya and their mobilization in terms of qawmiyya. This rhetorical tension is further reflected in Articles 12-15 of the Covenant. The former article, in its entirety, reads: “The Palestinian Arab people believe in Arab unity. To fulfill its role in realizing this, it must preserve, in this phase of its national struggle, its Palestinian personality and the constituents thereof, increase consciousness of its existence and resist any plan that tends to integrate or weaken it”. The rhetoric of this part of the Covenant affirms the tension between maintaining a commitment to the ideals of pan-Arabism while not presenting an overtly maximalist viewpoint that would alienate the PLO’s state sponsors. This is evident in the usage of the adjective watani40 to

40 “National” as in “wataniyya” nationalism.
describe their struggle rather than qawmi, all while offering rhetorical overtures to Arab unity. Articles 13 and 14 explicitly frame the issue of Palestine in Pan-Arab terms: “The destiny of the Arab nation, indeed the very Arab existence, depends upon the destiny of the Palestine issue”, as does Article 15, which states that Palestine is part of “the great Arab homeland” and that it is “a national (qawmi) duty to repulse the Zionist, Imperialist invasion” of it. As well as a means of assuaging the fears of Arab leaders, the PLO’s rhetorical paeans to wataniyya were a means of addressing the fundamental paradox of Palestinian nationalism: as Palestinians are Arabs who share a similar culture, language, religion, and history to other Arabs, they could be denied the right to their own particular state. Emphasizing the particular, Palestinian elements of their identity and of the territory they sought to control was a legitimizing strategy that allowed the PLO to continue to function as a national movement. As will be reflected in the case studies to come, the balance between these forms of nationalism was not always easily maintained.

Palestinian rebel diplomats likewise faced a unique dynamic vis-à-vis the Palestinian refugee population in neighboring Arab states. Palestinian armed groups depended heavily on the provision of sanctuary and support by local populations. Particularly in Lebanon, the greatest providers of such support to Palestinian guerillas were Palestinian refugees living in refugee camps on the outskirts of major cities like Beirut, Tripoli, and Sidon. This assessment of the role of ethnicity in Palestinian rebel diplomacy needs to take all of these factors into account.
4.6 The Case of Fatah

Yasser Arafat, a Palestinian activist who would arguably become the most important figure in the Palestinian history, founded the Palestinian National Liberation Movement, better known by the reverse acronym Fatah, in 1959. Though dedicated to the reconquest of Palestine, Fatah was international from its inception: Arafat widely traveled, recruiting members and establishing bases abroad in Algeria, Syria, and Jordan in the years after the group’s founding. Ultimately, Arafat would remain chairman of the PLO until his death. Under his leadership Fatah became the largest and strongest faction within the Palestinian national movement: as well as one of the most involved in rebel diplomacy.

In 1969, Arafat became the Chairman of the PLO. Arafat’s “resistance-oriented” leadership “enabled the PLO to have a more effective and central role in mobilizing the Palestinians and in expanding its basis of support both at the local and the international level” (Kirisci 1986). Fatah would ultimately become-and remain- the largest faction in the PLO. As will be detailed, this ideologically heterodox organization was diplomatically active and employed multiple frames a frame alignment processes in its efforts to gain normative and material goods.

4.6a: Fatah from 1967-1972

In 1967, Israel defeated the armies of Egypt and Syria in the Six Day War. It is difficult to overstate the importance of this event to the politics of the Middle East in general and of Palestine in particular. Palestinian political-military groups faced a

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41 “Harakat al-Watanniya li-Tahrir Filastin”
watershed moment. Realizing that they could not rely on Arab armies to defeat Israel, Fatah’s leadership maintained relations with Arab states (while not expecting them to intervene), great powers, and other states. By 1969, this group had become the largest faction in the PLO and effectively taken the reins of the Palestinian national movement (Miller 1983). This allows me to draw on data from a wide range of primary and secondary sources.

In March 1970, a delegation from Fatah visited Beijing: indeed, Arafat is quoted as saying that the People’s Republic of China was “the biggest influence in supporting our revolution and supporting its perseverance”. (Harris 1977). Prior to 1967, China had already met with members of the PLO. In 1965, a delegation led by Ahmed Shuqairy arrived in Peking to “flag-waving crowds beating drums and gongs” (Cooley 1971). This visit resulted in Shuqairy’s signing of a pact for Chinese diplomatic, economic, and military support. According to an Israeli military report released in 1967, such aid consisted of small arms as well as “anti-tank and anti-vehicle artillery, decontamination chemicals and carloads of poison gas” (Cooley 1971). Kirisci (1986) notes how Fatah’s ideology and framing strategies played a key role in consolidating support China and other Communist states in Asia. Visits from Arafat and other PLO officials coincided with the Chinese government stating that the issue of Palestinian self-determination was “no longer [merely] an international dispute over refugees, but [a] manifestation of the national liberation struggle of a distinct Palestinian people”. Arafat likewise made visits to North Korea and North Vietnam in the early 1970s, which resulted in the opening of diplomatic offices in these states and the provision of support. Israeli (in Norton and Greenberg 1989), notes the importance of supply-side factors in this relationship, such as
Sino-Soviet rivalry. However, he does not take into account demand-side incentives, such as the internal conflict over ideological aims within the PLO more broadly and within Fatah in particular. These conflicts over doctrine, and, ultimately, the political aims of the group, influenced to whom they directed their appeals.

Fatah’s rhetoric was directed to Arab as well as non-Arab audiences. Indeed, this was necessary as the “core Problem” that Fatah face was winning “official Arab recognition” after 1967 (Mishal 1986). As previously evinced, it was necessary for Fatah to appeal to the maximalist aspirations of the Pan-Arab governments of Syria, Iraq, and Egypt, while emphasizing the local nature of their revolution so as not to alienate supporters who feared irredentism and to ensure that Palestinian refugee populations would continue to provide them with support. In a 1968 interview with the newspaper *Al-Muharrir*, Yasser Arafat described the Palestinian struggle for Palestine as “Palestinian in face, but Arab in heart”, and in a 1970 statement released from Beirut, a Fatah spokesman stated: “We in Fatah view Palestine in terms of [Arab] national, not geographic dimensions”. However, in an interview with the Kuwaiti newspaper *Al-Rai al-Aam*, Fatah official Hani Al-Hassan stated: “We in the Palestinian revolution aspire to the day we will begin our social revolution, but it is nonsense to insist that we wage both [Palestinian and Arab] revolutions together, because if we do, we will lose both”.

What was the reality of the situation? Fatah sought to achieve their “parochial” goal of taking control over all of Mandate Palestine before seeking Arab unity. Mishal (1986) notes how Arafat sought to make appeals to both Arab Nationalist ideals while reassuring his Arab backers of non-interference in their own governments. In a 1968 interview with French newspaper *Jeune Afrique*, Arafat said: “Since we do not interfere
in the affairs of the Arab countries, since we have in common with them and with the Arab people the objective of ending the Israeli occupation, we see no reason for conflict between us”. As Mishal (1986) confirms, Fatah’s “cooperative” approach with Arab regimes was based on the assumption that “the fewer the ideological arguments over Arab national issues, the greater the chance to reach a workable consensus and to mobilize broad support from fellow Arabs”. However, such “cooperation” was confounded by the creation of PLO statelets, conflict with Arab leaders attempting to co-opt the Palestinian cause, and recruitment efforts (Miller 1983). From a perspective of rebel diplomacy and engagement with populations within Arab states, though, “non-intervention” was almost an impossibility.

Muslim-majority states did not play a significant role in Fatah’s foreign policy in this period. Though none of the Muslim-majority states listed recognized Israel’s existence in this period, signaling at least a tacit support of the Palestinian cause, and Fatah received financial support from Saudi Arabia, I did not see any evidence of lobbying by this group (Mishal 1986). It is unclear whether or not Fatah lobbied this state, or if the information is simply missing.

Communist states also played a role in Fatah’s diplomatic efforts. Fatah received support from the Soviet Union. In the aftermath of the 1967 war, all Eastern European countries (save for Romania) ended their diplomatic relations with Israel. The perspectives of Warsaw Pact states evolved substantially between this year and 1972, changing from simply viewing the issue of Palestine as a refugee problem42 to one of

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42 In early 1969, the USSR sponsored a peace proposal that guaranteed Palestinian refugees the right to return to their homes
national liberation. Kirisci (1986) notes two “breakthroughs” that influenced these states’ perceptions: Palestinian groups’ increased usage of violence on the local level and the increased discussion of Palestinian rights on the international level.

Fatah first made diplomatic contact with the USSR in 1968, courtesy of Egyptian leader Gamal abd el-Nasser, who facilitated a meeting between Arafat and Kremlin officials. However, the movement’s leaders made independent trips to Moscow in the early 1970s, including a 1971 trip by Yasser Arafat that cemented the provision of training and medical aid from the Soviets (Reppert 1989). As Reppert (1989) evinces, the PLO was “willing to seize the initiative in their relations with the Soviets” even as relations between Moscow and Cairo deteriorated. In this period, as in others, Arafat and others in Fatah made overtures to Marxist theory and a global struggle against imperialism. Arafat’s framing of Zionism as an extension of global imperialism matched the Communist Party’s official view, that defined Zionism as “militant chauvinism, racism, anti-Communism and anti-Sovietism” (Great Soviet Encyclopedia, 1969).

Fatah’s political doctrine was a heterodox blend of “Islam [and] Marxism-Leninism [and also] Third World radical nationalism” (Rubin 1994). As Brubaker and Laitin (1998) note, there were often incentives to frame conflicts in “grand ideological terms”, invoking the global struggles against capitalism and imperialism as a means of mobilizing resources. Thus, SEA did not (and could not) occur between PLO factions and the USSR, other forms of strategic framing may have likely taken place in diplomatic engagements.
Another Communist state that Fatah established diplomatic contact with was Yugoslavia. Yugoslav documents from this period note that Arafat-traveling under the alias Abu Omar-traveled to Belgrade in 1969 and met with Yugoslav officials from the League of Communists of Yugoslavia in an attempt to secure the provision of arms (Batovic). Documents do not indicate that Arafat explicitly framed his appeals in ideological or ethnic terms, however, given the PLO’s statements on the anti-colonial and leftist aspects of their ideology-and the fact that they met with officials from the League of Communists-such framing may have likely taken place. Documents, however, do indicate that Arafat emphasized how the PLO was seeking to “resolve the position of the Palestinian people” through armed conflict rather than through negotiations or third parties (Batovic). Rather than signaling convergent ideological interests, Arafat appears to have explicitly signaled the PLO’s resolve to use costly tactics. As previously described, signaling capabilities and resolve is a common strategy that prospective agents will employ when seeking to gain the support of a principal. Further visits by PLO officials Husam Hattib and Abu Lottof secured the rights of Fatah to open an information office in Belgrade in 1971.

Conflict between factions of the PLO within this period hampered Fatah’s diplomatic efforts with Yugoslavia. Internecine strife nearly caused Yugoslav officials to postpone a Fatah delegation’s visit in 1969 (Batovic). Other factors, such as Yugoslavia’s concern that too close a tie to the PLO could alienate it from more conservative Arab countries, served as obstacles in this period. In 1971, Batovic avers:
The Palestinian demand for arms supply was granted, but only on commercial basis, and not as a donation. Material help from Yugoslavia included purchasing military equipment through Yugoslav export company Yugoimport, shipping medical supplies, including a fully equipped mobile medical unit, medical treatment of wounded Palestinians in Yugoslav hospitals, education grants for Palestinian students in Yugoslavia. At the same time, contacts were established between the Yugoslav Unions Federation and the Jordanian Labour Federation, that represented the Palestinians; Yugoslav Red Cross and the Palestinian Red Crescent; Yugoslav and Palestinian Student Unions; Yugoslav information agency Tanjug and Palestinian News Agency Wafa, etc.

What of Fatah efforts to reach out to populations in Arab states with the intent of gaining support? In the years between 1967 and 1972, Fatah was able to attract and manage more recruits after 1967 than other Palestinian groups, due largely in part to resources granted by external supporters that enhanced their political and economic capacity. As Mishal (1986) maintains, this group entertained support from Egypt as well as “solid and continuing logistical backing from the Algerians, the Chinese, and the Syrians”. Even while receiving support from Arab governments, Fatah presented itself as an alternative to these states’ inability to defeat Israel. As Miller (1983) evinces, “The guerillas offered Arabs and Palestinians alike a chance to regain self-respect and to create
the “new Arab man”. Fatah’s position of strength after 1967, driven by Arafat’s efforts to unify the PLO, caused Arab states to relent and acknowledge the legitimacy and strength of Palestinian resistance groups (Miller 1983). Thus, some of Fatah’s influence in this period is more attributable to supply-side rather than demand-side factors.

Fatah’s diplomatic efforts were conducted both through direct and indirect means. As evinced in the preceding paragraphs, Arafat and other Fatah officials made direct contact with states from whom they sought to receive material and diplomatic support. However, “indirect diplomacy” was facilitated both through Arab governments and through multilateral forums. During this period, Arab states such as Egypt and Algeria facilitated meetings between PLO leaders and other states as well as international organizations such as the Non-Aligned Movement and Organization of African Unity (Kirsici 1986).

1968 witnessed the occurrence of the Battle of Karameh. On March 21st, 1968, Israeli forces launched a cross-border raid into Jordan as retaliation for an attack on an Israeli school bus. They were met by a combined PLO and Jordanian force which, though tactically defeated, inflicted substantial casualties on the IDF contingent. This event proved to be a key recruiting tool. As Miller (1983) avers, Fatah “sought to exploit the affair to enhance its prestige and create a new mythology”. The group substantially exaggerated the number of Israeli casualties and played off of the name of the battle’s location: Karameh is also the Arabic word for “dignity” (Miller 1983).

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43 To an extent
In 1970, the PLO was expelled from Jordan during that year’s “Black September”. Clashes between Palestinian Fedayeen and Jordanian security forces were common as more and more Palestinian guerillas launched raids from inside the kingdom, organized their own “state within a state”, and posed a threat to Jordanian sovereignty. Though, as Miller (1983) notes, the debacle that this ultimately resulted in “left the Palestinian movement divided, embittered, and with a host of organizational problems”, I would be remiss to let the outcome of PLO activity in Jordan shape our assessment of the processes that ultimately lead up to it: and the role of rebel lobbying in said processes.

Palestinian groups were active in engaging in recruiting activities among the Palestinian refugee populations in Jordan, Lebanon and other Arab states. After the Cairo Accord of 1969, the constituent factions of the PLO were permitted to establish social, economic, and legal institutions in refugee camps. Not only did the PLO serve as governing force in the refugee camps, but as one that “[promoted] a collective political and national identity among the exiled Palestinians” (Hanafi and Long 2010). Maintaining and developing this collective identity through means of SEA aided Fatah’s efforts to recruit from Palestinian refugee populations, maintain territory, and develop institutions. Fatah and other PLO factions’ “state-within-a-state” in Jordan exemplifies this (Miller 1983).

Fatah’s diplomatic efforts were constrained both by Palestinian institutions and international institutions. After Black September, Fatah suffered from a “period of intense factionalism” (Miller 1983). Aside from internecine disputes, Fatah’s efforts to “dominate and unify” the PLO as a whole, though successful, necessary took time and
effort away from outside engagement. These institutional constraints affected the content and quality of these diplomatic appeals.

The first hypothesis posits that rebel groups will be more likely to lobby states whose governments have a similar ethnic composition to their own. We receive mixed support for this hypothesis. Fatah indeed lobbied Arab states for support in this period, and even employed language invoking Arab identity at the time that it did so, thus validating H3. However, it also lobbied Communist states such as Yugoslavia and major powers like the Soviet Union. In these appeals, the group emphasized Leftist and third-worldist frames of reference.

I also received mixed support for the second hypothesis, which posits that rebel groups will engage diplomatically among ethnically similar populations. Literature indicates that Fatah was active in recruiting and promoting Palestinian national unity in refugee camps around the Middle East. However, I was unable to find systematic evidence of ethnic entrepreneurship occurring, thus not providing support for H4.

4.6b: Fatah from 1972-1977

From 1972-1977, Fatah officials continued to pursue rebel diplomacy as a strategy for gaining material and normative goods. However, in this period, Fatah faced severe internal constraints that likely affected its diplomatic activities. After their expulsion from Jordan, the PLO moved their headquarters to West Beirut, Lebanon. The shock of the expulsion from Jordan and subsequent organizational problems were the subject of much of the primary and secondary sources detailing Fatah’s activity in this
period. It was thus difficult to find systematic evidence for the employment of SEA in this period.

Fatah’s diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union continued throughout this period (Kirisci 1986; Sayigh 1997; Andrews and Mitrokhin 2005). Sayigh details how the USSR offered Arafat additional arms and military training for his forces during a 1973 visit to the Kremlin. Such aid, however, was structured as a way to induce the PLO to participate in the peace process with Israel and reject its prior maximalist aims. This helped lead to the adoption of the Palestinian National Council’s 1974 Ten Point Program, which called for the creation of a “national authority” to rule "every part of Palestinian territory that is liberated" (Palestinian National Council, 1974).

He visited Moscow again in the summer of 1974 and met with members of the Politburo in an effort to ensure the continuation of Soviet support to his forces. We can deduce that Arafat’s diplomatic efforts matched Coggin’s theorization of rebel diplomatic aims (i.e. seeking both material and normative goods): after his visit, Soviet President Podgorny spoke in support of establishing a Palestinian state (Kisirci 1986) However, supply-side forces played a major role in this period as well that may have confounded Fatah’s efforts to lobby for support. Realpolitik played an important role in USSR-Palestine relations. During this period, the Soviet Union lost influence in Egypt in the wake of the 1973 Yom Kippur War and sought to maintain relations with Palestinian groups as a means of retaining influence in the Middle East. Reppert, however, outlines that both supply and demand side factors influenced this dynamic. Ensuring superpower
patronage was a means of furthering the PLO’s aims towards international recognition as well as material and financial support (Reppert 1989). This corroborates Coggins’ and Huang’s outline of rebel diplomatic aims.

Communist states continued to play an important role in Fatah’s foreign policy in this period. In 1974, all ambassadors from Warsaw Pact countries met with Arafat in Damascus (Kirisci 1986). Arafat likewise established ties with Romanian security services (Andrews and Mitrokhin 2005). Interestingly, Arafat had previously reached out to the Polish government, it only allowed the PLO to open a diplomatic office in Warsaw in 1976 (Kirisci 1986).

In a statement released in January, 1973, by the Palestinian National Council, Fatah leaders called for the establishment of a “national democratic regime in Jordan”, expressing continuing hostility towards the Hashemite monarchy. In the same statement, the PNC calls for “the struggle of the Palestinian and Jordanian peoples” to be “[welded]…to the struggle of the Arab nation”. (Lukacs 1984). I can infer that language invoking a common Arab identity may have been used in Fatah’s diplomatic activities in this period.

Fatah engaged in diplomacy with Turkey, one of the Muslim-majority states listed, in this period, In 1975, Farouk Kaddumi, the head of Fatah’s Political Bureau, visited Ankara (Akgün, Gündoğar, and Görgülü 2014). This trip resulted in Turkey’s recognition of the PLO. Further diplomacy, facilitated this time by the Organization of

Likewise see Coggins (2011) for more information on the role of great powers in recognizing rebel groups’ claims to statehood.

A body constituted for the purpose of conducting foreign affairs, as per Huang.
the Islamic Conference in 1976, lead to the opening of a PLO office in Ankara. The role of the OIC suggests something of the salience of religious ties, however unclear.

Fatah’s goals, as Kirisci notes, were aimed at bringing attention to their cause at the international level: Arafat’s famous 1974 “gun and olive branch” speech at the United Nations exemplifies this. PLO diplomatic activity in international forums such as the UN, NAM, and OAU somewhat confound Asal et. al (2014)’s assertion that ethnonationalist rebels are less likely to contend for international support as their goals are limited to members of a specific ethnic group. This finding corroborates Benford and Snow’s assertion that social movements will use frame extension to portray their aims as extending to issues that may be of concern to its potential patrons and audiences.

4.6c: Fatah from 1977-1982

In the last period that this study examines, Fatah, as well as other PLO factions, faced harsh endogenous and exogenous political constraints yet continued diplomatic activity.

Fatah continued to engage in diplomatic activity with the Soviet Union in this period. On October 29, 1978, the USSR invited a PLO delegation headed by Arafat to Moscow (PLO Bulletin, 1978). According to the Bulletin this delegation also included “Khaled al-Fahoum, Chairman of the Palestinian National congress; PLO Official Spokesman Abdul Muhsen Abu Maizar, Zuhair Mohsen, Head of the PLO Military Department; Talal Naji, Head of the PLO Cultural Department; and Faiq Warrad and Saleh Ra’fat, both members of the PLO Central Council”.

According to a report detailing the proceedings of this meeting,
Arafat had asked to meet in Moscow for the purpose of consulting with the Soviet leadership on the eve of the Baghdad conference. During the discussions, we adhered to the same well-known policy that had been coordinated with the friends of the socialist community regarding affairs in the Middle East. Evaluating the situation in the Middle East, we emphasized that the American-Israeli-Egyptian deal concluded at Camp David and the separate agreement on Sinai being prepared on its basis constitute a conspiracy at the expense of the fundamental interests of the Arab people. By taking this path, Egyptian President Sadat has thrown a noose on his neck and keeps tightening it at every step. He has betrayed shared Arab interests and openly went over to the camp of those who support Israel” (Wilson Center)

At this meeting, Soviet officials reassured the PLO leader of their commitment to the “progressive forces of the Arab world” (Wilson Center). Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko reassured Arafat that “the Soviet leadership and people stand by your side and will not abandon you until you realize your just national goals, and will offer all support to your just struggle against the Zionist aggressors and their allies, who only dream of expansion and domination at the expense of the Arab Nation” (PLO Bulletin,
Likewise, Arafat nevertheless made multiple references to the goals of “the Arab people” and framed his efforts as being representative and supportive of their interests.

This reveals several interesting facts. It validates our claim that leaders of ethnic rebel groups utilizing SEA their dialogues with state leaders. Moreover, it shows that rebel diplomats will engage in this behavior even when lobbying governments with whom they do not share an ethnic linkage. More interesting yet, though, it reveals that ethnic affectation also occurs on the supply side of the state-armed group relationship. In this case, a principal (the USSR) invoked the identity of its agent (Fatah) in order to reaffirm its commitment to said agent’s efforts. In this context, Arafat likewise framed his demands in broad-based ethnic terms. These findings confound my hypotheses on multiple dimensions, but reveal interesting opportunities for future research.

Fatah’s diplomatic engagement with Arab states continued in this period. On December 4\textsuperscript{th}, 1977, Fatah and the other factions of the PLO called for the formation of “a Steadfastness and Confrontation Front”. The introductory text of this document reads:

“In the name of all the factions, we ratify this unificatory document. In asserting the importance of the relationship of struggle and nationalism between Syria and the Palestinians. The Syrian Arab Republic and the PLO announce the formation of a unified front to face the Zionist enemy and combat the imperialist plot with all its parties and to thwart all attempts at capitulation. The
Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahirnyah and the PDRY (People's Democratic Republic of Yemen - South Yemen) have decided to join this front, making it the nucleus a pan-Arab front for steadfastness and combat which will be open to other Arab countries to join”.

Fatah entertained strong relations with South Yemen during this period. These links appear to be both a function of the PDRY’s Pan-Arab and Socialist ideology and Fatah’s exploitation of it. In 1977, Arafat visited this state and was received in Aden as “Brother Arafat, the President of Palestine” (Halliday). It appears that Fatah’s anti-imperialist and third-worldist inclinations were more salient to Yemen’s leadership in this time period as after his visit foreign ministry officials in Aden announced that “supporting the just cause of national liberation movements, suppressed by Zionist imperialist and racist regimes did not constitute an act of terrorism” (Halliday). In the wake of the Camp David Accords, however, Fatah did not engage diplomatically with Egypt. Rather, Arafat mocked Egypt’s prime minister, Mustafa Khalil, as “insignificant” (PLO Bulletin, 1979).

Communist states remained an important part of Fatah’s diplomatic strategy: and, on the whole, Leftist and Third-Worldist framing strategies were highly salient in this period. The September, 1979 issue of the PLO Bulletin describes that year’s meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement and the role of Fatah’s Yasser Arafat in promoting the PLO therein.
“In the final session which lasted almost thirteen hours Chairman Arafat took the floor to point out the importance of such a resolution. Chairman Arafat referred in his speech to the continuous Israeli bombardments against Palestinian and Lebanese civilians in Southern Lebanon. He wondered whether the Israeli land, sea, and air shelling and bombardments coincide with the Camp David "peace" treaty. "The condemnation of the separate peace treaty might help to stop this hell imposed on us", Chairman Arafat said.

It is noteworthy to mention that all the speakers at the Sixth Summit considered the Palestinian problem as a central world issue. All the speakers unanimously asked for an equitable settlement of the Palestinian problem. Anti-Zionism was one of the main slogans at the conference and among the neon signs of Havana during the night you always read. "Contra el Sionismo\textsuperscript{46}".

These continued paeans to Third-Worldism reflect the fact that rebel groups, like other social movements, can and do employ multiple frames depending on context. Ethnic affectation would have confused and alienated many of the non-Arab representatives in attendance: framing

\textsuperscript{46} "Against Zionism"
Fatah’s struggle as part of a broader struggle against imperialism proved a more effective tool in this scenario.

Despite their affectations to the decidedly Pan-Arab PDRY, Fatah had a preference for a “specific” solution to the issue of Palestinian statelessness, reflected in their rhetoric of this period. A statement from Mahmoud Abbas, then a member of the Palestinian Central Committee, to the Qatar News Agency reflected this: “What is important now is to force Israel to withdraw from the occupied territories and to establish an independent Palestinian state. Only then will the Palestinian people determine their relations [with Arab Countries], taking into consideration the Palestinian people’s interest and those of the Arab nation at same time” (Mishal 1986). During this time period, Fatah leaders pushed for the idea of a Palestinian “mini-state” in the West Bank and Gaza rather than a more maximalist design that incorporated the whole of historic Palestine. This goal-designed to enable Fatah to “represent its diplomatic activity as contributing to, or at least not opposing, the PLO struggle for a Palestinian state in the whole of Palestine” without “deviating from official policy” set by the PLO as a whole and by the expectations of Arab states (Mishal 1986). Fatah engaged in public diplomacy to convey these aims and win legitimacy on the international level. Though Jones and Mattiacci (2015) outline how rebels use public diplomacy to gain material resources and encourage intervention from outside sponsors, this usage of public diplomacy proves that rebels can seek normative goals as well. Fatah’s public diplomatic efforts took the form of radio interviews with their charismatic leader, Yasser Arafat. By this time period, Arafat had firmly cemented himself as the symbolic and actual head of the Palestinian

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47 As Jones and Mattiacci (2015) detail
national movement: his public declarations were frequent and only served to reinforce this status. One such interview, with the Monte Carlo radio station, reveals details of Fatah’s diplomatic efforts germane to my research aims.

Arafat employs ethnically-based language in his rhetoric. When discussing the Camp David accords, he avers they “[harm] not only the PLO and the Palestinian people, but also the whole Arab Nation” (PLO Bulletin 1978). He continues to state:

> We are now at a historic turning-point, the implication of which is that this Arab Nation will be or will not be; that this Arab Nation, which includes 150 million people, will impose its own will and future, or accept a new colonialism and containment, and a US-imperialist-Zionist hegemony over the Arab region.\(^48\)

What drove these invocations? As evinced in my theory, strategic ethnic affectation is just so: strategic. It is targeted to specific audiences in the service of specific normative and material goals. Radio Monte Carlo, despite its Italian moniker, is an Arabic language media outlet\(^49\). Arafat, being a rational actor, employed a framing strategy in this exchange tailored to his Arab audience. Though this does not directly validate my hypotheses, through the inferential process described in the methodology section, I can infer that such language was influential in swaying Arab

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\(^{48}\) Emphasis mine

\(^{49}\) A link to its modern iteration: http://www.mc-doualiya.com/
opinion towards Fatah: Fatah lobbied and received support from Arab states in this period.

Muslim-majority states expressed broad rhetorical support for the Palestinian cause in this period. Arafat was able to successfully lobby the (largely Pakistani) Muslim World League to issue a statement against the Camp David Accords that spoke in support of the Palestinian right to Jerusalem (PLO Bulletin, 1978). According to the PLO Bulletin issued that year, “The PLO delegate to the meeting brought with him a letter and a cable from Arafat with regard to Jerusalem, to the Secretariat of the Islamic League”. I maintain that these successes were due to the Islamic elements of Fatah’s eclectic weltanschauung. According to Miller (1983), “[Fatah’s] social philosophy was conservative and used traditional Islamic symbols to appeal to a traditional Sunni majority”. Nevertheless, as in previous periods, most support from the Muslim world was rhetorical rather than material, revealing the limits of these efforts.

4.6d: Assessment of Results

Fatah’s ideological heterodoxy provided it with multiple, actionable frames that it employed in diplomatic activity. This merits a return to the previously listed criterion of politically relevant states.

Fatah actively lobbied two of the five major powers listed: the USSR and China. As none of the major powers in my random sample had an Arab/Palestinian majority population or an Arab ruling coalition, we find no support for any of the hypotheses. Yet this could be solely attributed to a demand-side ideological affiliation there is a distinct possibility of an interaction effect between supply side and demand side factors. For
example, as Byman et al. (2011) note, rebel groups often received state support out due to states’ rivalries. After the Yom Kippur War of 1973-and the United States’ subsequent military assistance to Israel, Communist states sought to strengthen their position in the Middle East against U.S. influence. This supply side factor may have combined with the known Leftist affectations of Fatah to create a strengthened state-armed group relationship.

Fatah lobbied all of the Arab states in the sample save for Egypt. What explains this disparity? First, it is important to recall that Nasser, via the Arab league, lead the efforts to create the PLO, albeit as a tool that he could manipulate to enhance his standing among other Arab states (Barnett 1998). Even after the PLO assumed greater autonomy in the late 1960s, Egypt continuously provided support to its constituent factions independent of any lobbying efforts on their part. Such support took the form of military training, intelligence sharing, and the provision of arms and financial aid (Sayigh 1997). However, the impetus for this activity came from the supply side, not the demand side.

Of the Muslim states listed, evidence suggests that Fatah only targeted Turkey for lobbying directly, while it indirectly lobbied Pakistan through the Muslim World League. In comparison to other state categories, from which Fatah sought both material and normative goods, Fatah seemed to only seek normative goods (in the form of legitimizing rhetoric) from Muslim states. This appears to be a calculation based on these states’ relative capacities to provide such goods. As Coggins (2011) notes, recognition by great powers is highly valued by rebel groups controlling (or seeking to control) territory as it gives them an “in” to a high-status group of actors. Likewise, great powers, being richer and more militarily powerful, are more capable of providing military and financial
assistance. None of the Muslim states listed had a comparative or absolute advantage in military power or wealth, but they were more able than other states to legitimize the Palestinian national movement in religious terms.

Fatah engaged in rebel diplomatic activity with all of the Communist states listed. Controlling for the Arab government and population of one of these states, South Yemen, it is clear that a Communist government had a significant effect on whether or not Fatah lobbied a certain state. This effect may have been endogenous, with influences coming from both the supply and the demand side. It is unclear whether Communist states saw Fatah as a capable agent due to this group’s more out of this group’s leftist affectations or out of other phenomena on the supply side, such as rivalry. Indeed, the most likely scenario is a combination of factors. Interestingly, none of the states that Fatah lobbied were democratic or had highly responsive regimes, which confirms Saideman (2002; 2012)’s assertions.

4.7 The Case of the PFLP

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) was founded after the Six Day War ended in December, 1967 by George Habash. A revolutionary leftist organization, the PFLP deigned to spread its revolutionary ideals to other states while engaging in armed resistance against Israel. The PFLP was born of a merger between the Pan-Arabist Arab Nationalist Movement and other groups such as Youth for Revenge and the Palestine Liberation Front (Schweitzer 2011). Habash, along with his Arab nationalist comrade Hani al-Hindi, were active in organizing students in Beirut during the late 1950s. The ANM gained a direct link to Egypt’s Pan-Arabist president Gamal Abd
El Nasser in the wake of a 1954 massacre of student demonstrators: the survivors, who were expelled from the American University of Beirut, were offered places at Cairo University under a special order from Nasser himself (Cobban 1984). By 1967, the ANM had already established itself as an international force. As Cobban notes, they had acquired members in both the Levant and Arabian Peninsula, particularly in South Yemen, where the ANM participated in the fight for independence from Britain.

Considered to be Fatah’s chief rival in the period surveyed, the PFLP nevertheless suffered from internal ideological debates, more than one of which lead to groups of fighters breaking away to form their own factions.\footnote{A notable case of this way Nayif Hawatmeh’s 1969 split to form the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine}

This thesis’ period of study begins with the PFLP’s founding, which occurred in the context of structural and ideological changes within the ANM. The group had begun to develop a notable “socialist temper” (Cobban 1984). Likewise, efforts to outbid the already popular Fatah movement had lead it to adopt increasingly violent tactics.

The PFLP is noteworthy for bringing the Palestinian cause to worldwide attention through attacking international targets they deemed part of the US-lead “imperialistic world”: airliners, banks, and businesses were all targeted (Schweitzer 2011). How did this tactically innovative group, however, conduct diplomacy? And what role, if any, did ethnicity and nationalism play in their efforts?

In addition to reaching out to states and populations for support, the PFLP was active in making connections with other leftist and nationalist revolutionary movements, including the Italian Red Brigades, the Basque ETA, and the Irish Republican Army.
These linkages also facilitated the recruitment of non-Arab individuals, such as Ilich Ramirez Sanchez, better known as “Carlos the Jackal”, which perhaps indicates a higher level of salience for ideology than for ethnicity. Likewise, time spent lobbying other groups was time not spent lobbying states or populations in accordance with my hypotheses.

**4.7a: The PFLP from 1967-1972**

On December 11th, 1967, the PFLP released their founding document, which declared: “The struggle of the Palestinian masses in the occupied territories is an integral part of…the Arab revolution against world imperialism and its collaborating forces”. As can be seen in this statement, the PFLP employed a heterodox mixture of Arab nationalist and third-worldist rhetoric in their diplomatic appeals in this period as they lobbied both Arab and non-Arab states.

“The Political, Organizational, and Military Report of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine”, a series of documents released in 1969, provide a useful introduction to the aims and ideology of the PFLP. The first section, the eponymous Political Report, names whom the PFLP considers to be their enemies. In addition to naming Israel, the Zionist movement, and “world imperialism” as their enemies, the PFLP targets “Arab Reaction represented in Feudalism and Capitalism” (Kadi 1969). The authors of the Report state that “merchants, bankers, feudal lords, big landowners, kings, princes, and sheikhs” are part of a “force which objectively sides with the enemy”. Though these actors are Arab, the Report continues to state that these “reactionary” forces are “the camp of the enemy which the Arabs are objectively facing in their war for
the liberation of Palestine”. The Report thus provides an introduction to the tension and interaction between ethnicity and ideology in the PFLP’s doctrine.

Great Powers both acted on and were diplomatically acted upon by the PFLP. In the wake of Black September, the Soviet Union sought to contain the crisis to the greatest extent possible. As Dannreuther (1998) evinces, the USSR “in no way wanted the Jordanian monarch to be replaced by a radical Palestinian leadership, including the pro-Chinese George Habash of the PFLP”. The late 1960s represented the PFLP’s “Chinese Phase” (Sayigh 1997). He notes that this group “emblazoned [its newsletter’s cover] with Mao Zedong’s portrait or other Chinese motifs, while PFLP literature contained numerous references to Mao, as well as to Lenin” (Sayigh 1997).

Supply-side forces also played a key role in determining whom the PFLP targeted for lobbying, particularly the Chinese-Soviet rivalry. Even so, Habash visited the Soviet Union in late 1972, albeit as part of a PLO delegation with Yasser Arafat (Reppert 1989). In 1970, George Habash visited the People’s Republic of China. However, he received a cooler reception than Arafat and other Fatah leaders. Chinese leaders harbored reservations about the more radical Palestinian factions and the potential strategic risks of providing unconditional support to them, criticizing Habash’s faction for “wrong tactics” (Kirisci 1986). This reflect’s Raucchaus (2009)’s assertion that risk-averse principals will attempt to chastise and constrain agents who they feel will ultimately act against their long-term policy aims. Habash also visited North Korea in 1970, though little information exists on the nature of his visit or his activities there.
Muslim-majority states did not play a significant role in the PFLP’s foreign policy in this or any other period surveyed. While Fatah maintained a conservative religious philosophy, the PFLP was avowedly secular, leftist, and Pan-Arabist. As much as legitimization in the eyes of the world’s Muslim population mattered to Arafat’s faction, legitimization to other leftist groups and Communist states mattered to the PFLP.

The PFLP made explicit appeals to the broader Arab world, took advantage of a perceived zeitgeist: “The hopes and anticipation of the Arab masses have reached a qualitatively new level from before the fifth of June”. To Mishal (1986), this represented the fact that “the PFLP…subordinated the daily struggle over Palestine to the social and political of the whole Arab world”; that they took “The Arab Revolution Approach”. This is apparent in the ethnically-based appeals they made to the “People of the Arab nation”. The PFLP also emphasized the dialectic of class struggle and proletarian internationalism in their official documents and rhetoric. Their international leftist ideology played as much as-if not a more significant role-than their ethnic nationalism. This is evident when one examines the regimes that they considered to be “agents of imperialism” as well as “enemies of the Arab people” (Mishal 1986). The PFLP derided such “reactionary” regimes as Jordan and Saudi Arabia, as well as Egypt and Syria. South Yemen, Iraq, Algeria, and Libya, however, were deemed acceptable ideological allies, and thus worthy principals. Their ideology lead them to consider other Communist countries and rebel groups allies and potential patrons as natural allies and providers of support, particularly China (Sayigh 1997).

The PFLP suffered political constraints in this period due to intra-group ideological conflict. In 1968, Nayef Hawatmeh, one of the original founders of the PFLP,
broke away from the faction to form his own, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP). Hawatmeh favored a stronger alliance with the Soviet Union and a more staunch ideological commitment to Marxism-Leninism in opposition to the PFLP’s perceived Petty-Bourgeois tendencies (Miller 1983). In the same year, Ahmed Jibril, another PFLP leader, broke away to form the PFLP-GC (General Command), which favored an explicitly pro-Syrian position. Likewise, the PFLP boycotted the PLO’s central leadership in this period out of protest for not being granted a high enough proportion of seats in the Palestinian National Council (Sayigh 1997). These internal constraints lead the PFLP to undertake more unilateral diplomatic activities all while limiting its overall ability to be an effective political-military group.

4.7: The PFLP from 1972-1977

Historical events in the period from 1972-1977 confounded the PFLP’s diplomacy. In 1974, the PFLP withdrew from the PLO’s executive committee in response to the Ten Point program forwarded by Fatah and the PLO’s “mainstream”. Likewise, at the end of this time period, the PFLP became embroiled in the Lebanese Civil War. While at the start of the war Fatah attempted to remain neutral and mediate between the different Lebanese sects, the PFLP saw this conflict as “a rightist, imperialist conspiracy to destroy “the Palestinian and Lebanese revolutions” (Miller 1983). Habash saw Arafat’s more moderate position as inviting defeat at the hands of Lebanese Maronite Christians and their Syrian allies. Ultimately, Syria did intervene in Lebanon in 1976 and struck hard against the PFLP as well as other PLO factions51. Likewise, Habash’s room to politically maneuver was severely reduced by the intra-PLO fallout

51 Save for al-Saiqa, a pro-Syrian Ba’athist faction
that resulted from Egypt’s 1977 peace accords with Israel. Arafat attempted to avoid a complete break with the Egyptian government, which resulted in the PFLP, DFLP and other factions distancing themselves from him politically. As with my case study of Fatah, clear evidence of SEA was difficult to come by in this period. Even so, I deduced SEA’s presence and found clear evidence of non-ethnic framing as well.

Without support from other PLO organizations, the PFLP thus faced a severe internal constraint on its diplomatic activity. Likewise, the Lebanon imbroglio imposed severe costs on it the organization both in terms of wealth and manpower. Perhaps due to these costs, rebel diplomacy was not a significant part of the PFLP’s strategy in this period. Even so, it entertained close relations with the Soviet Union, Iraq, and Libya throughout the 1970s. The USSR provided financial support, weapons\textsuperscript{52} training to PFLP operatives and underwrote some of their largest operations, such as the 1975 raid on the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in Vienna (Andrew and Mitrokhin 2005). The leader of their armed wing, Wadie Haddad, was the key to this relationship. However, rebel diplomatic efforts were not directly responsible for this: the KGB recruited Haddad in 1970 as an asset (Andrew and Mitrokhin 2005). Instead, as Saideman (2002) and Salehyan (2011) theorized, this is an example of a patron seeking out a rebel group rather than vice versa. Among Arab states, Sayigh (1997) avers that despite Iraqi-Libyan financial support, “the combination of [the PFLP’s] internal instability and Iraqi-Libyan backing encouraged further rhetorical militancy”, implying that patronage from external states—a supply side factor—affected the rhetoric of the group rather than vice versa.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{52} Small arms, rocket propelled grenades, mines and other explosives, and ammunition
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This process is a product of two endogenous factors: its fractured internal politics and its penetration by external state actors. As Pearlman (2011) notes:

“Though any non-state actor is vulnerable to interference, the more cohesive it is, the more impenetrable its internal decision-making processes and political-strategic position will be. The more fragmented, the more outside actors will be able to manipulate persons or factions within the movement to act as their proxies”.

This phenomenon is evident through the KGB’s recruiting of Wadie Haddad and the USSR’s underwriting of PFLP operations. The PFLP’s internal politics in this period helped bring about this state of affairs. In summary, though ethnic and ideology-based lobbying occurred in this time period, it is unclear to what extent demand-side diplomatic forces drove this rhetoric.

4.7c: The PFLP from 1977-1982

The PFLP remained outside of the PLO until 1981. As Sayigh (1997) notes, this decision was a serious miscalculation that ultimately lead to the strengthening and legitimization of the PLO mainstream and the weakening of the PFLP and other rejectionist groups.

While their break from the PLO isolated them from this group’s diplomatic access to states, the PFLP cooperated with other armed groups during this time period. In 1977, operatives from this group cooperated with the German Red Army Faction in an airliner hijacking. Despite its official boycott, the PFLP joined the other factions of the PLO to
sign the Six-Point Program announcing the creation of a “Steadfastness and Rejection Front”.

Like other documents released by the PLO, it was the result of much internecine debate and compromise over rhetoric. Even despite the institutional constraints that it faced, the PFLP managed to benefit from this diplomatic act. First, the PFLP’s “Arab revolution” approach was officially endorsed in the document’s 10th article:

“The conference pledges to the Arab nation that it will continue the march of struggle, steadfastness, combat and adherence to the objectives of the Arab struggle. The conference also expresses its deep faith and absolute confidence that the Arab nation, which has staged revolutions, overcome difficulties and defeated plots during its long history of struggle-a struggle which abounds with heroism is today capable of replying with force to those who have harmed its dignity, squandered its rights, split its solidarity and departed from the principles of its struggle. It is confident of its own capabilities in liberation, progress and victory, thanks to God.

53 Emphasis mine
The document also secured the cooperation of radical Arab states who historically cooperated with the PFLP, such as South Yemen, Libya, and Algeria. Article six states:

“In asserting the importance of the relationship of struggle and nationalism\textsuperscript{54} between Syria and the Palestinians. The Syrian Arab Republic and the PLO announce the formation of a unified front to face the Zionist enemy and combat the imperialist plot with all its parties and to thwart all attempts at capitulation. The Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahirnyah and the PDRY (People'.s Democratic Republic of Yemen -South Yemen) have decided to join this front, making it the nucleus a pan-Arab front for steadfastness and combat which will be open to other Arab countries to join.”

This rhetoric may have overstated its true degree of success. The last sentence of the document praises “Palestinian unity within the framework of the PLO”. This belies the contentious nature of relationships between Palestinian armed groups in this period. Supply side factors and internal constraints proved more salient to Palestinian groups’

\textsuperscript{54} Emphasis mine
efforts to gain support in this period than demand-side factors. Even so, I found evidence of SEA, providing support for my first hypothesis.

4.7d: Assessment of Results

Fewer data were available on the PFLP’s diplomatic efforts between 1967-1982. This issue of missing data, along with supply-side and institutional factors that limited the PFLP’s diplomatic capacity, confounded my hypothesis testing. Even so, I observed the following.

Of the major powers listed, the PFLP lobbied the Soviet Union and China. Of these two states, China proved to be a more reliable source of support and a greater ideological influence. This relationship shows signs of endogeneity and a potential for reverse causality, however.

Of the Arab states listed, the PFLP lobbied Algeria, Libya, and Syria. These states are conceived of in scholarly literature as being more revisionist or radical than others in the Arab world such as Egypt (Fawcett 2004). The PFLP’s maximalist, “Arab revolution” ideology and appeals thus fit with these states weltanschauungen and credibly signaled shared preferences. I thus see support for my first hypothesis. The PFLP’s influence among populations was less clear.

Muslim states did not figure in to the foreign policy of the secular, leftist PFLP. However, they engaged in rebel diplomatic activity with Communist states, such as South

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55 As well as South Yemen, which was coded as Communist
Yemen, the USSR, and China, seeking legitimization along ideological rather than religious lines.

4.8: Results and Confounding Factors

To reiterate, these case studies were intended to test the following hypotheses:

H1: Rebel groups that share an ethnic identity with the largest group in a state's population will lobby the state using ethnically-based language

H2: Rebel groups that share an ethnic identity with the majority of the ruling coalition of a state’s government will lobby the state using ethnically-based language

Likewise, my variables are as follows:

IVs:

A) The closeness in ethnic composition of a state’s ruling coalition to a rebel group
B) The closeness in ethnic composition of a state’s population to a rebel group

DVs:

A) The presence of rebel diplomatic efforts
B) The usage of ethnic appeals within said efforts

4.9a: Hypotheses 1 & 3

My government-based hypotheses received mixed support. While Fatah and the PFLP were more likely to lobby Arab governments than the majority of great powers and Muslim states, their propensity to lobby Communist states confounds my assertion.

4.9b: Hypotheses 2 & 4
My population-based hypotheses likewise received mixed support. There was a high level of covariance between all of my hypotheses: states that had a government coalition of a given ethnicity tended to have a majority population of the same ethnic group. Likewise, there is no clear evidence of indirect lobbying in the cases of Fatah or the PFLP. Graphically, the results of this analysis can be depicted as follows:

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<tr>
<td>Fatah</td>
<td>SEA, Non-Ethnic Framing(^{56})</td>
<td>No clear results</td>
<td>SEA, Non-Ethnic Framing</td>
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<tr>
<td>PFLP</td>
<td>SEA, Non-Ethnic Framing</td>
<td>No SEA</td>
<td>SEA, Non-Ethnic Framing</td>
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When compared with Kirisci’s (1986) conceptualizations of support for the PLO as a multi-step function or as occurring across levels, PLO rebel diplomacy did not directly mirror either of these propositions. Palestinian groups lobbied actors from many of these levels simultaneously rather than working their way up an arbitrary “ladder” of relevancy. The theoretical processes that Kirisci describes appear to have been better at explaining the behavior of the actors that were lobbied by the PLO rather than the PLO actors who chose to lobby them in the first place.

Evidence of “indirect lobbying” via populations within states, though empirically supported, could not be clearly found. Though some literature (Hanafi and Long 2010) suggests that PLO militants and workers in the camps helped promote a sense of

\(^{56}\) Such framing as ideological, religious or other framing strategies, e.g. framing conflict in leftist terms when lobbying Communist states
Palestinian identity in exile, usage of SEA to influence state policy via refugee populations can only be inferred.

**4.9c: Confounding Factors**

One possible reason that we failed to see the expected level of ethnically-based appeals in these case studies is because of the time period selected. Factors such as the 1961 collapse of the United Arab Republic, the defeat of Arab armies in 1967, and the death of Gamal Abd El Nasser in 1970 weakened the influence of Arabism among Palestinians. If I were to change the period of analysis to include the 1950s and early 1960s, more SEA would likely have occurred. However, less rebel diplomacy may have occurred as well: Palestinian groups were almost wholly subordinated to external (primarily Egyptian) leadership in this period (Kirisci 1986).

International rivalries also confounded this relationship. Delegation to Palestinian armed groups as a form of “war by other means” against Israel was one of the driving factors behind Arab states’ behavior and may have even had greater salience than ethnic linkages at times. After the 1948 war, Arab states allowed Fedayeen to conduct reprisal raids from their territory and consistently provided arms and support throughout the mid-20th century. Signals of military success also were influential. For example, the successes of the raids on Kiryat Shmona and Ma’alot in the early 1970s by the PFLP-GC served as a costly signal of their resolve and won them additional support from the Libyan and Iraqi regimes.

The internal political dynamics of Arab states had a strong, if uneven confounding effect In the years after 1948, these states attempted to confound Palestinian refugees’
efforts to organize politically within their borders: in 1949, for example, Jordan banned Palestinian social organizations from political activity and, fearing secessionism, Egyptian authorities cracked down on Palestinian Ba’athists and Islamists in Gaza during the 1950s. The security fears of Arab regimes, as previously evinced, drove some Palestinian groups to alter their diplomatic efforts. Fatah, arguably the largest and most influential of the PLO’s factions, had to engage in framing that presented itself a legitimate supporter of Arab nationalist ideals, yet within a distinctly Palestinian framework; after 1969, it referred to “the liberation of Palestine” rather than “ending Israeli occupation” (Quandt, Jabber, and Lesch 1973). A statement from Fateh spokesman Hani Al-Hassan notes: “We in Fatah have learned that the Arab nation will not embark on the course of struggle and cannot change its conditions unless it practices revolutionary mutiny…Revolutionary struggle as we view it is the only way for the recreation of the Arab nation, the reformation of its soul, and the reactivation of the Arab masses”. Thus, it can be seen that groups like Fatah still appealed to broader Arab nationalism even while they sought more limited objectives. Likewise, the PLO is something of a unique case among rebel movements, as it was created in a 1964 meeting of the Arab League as a “Potemkin village” controlled by Arab states (Barnett, 1998). This was rooted in concern over costs from supporting Palestinian actions against Israel: the creation and backing of the PLO was an endeavor far less costly than direct military engagement. The high level of external penetration by Arab states from the very outset ay have a strong impact on the results we saw.

The internal dynamics of the Palestinian national movement also greatly influenced how and from whom its constituent groups sought support. Particularly after
the “Black September” conflict of 1970, they Yom Kippur War, and the PLO’s Ten Point Program (which was perceived by hardliners as limiting the liberation of Palestinian territory) divisions between the Marxist, qawmiyya-oriented factions and more mainstream nationalists like Fatah were exacerbated, which ultimately led to the creation of the Rejectionist Front in 1974. The constituent factions of the Front, the largest of which was the PFLP, pursued an independent diplomatic agenda targeted at revisionist Arab states like Libya and Syria. As Pearlman (2014) notes, analyzing the Palestinian national movement as a singular entity is a difficult, if not fruitless endeavor, due to the number of discrete factions within it with often divergent motives.

Differing ideological currents within the PLO made its internal politics continuously contentious. Pan-Arab qawmiyya and Palestinian wataniyya clashed, and the Marxist views of groups such as the PFLP and DFLP made Arafat’s decision-making hard to enforce despite his efforts to present the PLO as a unified force (Rubin 1994). Smaller factions within the PLO, such as the previously surveyed Ba’athist groups, also confounded Arafat’s vision.

Another confounding factor is outside influence in the PLO’s constituent factions. As previously detailed, George Habash was recruited by the KGB as an asset. Extant literature notes that this not an uncommon process. Huang (Forthcoming)) notes that states can use the offer of diplomatic engagement to influence the behavior of rebel groups. In his study of militant groups in Kashmir, Staniland (2014) notes that the pre-existing weaknesses of the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) provided opportunities for penetration and interference by both Pakistan and India. In the case of the PLO, different Arab states founded and backed proxy factions within the movement.
Seeking to create a Ba’athist alternative to Yasser Arafat’s Fatah, the Syrian government created as-Sa’iqa ("the thunderbolt") in 1966. Iraq followed a similar course of action three years later with the creation of the Arab Liberation Front. Though officially a part of the PLO, Sa’iqa was forced to fight against other constituent factions of the movement during the Lebanese Civil War. This group, clearly a tool of the Syrian government for enacting its interests, is a clear example of state exploitation of a rebel movement. Thus, if we are to judge the PLO as a whole, it does not meet any of the aforementioned categories.

The strategic employment of ideological, rather than ethnic framing also confounds this relationship. This can be seen in the DFLP (then PDFLP)’s rebel diplomatic efforts with the Soviet Union. This group framed itself in Marxist terms and “Strove to assert itself as the principal Soviet ally within the PLO” (Sayigh, 1997). This form of framing was strategically employed in the 1960s, and sought to play into Soviet "third-worldist" foreign policy. The assertion that rebel groups can draw upon multiple frames of reference is substantiated in multiple bodies of literature and is demonstrated multiple times in this thesis’ case studies.

The time period analyzed may have influenced my results. The defeat of Arab armies in 1967 significantly affected the salience of Pan-Arab ideology to the PLO’s constituent factions, which likely had a significant effect on their usage of language invoking Arab identities-or lack thereof. Even so, the autonomy of said groups grew during this time period, due in part to the fact that until 1967 Gamal Abd El Nasser (who was largely responsible for the PLO’s actions during its earliest years) had placed stringent restrictions on Palestinian political activity (Cobban 1984).
Chapter Five: Conclusion

This thesis aimed to contribute to the filling of a theoretical lacuna by asking: “what role do ethnic ties play in rebel groups’ efforts to lobby for state support?” In it, I reframed Salehyan et. al (2011) and Saideman (2002)’s logic to address the demand side of the state-armed group relationship, positing that ethnicity can be used as a “screening device” by rebel groups as well as states. I hypothesized that rebel groups that share an ethnic tie with the majority of a state’s ruling coalition and/or population are more likely to lobby them for support. I also maintain that said lobbying will strategically invoke shared ethnic ties and historical memories, framing appeals in “ethnic terms”. I found that such framing was used, though in conjunction with others, including the invocation of ideological frames. This work’s contribution and aim is to start a broader conversation on the role of the “demand side” in state support and framing processes in rebel diplomacy.

This work is only the first to be written on the subject of Strategic Ethnic Affectation. Thus, there is substantial room for future research on this topic. First, there is an opportunity to continue to elucidate the role of ethnicity in rebels’ transnational political activities. Both this work and Asal et. al (2014) provide a solid foundation for such endeavors, yet several important questions remain unanswered. Do ethnic linkages change the amount of support that groups receive or the nature (financial, material, military) that they receive? Likewise, do rebel groups employ different frames when seeking material goals and others when they seek normative goals? Most importantly, f-
urther studies can test the assertions of my theory and determine whether or not my results are replicable.

This work intends to start a scholarly conversation on a topic of deep salience to both the academic study of conflict and the efforts of policymakers to contain it. As civil wars in Syria, Iraq, Ukraine, and other states continue, research on rebel behavior will continue to be of vital importance to those who seek to discover the processes at work when rebels turn their eyes to the outside world.
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PLO Bulletin 1 November 1978
Vol. 4 No. 19
PLO Bulletin 1979


Herbst 1989


The Political Manifesto of the Arab Liberation Front


