DEDICATION

To my family, friends, and advisors, who have kept me on track this past year and helped me through my struggles.

Most importantly, I dedicate this to my mother. Your continual support, prayer, and encouragement throughout my life has helped me become the hardworking person I am today. It couldn’t have been easy raising us nine kids, but you did so without complaint and without regret, and for that we will always be grateful.

It brings me great joy to know how proud you are of my work and accomplishments, but I am even more proud to have been raised by you- my hero. You’ve always encouraged me never to give up, especially when life gets tough. I pray your loving spirit and strong heart will always be there when I need it. For all that I am or ever hope to be, I owe to you.

“For I know the plans I have for you,” declares the LORD, “plans to prosper you and not to harm you, plans to give you hope and a future.” (Jeremiah 29:11)
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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this research is to study Brazil’s current pacification efforts in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro. Brazil has long been linked to violent crime, corruption, and increasing social inequality. It features more homicides than any other country on earth: one in ten people killed around the world each year is a Brazilian (Carvalho, 2015). However, in 2008, Rio’s state government began applying a new law enforcement program to rid favelas of gangs and crime before hosting the 2014 FIFA World Cup and 2016 Summer Olympics. Information on the current/future tactics and strategies that Rio will incorporate into its security program are based on interviews conducted with various members of Brazilian law enforcement. By examining existing empirical studies, this study focuses on whether Rio’s security efforts will ultimately be successful in fulfilling the goal of making peace in the favelas and reducing drug trafficking and violence. The results of this study show that Rio’s pacification program will not likely be a solution for long-term stability in the region unless security personnel can incorporate real community policing with favela residents and establish social programs for favela youth.
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

Over the past 30 years, since the democratization of Brazil, issues of violent crime and the expansion of regional drug trading in the favelas (slums) of Brazil have become more and more prominent. In fact, just within the past few years concern has risen drastically due to the upcoming 2016 Olympic Games and the 2014 FIFA World Cup that was hosted in states throughout Brazil this past summer. Immediately after winning both bids to host the two mega-events, international spotlight was suddenly thrust upon Brazil and it was obvious that something had to be done about its notorious crime-ridden slums. The state of Rio de Janeiro in particular, which is where the 2016 Olympic games will take place, has always been seen by news media as one of the “leaders” when it comes to the nation’s rising poverty and crime rates.

According to a Brazil 2014 Crime and Security Report, violent crimes such as murder, rape, kidnapping, carjacking, armed assault, and burglary, occur regularly (OSAC, 2014). However, it is not just citizens that have a bad reputation; there are many cases of police misconduct and corruption as well. A long history of extrajudicial killings and excessive violence by police officers has tainted people’s view of law enforcement in major cities throughout Brazil. Mistrust of police officers is common among both the rich and poor of Brazil, hindering recent efforts for winning support on new security plans implemented by Rio’s State government.
Even though Brazil’s economy has been on the rise for many years, now with the seventh largest economy in the world; it still has third-world problems. For example, anyone who paid the slightest attention to Brazil or the World Cup in 2014 was probably aware of the mass protests throughout the country that have saturated news stations the past two years leading up to the World Cup (Kadiyala, 2015). These protests were mainly caused by citizens’ frustration and dissatisfaction with their government’s excessive spending on getting ready for the World Cup instead of using funds to better education, public health, and transportation. Yet, long before international exposure was brought forth this way, Brazil has always been known as a country rife with political and social controversies. In the midst of this, one might ask the obvious question of what, if anything, has been done to snuff out these problems?

Thankfully, a plan has been put into place that claims to target and combat these issues; yet there is much debate on whether the strategies implemented by the Brazilian government have actually done more harm than good. The main program currently in use, and the subject area of this thesis, is the implementation of *Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora* (UPPs) in Rio’s favelas (UPP, n.d.). The main aim of these pacifying police units is to reclaim favelas previously controlled by gangs or drug dealers. There are of course certain steps UPPs go through before a favela can officially be labeled “pacified”, but these steps will be further discussed in chapter two’s review of literature.

**Statement of Problem**

Figuring out ways for law enforcement and security personnel to manage crime in just a normal, everyday setting is already a tough job; but police forces in Brazil face
many more challenges than what one would usually face in the United States, with the exception of certain well-known crime spots. However, since Brazil’s history is very much dominated by militarism, covering public safety remains an extremely difficult problem for law enforcement agents. The vast amount of opposition shown from favela residents and nonresidents alike these past few years has finally dwindled down in numbers recently. But there is definitely still a big percentage of citizens and even some government officials who think the UPP program is either a waste of time or just simply a show caused by international spotlight (Daily Mail Reporter, 2013). This begs the question as to whether UPP’s tactics in recovering Rio’s favelas are truly working and whether they will work in the future, and during my time abroad in Brazil, those are the exact questions I covered in this thesis.

**Purpose of Study**

The purpose of this research is to study Brazil’s current pacification efforts in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro. By examining existing empirical studies, this study focuses on whether Rio’s security efforts will ultimately be successful in fulfilling the goal of making peace in the favelas and reducing drug trafficking and violence. In addition, while spending six months in Rio de Janeiro, I visited pacified favelas and interviewed several high-ranking security officials about their agencies’ current and future plans for pacification. The four most important questions are outlined below:

1. What are the tactics that UPP and BOPE (Special Police Operations Battalion) use to reduce drug trafficking & stabilize favelas?

2. How successful have they been?
3. What new/future tactics do they intend to use?

4. Based on existing empirical studies, what is the likelihood that these new tactics will be successful?

I addressed the research questions through qualitative data obtained through interviews in Rio de Janeiro, analysis performed on existing empirical studies, and my own experiences in Brazil. For the future safety of both international tourists and natives alike, it is important to analyze Rio’s security programs and research the best methods to prevent and deal with areas of high crime.

**Limitations and Gaps in Knowledge**

Because the subject of the favelas is so sensitive in touching on the profound class and racial divisions of Brazil, certain limitations emerged. In the first place, security individuals interviewed during this study may hold a bias toward Rio’s pacification program; this makes it difficult to ascertain how much truth was told in interviews versus false information given in order to make the program look good. On the other hand, those who criticized the program may be biased against police and law enforcement in general.

Since Brazil’s government is not as transparent or forthcoming as other countries, it was hard to obtain accurate statistics and data with regard to reductions or increases in crime. Also, there is an assumption made that all law enforcement personnel will answer interview questions truthfully and to the best of their knowledge. Any conclusions or recommendations given by the researcher in this
thesis should be taken with caution in the effect that information obtained from security personnel was not given honestly.
CHAPTER 2

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

If one were to go back and research the vast history of Brazil’s favelas and
security/political governance, they would find a fascinating history that is unique to this
area and its people. There is an exclusively rich historical and cultural aspect of these
favelas that most outside societies do not hear very often, and this clearly justifies a more
detailed analysis to better comprehend this chapter’s concentration on the history, crime,
and problems that modern favelas continue to face and the type of violence they typically
breed. In addition to favela history, this chapter addresses the most relevant information
other researchers and scholars have found on the subject of preventing crime; specifically
on what they think works, what has proved not to work, and what has the most potential
to work. I will also attempt to relay as much information as possible about what the
government of Brazil has done to fix these problems as well as determining the success
of past and current strategies.

Starting with Rio de Janeiro’s favela history, it is first necessary to understand
what a favela is. Most websites gave a very simple, short definition. I realized that
throughout Latin America in general, the word favela was used interchangeably with
“ghetto,” “shantytown,” or “slum” (all of which have historically negative connotations).
However, during my time in Brazil I discovered that the actual residents of these “slums”
did not use the word favela to the great extent that outsiders do. Instead, they prefer to
call their place of residency a “community” or *comunidade*. Interestingly enough, it is indeed very similar to what most people would consider a community throughout America as well as other regions of the world. Even though favelas have bad reputations of being poor, unsanitary, and violent places to live and visit, the characteristics of the average favela resemble that of a “normal” community. In fact, most favelas have their own unique communities with food and clothes shops, pharmacies, repair shops and even small businesses. The range normally depends on the size of the population and location of the favela since not every favela is the same.

However, since there is still a bad connotation associated with the word “favela”, for the purpose of this thesis I have chosen to use the word ‘community’ interchangeably with favela so readers are able to see the two descriptions as one meaning. Although favela is the most popular and common word when describing these residencies, its meaning has a tendency to unconsciously cause people to form a biased opinion of the topic. I have discussed this subject at length with several Brazilian security officials and each one chose to use ‘comunidade’ in place of favela, even correcting me when I introduced my initial interview questions using the term “favela.”

Further, the switch to the usage of comunidade may offer a clear sign that the residents, outside population, and most importantly the government, are attempting to establish a sense of belonging and inclusion for the inhabitants that, until recently, has never been taken seriously. From the start of the very first favela in the late 1890’s, these informal communities were always seen as something the Brazilian government was ashamed of. In a statement made by Redes' director Eliana Silva, government officials

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1 A civil society organization that promotes sustainable development in favela communities throughout Brazil.
“have traditionally considered the dwellings eyesores and literally left them off the map” (Reporter, 2013). Yet Brazil is not the only with this attitude. Many developing countries face similar problems due to the huge issue of urban poverty, especially unemployment, low incomes and a lack of access to basic urban services in their own slums. Governments do not want to acknowledge these problems, which has unfortunately resulted in the increase of slum dwellers. According to a 2003 global assessment of slums by the United Nations, almost 1 billion people, or 32 per cent of the world’s urban population, live in slums, and this number is projected to rise up to 2 billion by year 2030 if nothing is done to address the problem (UN-HABITAT, 2003).

**Brief History of Favela Settlements**

In general, the majority of slums represent the worst of urban poverty and inequality. In Brazil’s case, the birth of the first favelas developed into the perfect example to showcase how social inequality was, and still is, produced in Brazil. Data from the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE) showed that in 2010, six percent of the Brazilian population lived in slums. This means that out of 190 million people, 11.4 million lived in areas of irregular occupation with a lack of public services and urbanization (IBGE, 2012).

Speaking to its origin, most scholars agree that the first real “favela” community was constructed on what is known as the Morro da Providencia (Providencia Hill) by homeless veteran soldiers returning from the Canudos War - a military campaign in the north-eastern region of Brazil- around 1897. Despite promises by the government, the state had failed to compensate the soldiers for their time spent serving their country, so
their presence on the Morro da Providencia essentially served as a form of protest to the state’s failed obligations (Arias, 2006). Interestingly enough, the soldiers who fought in the Canudos War had found a plant in the interior region of Bahia called a “favela”- hence the naming of their first favela community (Arias, 2006).

At the turn of the 20th century, there were several issues that contributed to the configuration of Rio’s first form of popular housing commonly known as “squatter settlements.” One of the first contributions happened in 1888 with the abolition of slavery. This resulted in a large number of unemployed and homeless people who had nowhere to go and no place that would give them work. Slavery in Brazil, even more so than in the United States and other countries, had created an immense lower class and extreme inequalities (Brazil Abolishes Slavery, 1999). Freed slaves began flocking to Brazil’s then-capital of Rio de Janeiro, where it remained the national capital until 1960, in the hopes of beginning a new life and finding work. Yet, they were not the only ones in search for a better life. Due to a “crisis” in the rural areas, migration from the country to the city increased significantly due to reductions in agricultural work and a boost in industrialization (Magalhaes & Xavier, 2003). Finally, one of the last urban changes to affect the first squatter settlements was the removal of many low-income populations and the demolishment of their houses by the consent of former Mayor Pereira Passos (Zarzar, 2008).

Serious problems of homelessness continued to grow in the city of Rio de Janeiro during the early 1900’s. This problem, coupled with precarious transportation from roads being destroyed under the Mayor’s urban reform, resulted in the lower-class workforce remaining close to their workplace near the squatter settlements (Ferreira, 2009).
Interestingly, these settlements began to rise up right beside the richest neighborhoods in Rio. There were literally hundreds of favelas popping up next door to expensive penthouses and Rio’s most famous beaches (Perlman, 2009). If you were lucky enough to be invited to the balcony of one of these extravagant penthouses, especially in present-day, you would have the opportunity of viewing the favelas in almost every direction.

During the Vargas\(^2\) administration, these low-income communities shot up significantly from the 1930s onward. This is mostly attributed to migration generated by industrialization in major Southeast cities, Rio being one of them (Arias, 2006). In fact, migration reached its highest rate in the 20th century with “38 per cent of inhabitants originating from outside the city” (Magalhaes, 2003). In addition, from 1950 to 1980, the number of people living in favelas in Rio de Janeiro alone increased from about 170,000 to more than 600,000, and by the early 21st century it was estimated that there were as many as 1,000 favelas (Wallenfeldt, 2013).

Yet despite the drastic increase of favelas, or maybe because of them, there were many plans by politicians and government targeting the removal of these communities based on their claim that favelas were “illegal” settlements (Perlman, 2009). Because of this mentality the favelas were seen as places undeserving of services such as electricity and running water. In accordance with this idea, Brazil’s poor essentially viewed themselves as illegal immigrants in their own land; often outside the boundaries and protections of the law. By 1960, 80 percent of favela households had access to electricity; however, this is mainly attributed to the use of illegal, pirated connections and favors granted from corrupt politicians in exchange for votes (Fischer, 2008). Instead of

\(^2\) Getúlio Vargas was president of Brazil from 1930-45 and 1951-54.
providing better social housing, the government instilled “slum clearances” in which thousands of residents were evicted from their homes. These operations were especially popular during the military dictatorship of the 1960s - 1970s (McGuirk, 2014).

Historically, the biggest difficulty facing Brazil has always been the enormous disparity of wealth between rich and poor. In the past several decades, this huge poverty gap has resulted in favela communities effectively becoming breeding grounds for crime and violence. The vast difference in quality infrastructure, transportation, education, healthcare, and basic resources resulted in fewer employment opportunities; thereby adding to the dramatically increasing social inequalities of Cariocas³ (Perlman, 2009). The social divide this caused was extreme, and despite the high rate of economic growth experienced over the past few decades, significant problems of social inequality and income disparity are still very much seen today in modern-day Brazil.

Background of Gangs in Rio de Janeiro

By the mid-1980s, Rio de Janeiro was faced with new problems. Not only were favela residents afraid of losing their housing to government clearance projects, but now they faced even bigger issues. The result of Brazil’s unequal income distribution, combined with endemic poverty, led to increasing crime and violence within poor communities. Drug cartels, a common consequence of living in such a poverty-stricken area, permeated throughout the favelas and caused the government and citizens massive concern (Arias, 2006). Soon after, favela territory became a breeding ground for violence between rival drug traffickers and Brazilian police. Thousands of innocent lives were

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³ A native of Rio de Janeiro.
caught in the crossfire, and until recently, the government did not implement any security measures regarding the safety of favela residents (Daily Mail Reporter, 2013).

With this new tidal wave of crime flooding into Rio’s favelas and streets, there emerged certain notorious drug cartels known for changing the face of crime in Brazil. The first and most prominent gang was called the *Comando Vermelho* (Red Command) (Penglase, 2008). Although statements from law enforcement claim this gang is practically nonexistent today, they are still semi-active and are said to control a small portion of the city’s most violent areas (Penglase, 2008). Born in the Candido Mendes prison during the military dictatorship, this group learned sophisticated organizational techniques from political revolutionaries stationed in the same prison unit (Leeds, 1996). The terrible conditions within the prison caused an unusual amount of prisoners to band together in order to survive the harsh conditions.

This new alliance between leftist militants and common street criminals resulted in the Red Command becoming one of the more “professional” crime syndicates in South America. Nurtured by the poverty of Rio’s favelas, the Red Command was able to dramatically increase the amount of organized criminal activities within the area and soon became heavily involved with the drug trafficking industry. In fact, after several turf wars with rival gangs, the Red Command controlled the drug trade in 70 percent of Rio’s favelas during the 1980s (Penglase, 2008).

Common activities associated with this group include: weapons and drug trafficking (mainly cocaine and marijuana), car theft, robbery/street crime (especially from tourists), and kidnapping for ransom (Masciola, n.d.). In addition, members of the Red Command have been known to extort protection fees from favela businesses and
obtain additional income from their monopoly on services such as van transportation and
pirated-cable TV (Leeds, 1996).

Another prominent gang in Brazil is the Amigos dos Amigos (Friends of Friends). Created between 1996-1998, this group originated from former members of the Red Command, along with ex-soldiers and marines, police, ex-police and drug traffickers, and is now considered one of Red Command’s main rivals. Amigos dos Amigos also joined forces with an earlier faction of the Red Command, called Terceiro Comando (Third Command) (Masciola, n.d.). Together, these two criminal groups quickly became a dominant power within their home base of Rio’s largest favela, Rocinha (Amigos dos Amigos, 2014). Recently, however, the group’s power in that region has been contested due to the capture of former boss Antonio Francisco Bonfim Lopes in 2011 (Amigos dos Amigos, 2014).

Although similar to Red Command’s organizational structure, Amigos dos Amigos wanted to instill a different operating style within the favelas. Instead of terrorizing favela residents, the group created a strict principle of reciprocity in order to foster better relations with their neighbors, thus creating a possibility of future expansion for their trafficking operations (Leeds, 1996). However, with the increased pressure from Rio’s police and pacification program, rival gangs have begun tolerating each other in order to retain their hold in the favelas. Since the end of the 2014 FIFA World Cup, though, there has been a surge of drug dealers trying to move back to their old favela communities (Amigos dos Amigos, 2014).

Surprisingly, most favela residents do not oppose the gangs’ presence. This is mainly due to three things. First, criminal groups tend to use fear and scare tactics to
consolidate their control in the favelas. If need be, gang members will intimidate residents by randomly firing guns and publically showing off weapons to reinforce their image of power (Penglase, 2008). However, there is also a second reason, called the “patronage system.” Since favela residents technically live outside of the city’s grounds, the residents are often offered social services by gangs in exchange for their support. This is particularly true for the Red Command, and services offered include van transportation, cable, youth development programs, public dance parties (bailes funk), and provision of soccer fields (Neuwirth, 2002). In addition, some gangs even supply school equipment, medicine, gas tanks for cooking, hospital visits, and money for funeral arrangements. If anyone requests a larger favor, it is sent to Comando leaders in prison who have the authority to withhold or grant the request (Penglase, 2008).

Thirdly, favela dwellers do not typically oppose major gangs due to what residents call the “rule or law of the hillside.” This is essentially a “code” used in favelas in which gang members do not allow petty or violent crime within the favelas in exchange for residents’ silence regarding illegal activities (Penglase, 2008). For example, the Red Command is known for carrying out executions inside its territory against suspected and alleged thieves or rapists. Gangsters even hold their own “trials” before carrying out sentences. The Red Command acts as an absolute power within their communities and is the deciding authority when it comes to resident crime within their claimed territory. The “code” is also administered for the purpose of manipulating their control of the favelas and preventing police from entering tráfico (favela-based drug traffickers) territory (Neuwirth, 2002).
Unfortunately, a majority of high-level gangs in Rio de Janeiro have vast connections to city police, which has made their trafficking operations much easier and harder to combat. Police are not trusted within most favelas, and with their history of violence against civilians and lawlessness in general, it is no wonder the residents of Rio do not consider the state’s security forces as possible alternatives to the gangs occupying favela territory (Penglase, 2008). Although not as militarized as during Brazil’s dictatorship, corruption still runs rampant within the city’s security forces, and many times the police accept monthly “taxes” to ignore trafficking operations (Penglase, 2008). At times they also practice ‘mineira’, which means they detain someone for a crime like trafficking, then demand payment for their release. Brazilian police have also been heavily connected to weapons trafficking, earning income to make up for their low-paying security jobs.

Even though there is a definite link between traffickers and police, the relationship has often turned volatile. Many times there are shootouts between drug traffickers and police, resulting in several deaths and injuries to innocent bystanders. Recently there has been an increase in government aid to stop the onslaught of police corruption and build a more trusting relationship amongst favela dwellers, but in the past, many residents actually felt safer with the traffickers’ protection (Penglase, 2008). This poses a huge problem for Rio’s law enforcement in their new pacification program to clear favelas of traficantes (traffickers).
The Face of Rio’s Inner-city Violence and its Lasting Effect

For the purpose of this thesis it is important to show how the above information has affected present-day Brazil as well as how the government has responded to the vast issues stemming from favela life. Using data from several reputable sources, this chapter will attempt to establish the real threat that crime and violence continues to have on Rio’s communities and surrounding neighborhoods. Despite being among the most influential democracies in both regional and global affairs, Brazil continues to fight against very serious human rights challenges (Human Rights Watch, n.d.). Some of these issues include the huge threat of police brutality in response to the high levels of violent crime, but this, along with similar problems, will be further discussed at a later point throughout the chapter.

According to a 2014 study published by the Mexican Citizens’ Council for Public Safety and Criminal Justice (CCSP-JP), Brazil had 19 cities rank in the top 50 of “most violent cities in the world”- the most of any other country (Pachico, 2015). In fact, Brazil has seen a significant increase in the number of cities making the list in just the past four years. In 2011, there were 14 Brazilian cities that made the top 50; now there are 19. What is even worse is that Brazil currently has four cities ranked in the world’s top 10 most violent, whereas in 2011 it only had two (Pachico, 2015).

Unlike other regions in South America, it may be difficult to understand what makes a democratic and prosperous country like Brazil so dangerous, but upon further analysis of this complex regional phenomenon, it is clear that certain factors emerge as contributing to the establishment of the current criminal framework. Those factors can be attributed to a whole host of things, but one could say the most prevalent are as follows:
the rise in inequality, greater availability of firearms, increased drug use, and even the changes in government structure.

Another big issue Brazil faces is the effort to reinvent citizens’ view of law enforcement, especially within the states with high crime rates. Faced with high levels of violent crime, some Brazilian police units engage in abusive practices with impunity, instead of pursuing sound policing practices. Justice officials who seek to hold police officers accountable for unlawful practices face threats of violence, which makes the problem of corruption harder to combat. Brazil has long been known for political corruption throughout both its past dictatorship and current democracy, and not surprisingly, this is something that directly relates to the country’s crime problems.

To voice their opposition of government corruption, Brazilian citizens often use protests as a way to bring international attention to this pervasive social problem. As seen in the months leading to the 2014 World Cup, international spotlight was cast upon Brazil for the multitude of anti-corruption protests regarding the government’s overspending for hosting the soccer tournaments (Lewis & Kiernan, 2014). Instead of focusing on the needs of the country, specifically concerning issues such as education, health, infrastructure, and transportation, the government poured billions of dollars into World Cup spending. As shown in Figure 1, estimated costs actually came to a price tag of almost 11 billion dollars, which is more than half of the country’s entire education budget for 2014.

Due to this extravagant overspending, the majority of residents in Brazil were none too happy to find out how their tax dollars were being spent, especially as public transportation and airfare began to rise dramatically as a result. With the wealth
discrepancies in Brazil being one of the largest in the world, its economy “does not seem to be improving much, and most people are finding it hard to get a job” (Chadha, 2014, n.p.). While prices and cost of living continue to increase even more, Brazil’s government does not seem to be putting in the effort needed to rise above their current status. As illustrated by Figure 2, there is a high percentage of Brazilians dissatisfied with World Cup spending, especially since there are problems within the country that they feel are more important for the government to focus on.

**Figure 1: Costs of hosting the 2014 World Cup**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Outlandish Costs of Hosting the World Cup</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total investments made in Brazil to host the 2014 World Cup</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **Stadiums** $3,400m
- **Urban mobility projects** $3,400m
- **Airports** $2,600m
- **Public security** $797m
- **Ports** $249m
- **Telecommunication networks** $171m
- **Costs related to 2013 Confederations Cup** $88m
- **Tourism infrastructure** $76m

Source: Brazilian Government, IET (n.d.)
Figure 2: Percentage of Brazilians dissatisfied with World Cup spending and economic issues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Dissatisfied %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rising prices</td>
<td>85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime</td>
<td>83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health care</td>
<td>83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corrupt politicians</td>
<td>78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of job opportunities</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gap between rich and poor</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor school system</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public debt</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Pew Research Center (n.d.)

General Crime and Forms of Policing (What Works, What doesn’t, and What’s Promising)

Crime prevention is a tough challenge for governments to take on, but based on existing empirical studies there is enough evidence to suggest that certain programs work while some do not. This thesis focuses heavily on this topic in regards to Brazil’s current security situation, and though it is still a little too early to know the long-term
ramifications of its new policing program, it is still beneficial to look at what the
literature says about crime prevention before deciding on a verdict.

A portion of the research used for this particular subject was done by referring to
George Mason University’s Center for Evidence-based Policing and the National Institute
of Justice’s Research in Brief. This Research in Brief is funded by the U.S. Department
of Justice, and although it was published quite a while ago (1997), this report is still
heavily cited and referenced within the Intelligence Community and various law
enforcement agencies. The key issues this report discusses are as follows:

1.) What works to prevent crime, especially youth violence?

2.) Out of all the hundreds of different strategies used in communities,
families, schools, labor markets, places, police, and criminal justice, which
ones succeed, and to what extent?

3.) What does the scientific evidence suggest about the effectiveness of
federally funded crime prevention?

Since these questions pertain to what this thesis is trying to answer, it makes sense
to include the findings of this report in the hopes it will shed light on how well Brazil’s
security programs are doing in curtailing the high levels of crime in some of its major
cities.

The report is based on a review of more than 500 prevention program evaluations
that meet minimum scientifically recognized standards and methodologies, such as
repeated tests under similar and different social settings. In the present work, the
researcher chose to focus on the areas of what works for high-crime hot spots and
delinquent and at-risk preadolescents. This independent review of the effectiveness of
state and local crime prevention assistance programs reveals a special emphasis on factors that relate to juvenile crime and the effect of these programs on youth violence. These particular findings are especially important since youth violence and the problem of youth gangs is a critical concern in South America. This issue is perceived as one of the main drivers of violent crime in the region, but unfortunately there has not been much empirical analysis of gangs within Latin America as of yet.

What studies do show is that youth, mainly young men, comprise the bulk of both victims and perpetrators of violence in Central America. As seen in Figure 3 below, data from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) suggest that the 15-29 and 30-44 age groups account for the vast majority of homicides globally, with 43 per cent of all homicide victims aged 15-29.

**Figure 3: Global homicide rate, by sex and age group (2012 or latest year)**

![Global homicide rate chart](chart.png)

*Source: UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013)*
In fact, the Americas is the region that possesses the greatest concentration of victims aged 15-29 for both male and female. In addition, this UNODC study asserts that the homicide rate for male victims aged 15-29 in South America and Central America is more than four times the global average rate for that age group, shown by Figure 4 below (Global Study on Homicides, 2013). This is estimated to be the cause of higher levels of gang-related homicide in certain regions in the Americas, and this is why the aforementioned Research in Brief, coupled with various other empirical studies, will help this thesis determine the best ways to prevent this type of crime.

**Figure 4: Homicide rates, by region and by sex (2012 or latest year)**

![Homicide rates by region and sex](image)

**Source:** UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013)

The National Institute of Justice (NIJ) Report attempts to measure: (a)“reductions in delinquency, juvenile crime, youth gang activity, youth substance abuse, and other high-risk factors; (b) reductions in the risk factors in the community, schools, and family
environments that contribute to juvenile violence; and (c) increases in the protective factors that reduce the likelihood of delinquency and criminal behavior” (Sherman, Gottfredson, MacKenzie, Eck, Reuter, & Bushway, 1998). The programs this Congressional Report examined include any that claim to prevent crime or drug abuse, especially youth violence, as well as the effects of these programs on risk and protective factors for youth violence and drug abuse. The institutional settings that this thesis will focus on are within communities and also those completed by police. These programs will be further evaluated by the science of measuring program effects in order to provide a consistent and reasonably objective way to draw conclusions regarding cause and effect. Although no conclusion is permanent, the authors of this report used evidence for or against certain programs based on the impact they made on crime to distinguish which programs worked the best and which ones showed little impact.

Based on their findings, the NIJ report concluded that community-based crime prevention programs could not be proved as 100% effective at preventing crime, but they noted that several of these programs can be found under “promising.” This is interesting considering the majority of today’s police departments in the United States incorporate the community-based policing strategy. In a 2014 survey conducted by the Police Executive Research Forum, (PERF) law enforcement agencies were asked questions such as, “What crime fighting strategies does your agency use currently” (COPS, 2014, p.2)? The results shown in Table 1 below reveal that 94% chose Community Policing as their number one strategy.
Table 1: PERF Survey Answers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategy</th>
<th>Percentage using</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Community Policing</td>
<td>94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Directed Patrol / Focused Deterrence</td>
<td>94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target Problem Addresses / Locations</td>
<td>92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime Prevention Programs</td>
<td>91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Problem-Oriented Policing</td>
<td>89%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime Mapping</td>
<td>86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime Analysis</td>
<td>85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Task Forces</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Police Executive Research Forum (2014)

In correlation with this information, authors William Bratton and William Andrews (2010) published a magazine article in the Americas Quarterly explaining their thoughts on what caused the violent crime rate to decrease in the United States over the past twenty years. Their claim is that, after years of remote and disengaged policing tactics, community policing ideas “pushed police departments to reconnect with local communities, decentralize operations and work in partnership with citizens to prevent crime” (Bratton, 2010). It is easy to see that even though the NIJ report categorized community policing as just “promising,” many institutions use it as both an acceptable and preferred way of problem-solving within communities and neighborhoods.

One of the strategies the report found to work involved extra police patrols in high crime hot spots for the purpose of reducing crime in those places. This conclusion was based on Dr. Christopher Koper’s (1995) study entitled, “Just enough police presence: Reducing crime and disorderly behavior by optimizing patrol time in crime hot spots.” Koper (1995), an Associate Professor in the Department of Criminology, Law and
Society at George Mason University and a senior fellow in George Mason’s Center for Evidence-Based Crime Policy, used his study to examine whether longer instances of police presence would create lasting effects on crime and disorder. To support his study, Koper (1995) used observational data collected during the Minneapolis hot spots experiment in which observers would visit hot spots at random times to record factors such as police presence, crime, and disorder. Findings for this study found that police have the potential to maximize the reduction of crime and disorder by implementing “proactive” 10-15 minute stops at hot spot locations during random, sporadic times. This is said to maximize deterrence along with minimizing the amount of unnecessary time spent at hot spots (Koper, 1995).

In addition, the study claims that installing rehabilitation programs that use treatments appropriate to adult and juvenile offenders’ risk factors reduces their repeat offending rates (Andrews, 1990). However, arrests of juveniles for minor offenses can often cause them to become more delinquent in the future; this study suggests that the better choice would be for police to exercise discretion to either warn them or use other alternatives. Specifically related to Brazil’s case, increased arrests or raids on drug markets “fail to reduce violent crime or disorder for more than a few days, if at all.” On the other hand, the report states that if police show greater respect to arrested offenders, it may result in reducing repeat offending (Andrews, 1990).

On a case by case basis, certain aspects of community-based mentoring, such as Big Brothers/Big Sisters of America, have been known to reduce drug abuse (Crime Solutions, n.d.). Community-based afterschool recreation programs may also reduce juvenile crime in areas immediately surrounding the recreation center. In an analysis of
the Milwaukee Domestic Violence Experiment regarding arrested offenders, policing with greater respect to offenders reduced repeat offending (Paternoster, 1997) and increased respect for the law and police. In North Carolina, an experiment using intense supervision and aftercare of first-time minor juvenile offenders, such as runaways and truants, decreased future offending relative to offenders who did not receive enhanced surveillance and services. In a similar experiment, Pennsylvania created a program with the same type of intense supervision and aftercare of serious juvenile offenders; this resulted in a reduction of rearrests compared to putting offenders on probation (Sontheimer, 1993).

On the topic of gangs, practitioners and researchers generally agree that success in responding to gangs requires an appropriate balance of “effective prevention, intervention, enforcement, and reentry activities” (Office of Justice Programs, 2009). One of the main determinants of joining a gang in the first place, though, is the background and childhood of the gang member growing up. Sample studies of American children exposed to violence found that, within one year, “60 percent were exposed to violence, crime, or abuse in their homes, schools, and communities” and that “almost 40 percent of American children were direct victims of 2 or more violent acts, and 1 in 10 were victims of violence 5 or more times” (Finkelhor, Turner, Ormrod, & Hamby, 2009, n.p.). In fact, statistics from 2005 show that juvenile and young adults ages 12 to 19 were more than twice as likely to be victims of violent crimes than the population as a whole (Baum, 2005).
These statistics suggest that poly-victimization\(^4\) could be one of the reasons youth become attracted to joining gangs or getting involved with criminal activities. Factors that are known to increase children’s risk of being exposed to violence include: age, gender, race and ethnicity, family structure, family alcohol problems/drug use, intimate partner violence, peer delinquency, and prior victimization (Finklehor et al., 2009). The outcomes of early exposure to violence can result in psychological and/or physical problems, academic and/or behavioral difficulties, and delinquency and offending. Successful practices recommended by the Office of Justice Programs (Office of Justice Programs, 2009) include the following:

- Engaging and intervening with both the parent and child
- Combined home-based and center-based approaches
- Multi-modal approaches (combining individual, group, family, advocacy, case-management and/or combining treatment approaches)
- Parent training as prevention and intervention
- Psycho-educational roles for all providers across all aspects of the continuum
- System partners that interact with children and families from prevention to response

Lastly, certain social programs created for youth have shown to be very effective with regard to keeping children out of trouble and providing activities and academic tutoring. These programs strive to promote positive outcomes by providing opportunities, fostering positive relationships, and giving the support needed to build on their strengths as well as

\(^4\) Term that describes individuals who have experienced multiple victimizations of different kinds, such as sexual assault and bullying, or witnessing intimate partner violence and physical abuse.
prevent risky behaviors. While researching youth development programs, I came across several well-known programs that have proven promising. However, since there are hundreds of programs available for review, and most being quite similar, I have selected a couple that are most suited to the problem areas concerning youth within favelas and ones with high ratings of promise/effectiveness.

Most Americans are familiar with Big Brothers Big Sisters (BBBS), which is a community-based mentoring program that offers one-to-one mentoring in a community setting for at-risk youth between the ages of 6 and 18. These youth often come from single-parent households and low-income neighborhoods. In a lot of cases, the children are coping with the stress of parental incarceration. The program targets those who are at high risk of exposure to violence and trauma at home and in the community. This particular program is associated with a significant reduction in initiating drug and alcohol use and anti-social behavior among mentored youth. In addition, youth who were actively involved with BBBS had more emotional support and better relationships with family and peers. Academic performance, however, did not seem to improve from this program (Crime Solutions, 2014).

The second program I wanted to discuss is probably not as widely known as the first. It is called Functional Family Therapy (FFT) and it is a family-based prevention/intervention program veered toward at-risk youths aged 11 to 18. The children in this program are generally at risk for delinquency, violence, substance use, or other behavioral problems. FFT uses a clinical model that concentrates on decreasing risk factors and increasing protective factors that directly affect adolescents, with a particular emphasis on familial factors. One of the studies (Crime Solutions, 2014) that
implemented this program, “An Outcome-Based Evaluation of Functional Family Therapy for Youth with Behavioral Problems,” was completed in 2013 and found that the Life Domain (LD), Child Behavior Emotional Needs (CB), and Child Risk Behavior (CR) scales of the Strengths and Needs Assessment (SNA) showed “significantly greater improvements in the FFT group compared with the control group” (Crime Solutions, 2014). In addition, the findings suggest that FFT “had a positive effect on youths in the areas of reducing risk behavior, increasing strengths, and improving functioning across key life domains” (Crime Solutions, 2014).

An older study on the same program (Gordon, 1988) showed great effectiveness as well, but in a different area. Researchers conducted a large-scale trial in the 1980s that followed Alexander’s behavioral-systems family therapy model. This trial targeted lower socioeconomic status juvenile offenders, most of whom had multiple offenses, including misdemeanors and felonies. Details of the study involve male and female delinquents who had recently been placed out of the home or for whom placement was imminent. The teens were court referred to in-home, time-unlimited family therapy (about 16 sessions). To balance the study, a comparison group of the same number of lower risk delinquents received only probation. The outcome was measured by the number and severity of offenses during a 2½-year period following group assignment (Gordon, 1988). The study found that for any 12-month period, the recidivism rate averaged 1.29 offenses for the FFT group and 10.29 offenses for the comparison group (Gordon, 1988). Overall, the average annual recidivism rates for the groups during the entire follow-up period (27.8 months) were “5 percent for the treatment group and 25.0 percent for the
comparison group” (Crime Solutions, 2014). The delinquents receiving the family therapy had a recidivism rate of 11% versus 67% for the comparison group.

**Problems with Incarceration and Prison Rates**

One of the more interesting ideas from the NIJ study suggested implementing prison-based vocational education programs for adult inmates within federal prisons. This idea would be especially suited if adapted to a country like Brazil since it has the fourth largest prison population in the world, only behind Russia, the United States, and China. In fact, the country’s prison population grew by 74% between the years 2005 - 2012, totaling more than half a million detainees (Alves, 2015).

Not only is it one of the world’s largest systems, Brazil’s prison population is also one of the most crowded. The prison system in Brazil comprises 1,598 facilities, which are vastly overcrowded. To demonstrate, the official capacity of the prison system is 348,000 with regard to prisons and 7,000 in police facilities. In December of 2013, there were a total of 581,000 inmates, which brings occupancy level to 163% in that year alone (Bruha, 2015). The likelihood of solving this problem is low due to the high rate of criminal recidivism in the country. Upwards of 70% of all released inmates end up re-offending (Bruha, 2015), following close behind the United States’ rate of 76.6% (Durose, 2014).

Even more alarming is the recent debate throughout Brazil regarding whether teenagers who commit violent crimes can be rehabilitated, or should be tried as adults and incarcerated in the country’s packed and dangerous prisons. If Congress passes the proposal, it will lower the age of criminal responsibility from 18 to 16 (Justice, 2015).
Currently, Brazilian law states that teenage offenders are to be detained for a maximum of just three years at “educational centers” in order to be “re-socialized” (Phillips, 2015). Those who are under 12 years are not punished at all, and offenders 12 to 17 years of age face the same maximum sentence of three years in detention centers; no matter the crime.

Lowering the criminal responsibility to 16 makes sense, especially if the crime committed is one of extreme violence. For example, in 2007 there was a case in Rio where four armed men, including an 18 year old boy and his 16 year old friend, carjacked a woman in the north suburbs. The woman’s six year old son was in the back seat, but when she tried to pull him from the car he got tangled in the seatbelt. As the assailants sped off with the car, the little boy was dragged outside the car for about seven kilometers (4.3 miles), resulting in his death; presumably by decapitation since the head and body were found in separate locations (Globo, 2007).

Normally, in a case such as this, one would think all criminals involved would be severely punished; yet the 16 year old was assigned to a one to three year stint in a juvenile reform institution because, according to Brazil’s legal majority law, a person younger than 17 is not mature enough to answer for the consequences of his actions and should be judged differently. In most countries, the legal majority varies depending on the situation, but in Brazil the legal age is 18 years old for absolutely everything. Also, because of Brazil’s strict “hard-and-fast” rule regarding age, those who commit heinous crimes will still receive the maximum sentence for their age. This means that if a 16 year old serial killer was to kill 15 people, he would face the same sentence (up to three years in a detention center) as if he had killed one; there is no way to extend a longer sentence.
However, since the other boys in the 2007 trial were 18 and older, they received a maximum of 39-45 years in prison, all able to appeal their sentences (BBC News, 2008).

The savagery of this crime stunned Brazil, and as a result, lawmakers drafted the new bill that would lower the age of criminal responsibility from 18 years to 16. In opposition to the proposal, Brazil’s justice minister, Jose Eduardo Cardozo, stated in a hearing of the congressional Human Rights and Minorities Committee that, in his judgment, the prisons are “in no condition to receive youths who will be judged as adults” (Justice, 2015). This is because a good part of societal violence is ordered from within the prisons, so it essentially makes them crime schools that continue to breed more hardened criminals. Cardozo adds that “[since] we know this, [why would we] place children and teenagers inside the prisons to be captured by those criminal organizations” (Justice, 2015)? Cardozo believes that Brazil needs an alternative to reducing the age of criminal responsibility, and many agree that lawmakers should instead increase the confinement time for teenagers who commit serious crimes, as well as doubling the sentences for adults who induce minors to commit crimes (Justice, 2015).

But are the juvenile detention centers really that much better than prison? In a report published by Amnesty International (AI) called Brazil: A waste of lives: FEBEM juvenile detention centres in Sao Paulo: A human rights crisis, not a public security issue, AI reports that over the past several decades they have received numerous stories of torture, ill-treatment, and cruel, inhuman, and degrading conditions of detention centers affecting hundreds of adolescents (Amnesty International, 2000). In addition,

\[5\text{ Fundação do Bem-Estar do Menor; Portuguese for the “Foundation for the Well-Being of Minors”} \]
there have been a number of boys who died in violent circumstances because of negligence and no protection by staff.

Specific cases in Rio de Janeiro include boys being held in overcrowded detention centers with no activities and regular beatings by *monitores*\(^6\). Boys are known by number, not name, and they must line up in order of age when ordered. According to one of the boys interviewed by AI, if they do not obey orders they are taken to a room and beaten around the head and stomach, as happened to him for allowing a younger boy to stand in front of him in a line. In past years, human rights organizations have tried to visit these juvenile detention centers, but have been refused access (Amnesty International, 2000). When the teens are eventually released, recidivism rates are as high among child offenders as adults.

**Government’s Efforts to Lessen Crime**

In any nation, preventing crime is a very difficult task, especially if it is in a rapidly developing country such as Brazil. Even more than in the United States, slavery here created a vast lower class and extreme inequalities. According to the World Bank, “40.9 percent of Brazil’s 155 million inhabitants live below the poverty line and the richest 10 percent own more than half the nation’s wealth” (Brazil Abolishes Slavery, 1999). As Brazil is a fairly new democracy, it is not surprising that several bad habits from its dictatorship continue to flow into the current administration.

To illustrate how current racism and corruption exist throughout Brazil, human rights workers claim that local law enforcement and judges have conspired with slave

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\(^6\) Warders
owners, and none have ever successfully been prosecuted for violating the law banning enslavement (Brazil Abolishes Slavery, 1999). According to the African American Registry, a church worker who condemned a federal congressman for owning slaves in 1992 was convicted of slander and sentenced to a year in jail (Brazil Abolishes Slavery.) To many people this seems unfathomable, but what I found during my time abroad in this country is that most outsiders do not realize Brazil’s troubles are not merely drug or gang-related—their causes run much deeper, and involve the nature of man. The present effects of this are seen in the fact that the cost of corruption within Brazil’s government was estimated to be upwards of 53 billion dollars in 2013 (Kadiyala). Faced with this information and given its crime-ridden reputation, one of the main questions I had to ask during my research was how well are Brazil’s police doing in tackling the problem?

Beginning in 2008, Rio de Janeiro State authorities developed special police units called “Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora” (UPP), or “Pacifying Police Units”. The establishment of the pacifying police program was based on the idea of “community policing,” where 24-hour police units maintain a physical presence within the favelas. The goal of these units is to make the favela streets safer by removing drug traffickers, militias, and all signs of the drug and arm trade. In other words, it is essentially a program to ‘take back territories’ that have long been neglected by Rio’s public authorities. Before the implementation of the UPP, areas containing favelas were considered completely lawless. Crimes were rarely reported to police, and when police were actually present it usually meant there would soon be an armed conflict between police and criminal groups. Now that the pacifying police units are in place, there is new hope for a safer future for favela residents (Stahlberg, n.d.).
Unfortunately, the question of how well Brazil’s police are doing in tackling Rio’s crime is very difficult to answer considering the many different opinions on the subject, specifically regarding the UPP Program. There are critics of the program who believe it is just another unsuccessful attempt by Brazilian politicians to show the world they are doing everything they can to provide safety and security for citizens and foreigners alike. On the other hand there are those who fully support the new policing program, saying it has given more protection and mobility to favela residents along with increased tourism opportunities. However, the focus of this thesis is to explore the current and future strategies of Brazil’s security personnel in stabilizing favelas and whether they will work long-term, so it is prudent to discuss both sides of this highly debated topic.

For starters, those who oppose the UPP Program insist that the only reason the government began making an effort to clean up the city’s crime problem was for international attention after Brazil found out it had won the bid for the 2014 World Cup and 2016 Summer Olympics. Critics have also pointed out that the only favelas the government seems to be targeting are those in wealthy areas of the city (Daily Mail Reporter, 2013). This essentially does nothing for long-term gain or stability since traffickers and their associated violence are only temporarily displaced to the poorer areas of Rio.

Another good example of why many citizens do not support this security program is due to Brazil’s long history of police repression. Police brutality has become the norm for much of the working class, and it is hard for many citizens to see the police in a different light. Because of this, most favela residents, and a good percentage of those outside the favelas, have grown to fear and hate the police forces instead of respecting
them. Viewing the police as part of the problem has caused a definite issue when it comes to asking whether residents feel comfortable with the constant presence of security personnel in their neighborhoods. There will always be those who distrust the police and would rather them stay out of favela life, even if it means foregoing potential protection for their family.

However, not everyone in Brazil thinks so badly of Rio’s pacification initiative. Advocates of this program understand that violence only begets more violence, so they are more willing to overlook the prior history of Brazil’s police force in order to focus on the potential good that could come if UPP’s goals are met. Statements from several public figures and even some citizens have claimed that UPP policing is a successful solution to urban public security issues, and José Mariano Beltrame, Security Secretary of Rio de Janeiro, states that “this program is not just a security project; it is a State policy of life improvement and hope development to the people of Rio de Janeiro” (UPP, n.d.). Because of the many positive attributes associated with the pacifying police units, I will attempt to cover their current achievements in the following paragraphs. Afterwards, I will discuss whether the mentioned actions and activities of Rio’s UPP task force will likely stabilize the favelas as much as authorities propose it will.

One of the key issues surrounding the program will be the task of regaining the confidence of the inhabitants in the areas with UPP presence. The objective of Rio de Janeiro’s security forces was never intended to fully eliminate drug trafficking; this task would be nearly impossible. According to the official UPP website, the main goals of the program were the following: 1) To regain control of territories previously dominated by armed drug factions and establish democratic rule of law in those places, 2) To ensure
peace for these communities, 3) To help to break the logic of war existent in the state 
(UPP, n.d.). Even though each UPP is administratively bound to a Military Police 
Battalion, they are essentially still separate entities. Unlike previous police battalions, 
each UPP officer is supposed to be trained specifically in “community approximation and 
given a basic education in human rights” (Ashcroft, 2014). In addition, UPP officers are 
usually newer, younger recruits in the hopes of limiting links to the corrupt practices of 
former police generations.

The form of policing UPP has tried to incorporate in their program is one of 
community policing. As mentioned before, community policing has existed for many 
decades and chooses to focus more on the cause of crime rather than the prevention. It 
can also be considered as a problem-solving technique where police switch from 
exclusively taking care of incidents to developing long-term, preventive solutions for 
community problems (Lincoln Police Department, n.d.). Collaboration between the 
community and police is something the Rio state government is striving to do with the 
UPP program, but the majority of law enforcement still has a “zero tolerance” mindset 
when it comes to the favelas.

Because of this mindset, there is a question of whether Rio’s pacification 
initiative truly embraces the concept of “community policing.” For starters, components 
of community-oriented policing are primarily established by problem solving, 
administrative decentralization, and protection of the public while respecting human 
rights (Docobo, 2005). Brazil’s past relationship between law enforcement and poor 
communities has cast doubt in the minds of many that the government can really install 
community-oriented policing in poor regions of Rio. Yet even though there is much
doubt, there is also much hope for the program’s success. In a speech by the Secretary of Security, José Mariano Beltrame, one can see the hope of change:

It is necessary to respond to the population’s demand. We used to have the old speech: there is no school, there is no doctor because there is no security. Now there is security. Let the services come. Rio de Janeiro’s population needs to be more active, demand more from its governors, its politicians. To know from whom they can demand. The police will create the peaceful environment for other people to solve. The more we value citizenship, the less security will be needed. (Riccio, Ruediger, Ross, & Skogan, 2013).
CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

Since favelas are sometimes considered sensitive in describing the profound class and racial divisions of Brazil, access to certain information often depends on the social skills and political contacts of the individual researcher. Therefore, I chose to conduct qualitative data [on the current/future strategies that Rio’s state government will use to stabilize Rio’s favelas] by interviewing high ranking security personnel from various sectors of law enforcement. The interviews were semi-structured, consisting of ten base questions, and allowed room for the interviewees to add additional and pertinent information.

The following questions guided this study:

1. What are the current tactics that UPP and BOPE use to reduce drug trafficking and stabilize favelas?
2. Have these tactics been modified in any way?
3. Are there plans to implement new strategies in the future?
4. Has UPP presence helped Brazil’s efforts in “cleaning up” the favelas?
   - What statistics or evidence is there that shows this?
5. What are the ultimate goals of Rio’s government in this endeavor?
   - How long do they predict it will take?
6. Do you think the current or future tactics work/will work?
7. Are there other ways to reduce crime and violence in the favelas besides constant police presence and interference?

8. Are there any counterproductive strategies that have proven unreliable or inadequate?

9. Why do you think some people do not support the UPP program?

10. What agencies are involved in the UPP pacification program?

    Before selecting my interviewees, I conducted thorough research on the best potential subjects, giving extra credence to a person’s work experience, years on the job, rank/position, availability, and willingness to answer my chosen questions. In addition to these aspects, I also wanted to stay within agencies that were actively involved in the pacification program. Those agencies consisted of the public security department of the state, military police, and the civil police.

    In the beginning stages of selection, I planned to interview five people of differing perspectives. However, upon arriving in Brazil, a few of my top choices were not available to talk due to busy schedules during Brazil’s 2015 presidential election. Because of this, I was only able to interview three of the five original subjects. The positions of these subjects are as follows:7

1.) Federal officer with 25 years experience in the Departamento de Policia Federal (Federal Police Department; equivalent to the United States’ FBI).

2.) High ranking inspector with 25 years experience within the Civil Police and Department of Public Security.

7 See Table 2 in Chapter 4 for interviewees’ answers.
3.) High ranking member of BOPE (Special Police Operations Battalion); served for 19 years.

One of the difficulties during the interview process was having to conduct the interviews in Portuguese. The reasons for doing this were to receive a more accurate response to the questions asked and to make the interviewees more comfortable by using their native language since the majority could not speak English very well. I kept a notepad to write down anything that stuck out to me with regard to the questions asked or additional information the interviewee relayed. In addition to taking notes, the interviewees granted me permission to record the interactions in order to later transcribe them into written form for closer study.

After the interviews were complete, I translated them to English and asked several Brazilian scholars to look over my translations for any mistakes or Brazilian slang that I did not recognize.

Following my review of each recorded interview, I noticed that common themes emerged regarding the four most important questions:

1.) What are the tactics that UPP and BOPE use to reduce drug trafficking and stabilize favelas?
2.) How successful have they been?
3.) What new/future tactics do they intend to use?
4.) Based on existing empirical studies, what is the likelihood that these new tactics will be successful?

A more detailed analysis of the answers to the above questions will be further discussed in the results section of Chapter 4. Broadly speaking, however, the most
common themes that evolved from these interviews dealt with the interviewees’ beliefs that the Pacification Program is working to reduce crime. In addition, all three interviewees admitted there are other activities needed to reduce crime and violence, such as social programs and education. Also, all interviewees added that it is unrealistic for outsiders to think the UPP can pacify the whole State of Rio indefinitely. Lastly, when asked, the majority of interviewees refrained from commenting on whether the UPP program was placed there solely for the purpose of decreasing international concern when picked to host the 2014 World Cup and 2016 Olympics.
CHAPTER 4

RESULTS AND SUMMARY

Initially, the UPP program showed great promise for reducing crime. As seen in Figure 5 below, between 2008-2012, lethal violence fell by 65% in pacified communities (Glickhouse, 2015). Short-term results show a positive impact on safety. However, violence began rising again in 2013.

**Figure 5. Homicide rates per 100,000 (State of Rio de Janeiro)**

Source: Rio de Janeiro State Department of Security (2014)
The recent resurgence in violence is likely caused by various factors. One theory that an interviewee mentioned was that Brazil’s borders are a huge problem for security. This interviewee is a member of BOPE, and states that “a more effective border control over the entry of arms and drugs would help a lot” in efforts to reduce crime and violence in the favelas. Also, Rio’s top security official, Jose Mariano Beltrame, blamed their recent stray bullet problem on Brazil’s porous borders. A June 2014 United Nations (UN) report found that between 2009 to 2013, Brazil had the second highest number of stray bullet incidents in Latin America; Venezuela being the first. From 2007 to 2011, the number of people hit by stray bullets actually fell from 258 to 81, but in 2012, stray bullet injuries came up again, resulting in 111 cases in 2013 (Glickhouse, 2015).

Regarding the most important questions of this study (as discussed in Chapter 3), I found that Rio de Janeiro’s police forces do not have any new strategies in place for the future; at least not publicly. The Pacifying Police Units currently implement a process of “tactical intervention, police occupation, installation, evaluation, and monitoring.” These strategies will remain the same in the future, with the addition of better technology, human resources, and training. Table 2 on the following pages shows respondents’ answers to the 10 security questions mentioned in Chapter 3’s methodology.
Table 2: Q&A from Security Respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Questions:</th>
<th>Interviewee # 1</th>
<th>Interviewee # 2</th>
<th>Interviewee # 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Federal Officer</td>
<td>Civil Police Inspector</td>
<td>B.O.P.E. official</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. What are the current tactics that UPP and BOPE use to reduce drug trafficking and stabilize favelas?</td>
<td>I know from public knowledge that BOPE’s task force enters the favelas to find weapons and drugs before the pacifying police units arrive.</td>
<td>UPP intervention: set up police stations in favelas to start social programs and set up a permanent presence.</td>
<td>Tactical intervention, police occupation, installation, evaluation, and monitoring.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Have these tactics been modified in any way?</td>
<td>Not that I know of.</td>
<td>They are basically the same for every favela.</td>
<td>Depends on the size and history of each community.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Are there plans to implement new strategies in the future?</td>
<td>I do not have the answer to this question.</td>
<td>The UPP program is based on community involvement, which I assume will continue.</td>
<td>Yes; a development of the expansion of the current program.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4a. Has UPP presence helped Brazil’s efforts in “cleaning up” the favelas?</td>
<td>Statistically, I believe it has helped with homicides in most favelas with pacified police units. There are less calls of murder in the area.</td>
<td>I will say that UPP presence has helped, but there are difficulties in getting residents to trust the police.</td>
<td>“I did not understand the term “clean”. I believe the question is regarding the contribution of the removal of assault rifles, but they are not manufactured in Brazil.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4b. What statistics or evidence is there that shows this?</td>
<td>I can not provide up-to-date statistics or evidence of this.</td>
<td>I do not have any data with me to show, but there are government websites that have official statistics.</td>
<td>In the past 23 years, there was a tendency of reduction in cases of intentional homicide in the state (-47.98%). In the last 5 years the reduction was 22.02% in violent actions against life and this is directly related to the implementation of UPP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5a. What are the ultimate goals of Rio’s government in this endeavor?</td>
<td>From what I know, the government would like to take back favela territory that drug traffickers have claimed. They want residents to feel more included in normal society.</td>
<td>The main goals consist of promoting better relations with the community and installing a permanent police presence. Also, helping people in favelas to live a better life without the worry of gangs.</td>
<td>To measure the operational efficiency within institutions involved in producing better results in controlling crime in the state in strategic, tactical, and operational levels.</td>
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<tr>
<td>5b. How long do they predict it will take?</td>
<td>I can not speak to this question. I don’t have that information.</td>
<td>You can never tell with these kinds of things, but the Secretary of Public Security wants a permanent UPP presence in at least 35 favelas before the World Cup.</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Do you think the current or future tactics work/will work?</td>
<td>Brazil is a country that solves only 3 – 5% of its crimes, so I think the tactics of UPP will help with the drug problems and other crimes in the favelas.</td>
<td>I think the UPP program is doing the best it can under the circumstances.</td>
<td>It is understood that the more technology we can use and the better we qualify our human resources, the more qualified we will be in providing public security services. This will allow others to become more confident in police authority, creating ambience within communities.</td>
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</table>
7. Are there other ways to reduce crime and violence in the favelas besides constant police presence and interference?

Yes, but in Brazil it is different than the United States. Here it is very difficult to get things done because of all the bureaucracy. Our presidents “wash their hands” of security matters and leave it to each state, but they are not given enough money for good programs.

I think that yes, there are other ways. But putting UPPs in the communities are very important as well. This is one of our primary concerns.

I do not think the term “interference” is good to use.

Yes. Sanitation, garbage collection, documents and titles to property, access to justice, and quality of basic education are essential and complementary to police action. Also, more effective border control over the entry of arms and drugs.

8. Are there any counterproductive strategies that have proven unreliable or inadequate?

I don’t know for certain, because federal police are not involved in this area. But as with any country I am sure.

I would say only in the past did we have bad policing strategies.

Not that I know of.

9. Why do you think some people do not support the UPP program?

I would assume it is because the government left favela communities alone for a long time; they ignored the people there and allowed crime to flourish.

Because of the many years of police abuse and mistreatment of the people during Brazil’s dictatorship. Many people disappeared during this time, and many others were unjustly imprisoned.

Some do not believe that the pacification program is sustainable in logical terms if you take into account the number of favelas to be reached and the state’s ability to produce police to cope with demand.

10. What agencies are involved in the UPP pacification program?

We, [the federal police] are not involved. BOPE and military police are involved first followed by civil.

Civil police and military police. There are subordinates of each division.

The public security department of the state, especially the military police and subsidiarily the civil police.

The interviewees were clear that the government seems to be content with their current security tactics. The claimed success rate of the pacification program varies, with
the majority stating that, due to the implementation of UPP, there has been a reduction of intentional homicide cases in the state as well as cases involving armed robbery and police resistance. Overall, the individuals who were interviewed mostly agreed that the UPP program has resulted in decreased violence and safer communities. On the other hand, relevant literature on this topic, as well as information from one of the interviewees, suggests that particular categories of crime have actually risen, such as non-lethal violence and street crime. An increase in the number of missing persons over the last few years of UPP implementation was also found. According to figures from Rio state’s Institute of Public Safety, between the years 2007 to 2013, 35,000 people went missing in Rio (Rodriguez, 2013).

Finally, based on existing empirical studies, what is the likelihood that UPP’s new tactics will be successful? Since my study did not reveal any new tactics that UPP plan to use in the future, besides their current practices, it is too early to tell the success of anything they may add in the next several years. Presently, however, there is still a debate among law enforcement, media, and citizens about the real success of the program. According to the BOPE interviewee, there are many people who do not believe the pacification efforts are sustainable in logical terms when taking into account the number of favelas to be reached in the state of Rio and the state’s ability to “produce police” to cope with the demand.

**Future Strategies and Likely Success**

As mentioned earlier, some of the future strategies the interviewees proposed for the government consisted of social programs and basic education/sanitation within the
favelas. Presently, the current tactics that UPP uses to reduce drug trafficking are loosely based on the United States’ “community policing” model. According to the Rio de Janeiro Government’s home page, the UPP program is:

a concept that goes beyond the community police approach and has its strategy based on the partnership between local residents and law enforcement institutions. The pacifying police approach, which is guided by dialogue and respect to the culture and uniqueness of each community, eases conversations and stimulates the growth of local leaders. (UPP - Unidade de Policia Pacificadora, 2015).

So far, this is the only model of action that the participants mentioned, and one they believe is working. Yet even though community policing is normally praised throughout America, it is not viewed the same in Brazil; mainly due to Brazil’s past problems with corrupt government, police, and military.

Although Rio State’s current law enforcement practices are modeled after community policing, favela residents and media outlets still show high criticism of Rio’s security efforts. Besides the UPP program, there are no additional programs the government is considering putting in place within the favelas, and because of this, it does not seem likely that Rio’s pacification efforts will be enough to produce long-term stability or reduction in crime. However, if Rio’s government was to introduce better social programs like those mentioned in Chapter 2, as well as ideas stated by the security personnel I interviewed, this could dramatically reduce the number of youth being recruited for illegal activity. In addition, the likely success of these proposed social programs could potentially give favela residents a better view of Rio’s government, thereby enacting trust and reliability on a government that has not been present in many decades.
CHAPTER 5

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Throughout my research on crime and security in Brazil, it became obvious that the country still has considerable challenges in meeting the whole population's needs for education, health care, and income. However, Rio de Janeiro’s state government seems to be on the right track with the UPP program. Although Rio’s pacification methods are not exactly standard community policing, the program has had to deal with the police’s tarnished reputation after years of corruption and abuse, so it would not be fair to call the program a failure as of yet. This thesis attempted to present the risks, opportunities, mistakes and achievements of the Pacifying Police Units, and it intends to give a clearer picture of the likelihood that these police units can make a real change.

Overview of Chapters

In the previous chapters, we learned several important things that I will briefly recap in the next few paragraphs. First, we learned about Brazil’s status as an upcoming world leader in global economics, as well as the history of favelas and the start of Brazil’s famous crime-ridden regions. We also covered information regarding notorious gangs that were created in Brazil’s dangerous prisons, such as the Red Command and Amigos dos Amigos, and how they have affected life in the favelas. Though the government claims these gangs have been taken over during police occupation of favelas,
we were also given evidence that they only moved to outer cities and are now attempting to take back control over their old territories.

In addition, we learned how Brazil’s past dictatorship caused a rift between citizens, police, and government, and how human rights challenges from the latter two have shaped the way the new UPP program is viewed by residents and foreigners alike. Other challenges demonstrated in this thesis included Brazilians’ unhappiness with the government’s overspending in preparation for the World Cup and Olympic Games, and most importantly, the favelas’ representation of poverty and inequality within Brazil. We then shifted to relevant literature regarding crime and forms of policing that have proved effective or not effective. Since this topic is one of the key areas of this thesis, it provides an in-depth overview of many different programs and studies that pertain to the question of what, based on existing empirical studies, is the likelihood that the UPP program’s tactics will be successful?

The results from the literature review found that most instances where law enforcement implemented community policing worked to derail crime or at least have a positive impact on the region and population. Research also showed that certain social programs geared toward at-risk youth were rated effective in their goals of preventing youth violence and delinquency in most cases. Two programs mentioned were Big Brothers Big Sisters and Functional Family Therapy. In my opinion, these programs, or similar ones, could work in Rio’s favelas if incorporated the right way. Many youth in Brazil’s favelas are exposed to high levels of violence on a daily basis, and research shows that when kids become involved in social programs and parents become more
involved in their children’s activities, there is a less likelihood that youth will get
involved in criminal behavior.

The next couple of sections describe the prison problems in Brazil with regard to
high levels of incarceration, recidivism, and overcrowding. Brazil has the fourth largest
prison population in the world, only behind Russia, the United States, and China. This
issue pertains to both adults and youth, and we learn about the recent debate regarding
Brazilian lawmakers’ proposal to lower the age of criminal responsibility from 18 to 16.
Currently, Brazilian law states that teenage offenders are to be detained for a maximum
of just three years at “educational centers” in order to be “re-socialized,” but those in
favor of the proposal express an interest in seeing all criminals who commit heinous
crimes to pay for their actions and take responsibility as the young adults they are.
However, there are critics of this proposal who think sticking teenagers in the same
prisons as hardened criminals will do more harm than good. In a country such as Brazil,
with so much overcrowding and denunciations of ill treatment within detention centers
and prisons, it is difficult to find a balance to this problem. Even though it makes sense
to lower the age of responsibility from 18 to 16, it will mean more overcrowding and the
likelihood that when the teens are released from prison, they will have even more
criminal knowledge and behavior problems than before.

Rio’s state government’s efforts to lessen crime in Rio de Janeiro is of particular
importance because it established Rio’s Pacifying Police Units and introduced the steps
that these units take to maintain peace and stabilize the favelas. However, slavery in
Brazil created a vast lower class and extreme inequalities, and corruption and abuse of
power by authority figures have cast Brazil’s government in a very negative light.
Because of this, and given its crime-ridden reputation, this section strove to answer how well Brazil’s police are doing to tackle these problems. The UPP program is said to be based on community policing, where 24-hour police units maintain a physical presence within the favelas. Authorities say that the program has reduced crime and trafficking as well as provided protection within pacified favelas, but critics suggest that the government only started this project for the purpose of clearing out favelas surrounding touristy/wealthy areas for the World Cup and Summer Olympics. They add that certain types of crime have actually increased due to police presence, such as missing persons, stray bullet incidents, and street crime, and some say they felt safer when the drug traffickers were in charge.

Lastly, collaboration between the community and police is something the Rio state government is striving to do with the UPP program; but what has been seen from the majority of law enforcement is a “zero tolerance” mindset when it comes to crime in the favelas. Because of this mindset, there is a question of whether Rio’s pacification initiative truly embraces the concept of “community policing.” Brazil’s past relationship between law enforcement and poor communities has cast doubt in the minds of many that the government can install community-oriented policing in poor regions of Rio.

The original purpose of this research was to study Brazil’s current pacification efforts in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro. By examining existing empirical studies, this study focused on whether Rio’s security efforts would ultimately be successful in fulfilling the goal of making peace in the favelas and reducing drug trafficking and violence. In addition, while spending six months in Rio de Janeiro, I visited pacified favelas and interviewed several high-ranking security officials about their agencies’ current and
future plans for pacification. To review, I will outline the most important research questions found in this thesis:

1.) What are the tactics that UPP and BOPE use to reduce drug trafficking & stabilize favelas?
2.) How successful have they been?
3.) What new/future tactics do they intend to use?
4.) Based on existing empirical studies, what is the likelihood that these new tactics will be successful?

The interviewees’ responses to Question 1 suggest that they institute a form of community policing as part of their “tactics” to reduce drug trafficking and stabilize favelas. One interviewee answered that before UPP units are installed, the B.O.P.E. squad will provide tactical intervention, and then UPP brings police occupation, installation, evaluation, and monitoring. However, it is my opinion that their usage of “community policing” is a bit far-fetched. It is clear from an outsider’s perspective that the favelas are policed with a much heavier enforcement than would constitute community-oriented policing as defined in the United States. Though, with more time and training, the police officers serving in the UPP program can provide a truer form of community policing than what is currently used. Although this is the case, Rio’s state government and security personnel are on the right path to better protection and inclusion of favela residents.

The question of their success is somewhat difficult to answer. The UPP program had promise from the start, with statistics from certain media and government
publications suggesting high levels of improvement, yet data from other sources suggest that levels of certain crime have actually increased. One interviewee responded to this question by giving numbers that show improvement, such as a reduction in cases of intentional homicide in the state and a reduction in violent actions against life within the last five years. It is true that homicide rates have lowered in the state of Rio de Janeiro recently, but in other areas of Brazil violent crime has shot up, possibly due to drug traffickers moving to other areas outside of Rio and becoming involved in turf wars with other gangs. So when answering the question of UPP’s success, you have to take into account the consequence of pushing drug dealers into other areas and whether the government’s only concern is “cleaning up” the immediate surroundings of Rio’s wealthy neighborhoods. If this is the case, I would rate the success of the program as low, especially if there is no plan to make all of Rio safe from crime and instability.

Regarding the question on any new or future tactics they intend to use, from what I gathered, Rio de Janeiro’s police forces do not have any new strategies in place for the future, at least not publicly. The Pacifying Police Units’ current implementation of “tactical intervention, police occupation, installation, evaluation, and monitoring” will remain the same in the future, with the addition of better technology, human resources, and training. More training is a definite must if police are to get out of the military-like mindset that has taken hold since Brazil’s dictatorship. Although their new strategies are not completely counterproductive, negative views of the program have not decreased, which means there is something else needed to counteract the hostility and bitterness favela residents have toward law enforcement.
Lastly, based on existing empirical studies, it appears that UPP’s tactics have the potential to succeed if implemented correctly. If authorities are going to claim community policing as the UPP’s inspiration, then more work is needed to make that concept true. Matching violence with violence has already proven to be unsuccessful, so police have to acknowledge that a path of heavy enforcement and little community outreach does not bode well for future success. Such instances are not strictly confined to developing countries, though. If one examines cases of extreme unrest and outrage among community residents and law enforcement in the United States, such as the case in Ferguson, Missouri in 2014 where an officer shot and killed an unarmed black teen, you might start to ask how events began spiraling out of control in the first place? On further inspection, there appears to be a pre-existing pattern of mistrust between police officers and residents when there is a virtually all-white police force within a majority African-American city.

In many instances where these situations happen, it’s revealed that there was an almost non-existent connection between the city’s police and its residents; no established lines of communication. Instead of instilling community-oriented tactics, Ferguson police opted for heavy-handed police tactics both before and after the shooting, including a military-style response to the initial protests. Community policing could have reduced tensions and violent reactions, but as is often the case in places like Ferguson and Rio, officers and residents alike hold on to an “us versus them” mentality. When police officers are not seen as part of the community, it is likely that unrest and violence will soon follow. Questions one must ask are: How can you tackle violence in cities where the police are untrustworthy? Where do you start when violence is deeply entrenched, as
in Brazil and much of South America, where the world’s most dangerous cities are housed?

Poverty and inequality levels are high in Brazil, particularly where black, mixed race, and indigenous populations are disproportionately affected. These disparities contribute to Brazil’s high crime rate, particularly sparking violent crime in cities flanked by favelas. Levels of violence in this region are further shown by a new study on global peace released in June, 2015. Latin America emerged as a “less peaceful region” than it was the year before, and according to the Homicide Monitor data project- an online tool collating country-by-country statistics on homicides from a range of sources-, “one-in-five murder victims around the world is Brazilian, Colombian or Venezuelan, despite the three countries containing less than four per cent of the world's total population” (Marszal, 2015).

**Recommendations and Concluding Remarks**

While this thesis tries to establish a strong sense of Brazil’s security system and future success, it becomes clear that this country’s history and current policies are complex topics to understand. In a region of the world where homicide rates are higher than fatality rates in some of the world’s worst war zones, it can be hard to process the many security challenges that arise. Yet Rio’s efforts in pacifying its state’s favelas show promise that policy makers are serious in their quest for peace and stability.

However, though their hearts seem to be in the right place, their current tactics for pacifying the favelas may be viewed as overly harsh. It’s understandable that with their past history of violence the police would want to establish a permanent presence within
the area, but for this to work long-term it is necessary to instill better community-oriented policing rather than a “zero tolerance” mindset. While community policing may work in the United States and elsewhere, there is a possibility that it may not work in Brazil; perhaps some adaptation taking into account Brazil’s culture would work best. Already the UPP Program seems to have lowered homicides in the areas of pacification, but petty crime has risen and residents continue to die from stray bullets.

In addition to security efforts, other factors are needed to establish peace in the favelas. Among the most important are economic improvement, financial improvement, individual rights, and education. Social outreach programs are needed within the favelas to balance law enforcement efforts, particularly ones targeting at-risk youth in unstable environments. Also, implementing police strategies such as community policing, intelligence-led policing, and inclusion could result in better police-citizen relationship. Transparency and community involvement are obviously key instruments in building trust with residents, but it is also necessary to train security personnel to use their power properly, enforce accountability, and continually refine their policies. Finally, besides the UPP Program, Rio’s government leaders should further incorporate favela residents into society and advocate for better human rights as well as better laws regarding the responsibility of public security.
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